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·,.,  ~ PREFACE  OF  THE  OOMMISSION 
It is today generally accepted that action taken solely on 
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useful to have  independent  experts study,  in the different member 
countries,  the possible part played by certain primary non-employ-
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I  N T  R 0  D U C T  I  0  N 
Inflation and its control have  taken the attention of  U.K.  policy 
makers throughout the post-World  War  II period.  Interest in  th~ potency 
of alternative anti-inflation policies  stemmed mainly from  concern over  the 
course of  the balance of payments.  Balance of payments equilibrium  and 
full  employment were  the main macro-economic objectives of government 
policies since 1945.  The  commitment  to full employment  was  made  by all 
political parties.  Also there was  general  agreement that U.K.,  being  a 
major  economy  with sterling as  a  reserve currency,  should  ensure that its 
balance of payments did not develop in such a  way  as to undermine the inter-
national monetary  arrangements as  embodied  in the I.M.F.  system.  This system 
placed the emphasis  on the maintenance of fixed  exchange rates at least for 
the major  industrial countries. 
Fiscal policy was  the main means  through which the objective of full 
employment was  pursued.  Taxation  and  government  expenditure changes  were 
initiated along  lines thought to be consistent with  a  balance of payments 
position conducive to maintaining  the strength of  sterling.  In other words, 
deflationary measures were taken when  a  balance of payments deficit developed 
or persisted for  some  time.  The  ensuing  unemployment  was  never  allowed~ 
rise above  3%  for  the whole period of the 1950's and  1960's.  Indeed,  for 
most of the years during  this period unemployment  was  below  2%.  Deflationary 
fiscal measures were  seen as operating  on  the balance of payments via their 
impact on the rate of inflation.  This stance  re~lected the economic  thinking 
prevailing till the mid-1960's,  which is best expressed by  the Phillips curve 
relationship between unemployment  and  the rate of  change in money  wage  rates. 
Evidence presented  towards the end  of the 1950's reinforced the view 
that there is an inverse relationship between unemployment  and  wage  inflation. 
The  same  evidence was  all the mare  impressive as it suggested that this relationship was  stable over  nearly a  century during  which many  institutional 
changes  had  taken place.  Thus policy makers  were presented with what  appeared 
an  easy  and  simple  choice:  a  small rise in unemployment  for  a  smaller 
inflation rate if balance of payments developments required it, or  alternatively 
the endurance of  a  higher rate of price rises in the pursuit of  a  smaller 
level of unemployment. 
Policy formulation based on the simple relationship between  excess demand 
and  inflation inevitably had its critics.  On  the one  hand it was  argued that 
U.K.  policy makers  were mistaken in relying  solely on fiscal policy in the 
belief that the control of  the money  supply is unimportant if not irrelevant 
for promoting price stability.  Others  argued  that incomes policies could 
ensure price stability without having  to sacrifice the objective of full 
employment.  These conflicting attitudes towards the potency of the various 
anti-inflation policies reflected alternative diagnoses of the causes ofDLsing 
prices.  Some  advanced  the view that inflation is a  monetary problem requiring 
monetary remedies,  while others argued that inflation was  caused  by trade 
union militancy.  According  to the latter, trade unions  can  and  do make  use 
of their power  to push wages up  independently of the state of demand  in the 
labour market.  As  a  result of union militancy costs increase so that firms 
are forced  to raise their prices in order to maintain their profit margins. 
Thus  incomes policies were recommended  as  the best way  of  affecting price 
inflation through the  imposition of  ceilings above which money  wages  could not 
rise. 
Events  since the mid-1960's appeared  to confirm  the diagnosis that trade 
union militancy was  the main  cause of  inflation which began to accelerate. 
Increases in the level of unemployment did not  appear  to have the desired 
impact  on  wage  inflation.  The  inverse relationship between unemployment  and 
the rate of  change  of money  wages  came  to be  seen  as  something  of the past. 
At  the  same  time  as inflation accelerated,  industrial unrest began to assume 
larger  and  larger dimensions.  Rising unemployment,  increasing industrial 
2 strife,  and  accelerating price inflation formed  the basis for  the  argument 
that if price rises are to be  curbed  trade union militancy needed  to be 
restrained.  Wage  and price controls were  advocated.  Thus  the years 
since 1966  have been  characterised by repeated  attempts to institute 
arrangements regulating increases in money  incomes.  The  controls have 
sometimes  been statutory and  sometimes voluntary and  there has  been more than 
one wage  freeze. 
Whether  or not trade union militancy is the cause of inflation, whether 
or  not inflation is a  monetary phenomenon,  and  whether  or  not there is a 
stable relationship between unemployment  and  wage  inflation are all questions 
which  can in principle be resolved by  appealing to empirical evidence.  It is, 
therefore, useful if we  set out certain features present in the determination 
of  economic policy in the  U.K. 
The  U.K.  played  an  active role in the setting up of  the Bretton Woods 
system  and its subsequent evolution.  Whatever  the intentions of  the 
creators of  the I.M.F.  system may  have been,  after the 1948-49 realignments 
of  exchange rates,  this system  came  to imply  a  commitment,  at least on the 
part of  the major  industrialised  countries,  to maintain the exchange rates 
fixed.  Fixity of  exchange rates leads to an  interdependence of price levels 
among  economies.  Individual economies  become  linked with each other  in very 
much  the  same  way  as reqions within an  individual  country are interdependent 
through the use of  a  common  currency.  In  1958 full convertibility wasfurmally 
established  and  in the subsequent years numerous  international agreements 
resulted in the removal  of most obstacles  in the movement  of goods  between 
countries.  Similarly, during  the 1960's the mobility of  capital and  labour 
greatly increased.  The  implication of  these developments  was  that therourse 
of  each individual economy  with the exception of the United States was  largely 
determined by  events in the rest of  the world.  More  specifically, fixity 
of  exchange rates  led to price level trends being mainly determined  at an 
international level.  Each individual country,  except of  course the u.s., 
3 was  too small to have  a  significant  ~pact. 
Given the monetary arrangements governing  international relations 
during the 1960's we  may  think of  individual countries as exporters/importers 
of inflation, the  long-run  average  inflation rate being determined at a 
world  level.  Thus  any country,  including the U.K.,  pursuing certain 
policies aiming  at a  rate of inflation different from  that in the rest of 
the world while maintaining its exchange rate fixed  would  find its policies 
frustrated.  International organisations such as  the O.E.C.D.  as well as 
academic  economists have drawn  attention to the convergence of  inflation 
rates during  the 1960's  and  drew the conclusion that economic policies need 
to be  internationally co-ordinated.  For  an  economy  to be insulated from 
external inflationary impulses its exchange rate must be  allowed to be freely 
determined by the demand  for  and  the  supply of its currency.  Indeed,  following 
the recent break down  of the  I.M.F.  system  and  the  adoption of greater 
flexibility of  exchange rates by  the major  countries,  their inflation rates 
have begun to diverge,  in sharp contrast to the trends of the 1960's. 
In  considering,  therefore,  the U.K.  experience  and  in discussing the 
potential effectiveness of alternative  anti~inflation policies it is necessary 
to analyse the impact on  U.K.  of its relations with the rest of  the world 
and  its exchange rate policies. 
During  the  post~war period U.K.  policy makers relied on fiscal policy 
for the achievement of the objective of full employment.  This reliance on 
fiscal policy reflected the prevailing intellectual environment which minimised 
the importance of the money  supply  and  the effectiveness of  the market mechanism, 
especially in the  labour market.  Instead of attempting to control  the~ate 
of growth of the money  supply,  U.K.  policy makers  chose to maintain stable 
interest rates.  Thus  open market  operations were undertaken with this 
objective.  The  implication of this was  that control of the rate of expansion 
of the money  supply was  abandoned.  For  the  same  reason,  i.e.  to maintain 
stable interest rates, budget deficits were primarily financed by borrowing 
4 from  the central bank.  The  alternative course of  borrowing  from  the public 
was  considered as undesirable to the extent that it would  have  led to the 
rate of interest rising.  A rate of  interest policy was  chosen not only 
because of the belief that "money  does not matter"  but also because it was 
considered as desirable in andof  itself.  For  example,  a  policy of maintaining 
a  particular, usually "low",  level of interest rates has  a  direct impact to 
a  large, politically important group of people, i.e. the people who  are 
buying  their house by using mortgages.  Mortgage  payments  can be kept  low 
ie is believed by maintaininglow interest rates,  a  belief that completely 
ignores the impact of  such policies on  the demand  for  housing  and  the 
resulting price increases,  which in turn affect monthly payments. 
U.K.  monetary authorities have  attracted wide  criticism for  their policies. 
It has been pointed out on many  occasions  by  numerous  economists  and  institutions 
that people choose to maintain a  stable part of their wealth in cash balances. 
If they find that their  cash balances are increasing,  they  attempt to 
eliminate their excess cash balances.  In doing  so they increase their 
expenditure which  soon manifests itself in higher prices.  Higher prices 
!mply lower real balances,  and  this process will continue until real cash 
balances are re(iuced to their desired  level.  But if the  economy  is operating 
a  system of fixea  exchange rates then economic  agents  can adjust their  cash 
balances  through the balance of payments.  Monetary policy in this case will 
have  a  direct impact on the balance of payments  and  only short-run effects 
on domestic inflation.  In other words,  excessive monetary expansion will 
lead to a  balance of payments deficit and  temporarily to a  rate of  inflation 
higher  than that prevailing in the rest of  the world,  and  vice versa if 
the growth of the money  supply is less than that of the world  aggregate. 
If the exchange rate is allowed to fluctuate freely then monetary policy 
bas more  impact on  the domestic rate of inflation;  the exchange rate changes 
to equilibrate the balance of payments  and  insulate the country from  the 
Jrice behaviour in the rest of the world.  In short "monetarists"  have 
5 argued that given fixed  exchange rates inflation is an  international pheno-
menon  determined  by  the rate of growth of the world  money  supply.  Economies 
operating  such exchange rates can only deviate  from  the internationally 
determined rate of inflation in the short-run and  if they  are  small,  can 
have  no  significant impact on  the world  average rate of inflation.  Thus 
while  the world  was  in a  state of mild excess  supply  in the 1950's  and 
early 1960's the  average  world rate of inflation was  low.  At  the  same 
time the U.K.'s permissive monetary policy resulted  in a  British rate of 
inflation slightly higher  than that of the rest of the world,  but still low 
in comparison to the rate prevailing since the mid-1960's,  and  in  a  steadily 
deteriorating balance of  payments.  In the mid-1960's  the rate of growth 
of world money  supply  increased  leading to  an  acceleration of  th~ world 
inflation rate.  U.K.  attempts  to reduce  the domestic rate of  inflation 
through either deflation or wage  freezes failed in the face of pressures 
coming  from  the rest of  the world.  U.K.  policies were  too insignificant 
to affect the world  inflation rate.  Furthermore,  events following  the 
1967  devaluation of  sterling provide striking evidence of the inter-depend-
ence  of  economies  on  fixed  exchange rates and  their inability to pursue  an 
independent monetary policy.  The  devaluation of  1967  did not lead to the 
expected  improvement  in the U.K.'s balance of payments  as it was  accompanied 
by permissive monetary policies.  Prices rose steeply to the level prevailing 
in the rest of the world,  a  manifestation that prices are determined at a 
world rather than national  level.  When,  however,  monetary policy was  reversed 
under  I.M.F.  pressure the balance of payments moved  into a  position of 
surplus during the years  1969-1970.  But tight monetary policy in a  world 
of accelerating inflation was  not effective in reducing the U.K.  domestic 
rate of  inflation to levels comparable to those prevailing in the late 1950's 
and  early 1960's. 
Monetarists,though they stress the role of  excess demand  as  a  cause 
of inflation, are highly critical of policy  fo~mulation based  on the simple 
Phillips curve relationship between unemployment  and  the rate of  change 
6 of money  wage  rates.  The  essence of the Phillips curve relationship is 
that the demand  and  supply of  labour determine the equilibrium wage rate, 
the higher  the excess demand,  i.e.  the  lower  the level of  unemployment,  the 
higher will be the rate of  change  in wages.  But monetarists point out that 
the implication of this analysis is that although negotiations  are over 
money  wages  what  the  two  sides in the wage  bargain try to influence is real 
wages.  Thus  in order to make  consistent the Phillips curve relationship 
with  the analysis whereby demand  and  supply determine the equilibrium real 
wage  level monetarists  argue that the rate of  change  of money  wage rates 
will be  equal  to the expected rate of price inflation plus  an  adjustment 
reflecting the state of excess demand  in the  labour market.  Thus it is 
to be  expected that mild deflationary measures will not immediately cut down 
the inflation rate.  It will continue on its course as  a  result of 
expectations regarding price rises.  Monetarists,  therefore,  explain the 
phenomenon  of rising unemployment  and  accelerating inflation as  a  manifest-
ation of  the  impact of the  expected rate on the actual rate of inflation. 
Empirical research undertaken both in the  U.K.  and  elsewhere  suggests 
that the monetarists'  explanation is not contradicted by the evidence. 
Be  that as it may,  a  substantial number  of  economists,  policy makers  and 
economic institutions have not been persuaded  by the monetarists'  evidence. 
Instead,  they  advance  the  argument that it is trade union militancy that 
causes inflation and  that incomes policies rather than  control of the money 
supply is potentially the most powerful anti-inflation policy. 
Incomes policies though widely advocated in the U.K.  have not attracted 
general support.  The  U.K.  experiments with incomes policies have  tended 
to place emphasis  on restraining money  wage  increases.  This feature  of  U.K. 
incomes policies  combined  with the consequences directly arising  from  the 
acceleration of inflation have  led to both employers  and  trade unions 
expressing their opposition to wage  and price controls. 
In periods of infation people find the real value of  their income being 
7 eroded  by price increases.  In their attempt to make  up these  lOSses 
they seek to achieve increases in their money  income  which will compensate 
for  the  losses suffered.  If ceilings are  imposed  on these money  income 
increases while prices in one  form  or  another  continue to rise,  income 
recipients are frustrated  from maintaining their real income.  The ability 
of different social groups  to achieve money  income  increases in line with 
price inflation varies.  On  the one  hand  those groups with fixed  incomes, 
e.g.  pensioners  and  others relying  on  social security,  have  no market power 
in maintaining their real incomes  and  must rely on the political process. 
On  the other hand  workers  in the private sector belonging to a  strong trade 
union are better placed· to offset the effects of  accelerating inflation. 
Thus,  in times of accelerating inflation income is redistributed  and  this 
l~ds to social unrest.  The redistributive effects of unanticipated inflation 
have  tended to be worsened by the adoption of  incomes policies.  Trade union 
opposition to incomes policies stems from  their apparently uneven  impact. 
Whenever  incomes policies have  been instituted in the U.K.  the government 
was  regarded  as being better placed for  a  time to  enforce in the public 
sector its chosen  norm  of wage  increases.  This contrasts with the experience 
of the private sector which was  often unwilling  to comply with the  imposed 
ceilings.  Thus,  income  was  redistributed towards  workers  in the private 
sector;  the ensuing resentment led to industrial strife in the public  sec~or. 
Indeed,  a  casual investigation of  strike activity data for  the recent years 
is sufficient to show  that the major  industrial disputes occurred in the 
public sector.  The  two disputes involving  the mineworkers  in 1972  and  1974 
are the most striking examples of this phenomenon. 
Trade unions are opposed to incomes policies not only because of their 
uneven impact on different groups of workers but also because if they are 
not successful in containing price inflation then profits take a  larger share 
of the national income.  Further, it is argued  that controls on money 
income  incr~ases for  certain professions,  e.g.  solicitors, estate agents, 
8 accountants,  etc., are either ineffective or non-existent so that these 
groups  tend to suffer less from  inflation. 
The  corporate sector is also,  to say the least,  lukewarm  in its support 
for  incomes policies.  Their  opposition is based  on the difficulties that 
emerge  in the recruitment of  labour,  on  company  liquidity when prices are 
held down  and  appreciated capital is taxed  as  a  corollary of the incomes 
policies pursued by the government. 
The  control of inflation is now  the top priority of  economic policy in 
the U.K.  All political parties agree that unless the inflation rate is 
stabilised at a  level below that experienced  in recent years the prospects 
for the British economy are alarming.  Anxiety is expressed  about the socio-
political consequences of accelerating inflation.  It is, therefore,  not 
surprising that all policy options are discussed,  the advantages  and  disadvantages 
of  each being  carefully evaluated.  Inevitably monetary policy is advocated 
by  some  but the majority of policy makers  in the U.K.  remain highly sceptical 
about the prospects of  success to control inflation through the pursuit of  an 
active monetary  policy.  Similarly, doubts have been expressed  on whether 
reliance on fiscal policy is likely to yield the desired results.  Incomes 
policies, in some  form  or other, still attract support  among  those directly 
and  indirectly involved in policy making  though opposition to them has, if 
anything,  increased in the wake  of recent attempts to regulate money  income 
increases. 
Though  a  good deal of work has been done on the  impact of  such policies 
on the overall rate of money  wage  and price increases, very little is known 
about their impact  on  non-wage  incomes  in the United  Kingdom,  or  about  how 
they have  impinged  on specific sectors of the economy.  Moreover,  very little 
is known  about the way  in which  such policies interact with more  conventional 
fiscal and monetary weapons.  This  study seeks to answer  some  of the questions 
implicit here.  In the pages  that follow we  deal with such issues as the 
9 measurement of profits in an inflationary environment,  clearly a  prerequisite 
for  controlling  them.  We  also deal with the  impact of  fiscal policies on 
wage  and price setting behaviour  and  hence on  important aspects of the inter-
connectedness of  economic policy tools.  In studying  the banking  sector, 
we  again  come  upon  a  potentially important  linkage for  in this case we 
inevitably raise issues about the interaction of monetary policies  and  incomes 
policies.  We  then turn to consider  the effects of  incomes policies on  a 
specific sector - the nationalised industries - but here  again we  find 
interconnections with other branches of policy that arise from  the effects 
of price controls on the.need of  these industries both to borrow to cover 
deficits  and  to be  subsidised from  the central government budget.  A chapter 
on  transport follows  after which we  go  on to consider  the effects of inflation 
on  the  owner  occupied housing market,  where  once  again there are important 
linkages with taxation and  interest rate policies.  Then we  go  on to discuss 
the behaviour of certain classes of professional incomes  in recent years. 
Thereafter,  in the final chapter,  we  summarise our  findings,  show  how  they 
are interlinked,  and  draw certain tentative conclusions  about the appropriate 
conduct of anti-inflation policy in the United  Kingdom. 
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There does  not exist,  indeed  there cannot  exist,  any general  purpose 
definition to which  we  may  refer to discover how  to measure  income. 
Income  is a  concept  invented to assist people in taking decisions.  In 
order to discover  the most  useful way  to measure  income  for  some  particular 
decision purpose,  we  must: 
(1)  specify carefully the purpose we  have  in mind;  we  must  identify the 
decision  takers,  the nature of  the decisions  and  the objectives of  the 
decisions; 
(2)  specify the various alternative methods  of measurement  that  are to be 
considered,  and 
(3)  choose between  the alternative methods  by estimating which would 
contribute most  to the objectives of  the decisions. 
Measurement  of  income  may  be required  for many  different purposes.  It 
is possible that a  different method  of measurement  may  be  required for  each 
purpose.  The  selection of  a  method  of measurement  should  take  account  of 
the benefits and  the costs of  each available method;  if we  consider  each 
purpose  independently,  the optimal method  would  be that which was  expected 
to yield  a  maximum  surplus of benefits over costs.  The  method  having  the 
highest benefits  (method  A)  may  not be optimal if it also has high costs; 
some  other method  (method  B)  is likely to be preferred if it yields numbers 
which  are highly correlated with  those produced by method  A,  so that method  B 
yields efficient predictions of  the numbers  which would  be produced by 
method  A,  and  it has  a  lower  cost. 
The  choice of  optimal method  of  income  measurement  is complicated by 
the fact  that many  of  the costs  of  producing different measures  are joint 
costs.  Consequently,  it is not  satisfactory to  consider  each purpose 
independently.  Strictly the problem of  choice  involves  considering the 
full set of purposes,  identifying all possible sets of measurement  methods 
13 associated with the set of  purposes  and  selecting the  set of measurement 
methods  which yields  a  maximum  surplus of benefits over  costs  in aggregate. 
The  method  chosen for  any  particular purpose may  differ from  the method 
which would  be  chosen  in  an  independent  study of  the purpose because  of 
considerations of  cost  economy.  A relatively inexpensive method  which is 
highly correlated with the most  useful method  is again likely to be  chosen. 
This discussion begs  some  measurement  problems  which cannot be resolved with 
confidence at  the present  time;  nevertheless,  it provides  a  conceptual 
framework  for  our  study, 
The  purpose  of  our  study is to consider  the  optimal method  of  measuring 
business  income  when  that measurement  is to be used  as  the basis for  some 
incomes  policy,  part  of  a  general  strategy for  the management  of  the  economy. 
Control  of  business profits would  presumably be exercised by  control of  prices 
either by statute or by voluntary means.  The  choice of what  income  measure 
should be used  as  the basis  for  controls depends  on what  state the controls 
are desired  to bring about.  That  is a  political question.  We  assume, 
however,  that  the controls  should  introduce as little distortion as possible 
to the allocation of  resources  in the  economy. 
The  implementation of  an  incomes  policy will have various effects on 
the  output  of  a  wealth maximising  firm;  it will  tend  to reduce marginal 
costs because  of  controls  on other  incomes  in the  economy;  it will  tend  to 
reduce  demand  for  a  product at  each possible price;  the contraint on price 
will tend  to  increase the optimal  output  level.  It is not  possible  to 
generalise about  the net effect of  these influences.  Presumably,  however, 
it would  be  thought  undesirable  to base the price controls on  a  measurement 
of  income  which would  increase the likelihood that  the mix  of  output would 
differ under  the  incomes  policy from what  it would  have been without  inter-
ference.  For  example,  it would  be undesirable to use  a  measure  that 
systematically understated  the opportunity costs  of using capital resources. 
14 That would  cause  the measured  relationship between  the  trend of results 
of  capital intensive industries  and  the  trend  of results of  non-capital 
intensive  industries  to suffer  from bias,  and  the controls would  affect 
output  of  a  firm differently according  to the level of  its capital 
intensity.  Similarly,  it would  presumably be  thought  undesirable that 
controls  should  affect output  in a  way  that was  biased with respect  to 
the  age  of  a  firm's assets  and  so  on. 
This  reasoning  leads  us  to suggest  thatthe ideal measure  of  income 
for  purposes  of price control would  be  a  measure which reflected the 
opportunity costs  of  resources  and  which recorded  an  increase in  income  when 
a  firm  implemented  efficiently a  wealth maximising decision.  The  greater 
the wealth of  a  firm,  generated  by  the activities of  a  period,  the greater 
income  should  be. 
The  use  of  such  a  measure might  lack the required neutral  role if firms 
did not normally  seek to maximise profits or if they did not  recognise 
opportunity costs  in their decisions.  In either  case,  the use  of  a  measure 
related  to wealth maximisation might  be  thought  desirable for  its role as 
an  incentive.  This  suggestion remains  subject to the political objectives 
of  the Government  however.  It might be desired,  for  example,  to  take 
account  of  social costs  and  benefits of  a  firm's activities in the control 
procedures. 
In Section 2  we  consider  some  available measures  of  income.  We  identify 
two  measures,  which we  call economic  income  and  economic  profit,  and  show  that 
both appear  to have  the required relationship with wealth.  We  discuss  the 
difficulties in measuring  the  two  concepts  and  consider  some  measures  of 
accounting profit as  possible proxies  for  the preferred measures. 
In Section 3  we  give  some  estimates  of  the relationship between  accounting 
profits and  economic  income.  The  estimates provide  a  basis for  assessing 
whether  the extra cost  of  a  measure,  such  as  economic  income,  having direct 
15 relevance would  be likely to outweigh the extra benefits from  its use. 
The  mere  fact  that accounting measures  give different numbers  from  economic 
income  or  economic profit is not necessarily an  indication that  they are 
suboptimal.  The  accounting numbers  might  be excellent if their relationship 
with other measures was  consistent  so  that the other measures  could be 
predicted  from  them with high confidence.  Section 4  gives further  estimates 
of  the relationship between different measures,  this time at  the aggregate 
level. 
Finally,  our  conclusions  are  summarised  in  Section 5.  It should be 
kept  in mind  that a  good  deal  of  further research is required  to reach firm 
conclusions.  In particular,  further work  is needed  on  the practical 
difficulties of measuring  economic profit;  on  the possibility of modifying 
standard  accounting measures  to generate improved  estimates of  economic 
profit,  and  on  the relationship between accounting profit numbers  and  the 
preferred measures. 
16 2.  SOME  ALTERNATIVE  MEASURES  OF  PROFIT  AND  INCOME 
Business profits,  which  form  a  significant part of  non-wage  incomes, 
are calculated by  accountants  according  to conventions  that may  not reflect 
real  economic  costs and  benefits.  Accountants  in the United  Kingdom  at 
present are  reviewing  the available methods  of reporting business profits 
with a  view  to amending  current practices.  Particular attention is being 
given to  the methods  of  "accounting for  inflation".  In this context,  the 
term "inflation" is used very broadly  to include all price changes  irrespective 
of origin.  Proposals for  reform have been  issued by  the professional 
bodies,  but  there  is no  concensus  as  to their merits.  Consequently,  a 
Government  Committee  has been established to examine  the problems  of 
accounting  in a  period  of  inflation;  its report is expected  to be published 
in Summer  1975.  In view  of  the  present activity concerning  the methods 
of  reporting business profits, it is not  clear what  information will be 
available in future years.  But  the usefulness  of  reported profits as  a 
basis for  an  incomes  policy may  be one  of  the criteria used  by  the Government 
Committee  in assessing  the usefulness  of  the alternative accounting methods. 
In this section we  examine  two  measures  - economic  income  and  economic  profit 
which  may  be  useful for  purposes  of  an  incomes  policy and  compare  them  with 
conventional accounting measures. 
Economic  Income 
Much  of  current  thinking  about  the measurement  of  the outcome  of 
business activities is derived  from  the concepts of  income  and  value developed 
by Fisher,  and  later Hicks.  These  concepts were  initially discussed  in 
relation to  the  income  of  an  individual,  but have  subsequently been  extended 
to  the  income  of  a  business enterprise.  Hicks  defined  the  income  of  an 
individual  as  the "maximum  value which he 'can  consume  during  a  week  and  still 
expect  to be  as well-off at the  end  of  the week  as  he was  at  the beginning". (l) 
(1)  J.R.Hicks,  Value  and  Capital,  (Clarendon Press,  1946),  p.l72. 
17 In deriving  an operational measure of  income  from  such  a  definition the 
major difficulty is the meaning  of  the  term "well-off".  Hicks  suggests 
that  the present value  of  prospective receipts may  be  taken  as  a  measure 
of wealth  ("well-offness").  The  definition of  income  then becomes 
"the maximum  amount  the  individual  can  spend  this week,  and  still expect 
to be  able  to spend  the  same  amount  in each ensuing week". (2)  In other 
words,  income  is a  residue after the capital value of prospective receipts 
has  been maintained  intact. 
Such  a  definition may  be  adapted readily to  the measurement  of business 
income.  The  income  of  a  business is the  amount  by which its wealth 
(measured by  the present value of prospective receipts)  has  increased during 
the period,  due  allowance being made  for  new  capital  introduced  and  capital 
or  dividends distributed.  This measure will be  referred to as  "economic 
income". 
The  measurement  of  economic  income  can be described by  the following 
equations: 
Income  j  R. 
J 
+  w. 
J  ....  W·  1'  J- (1) 
where 
00  Rt 
w.  l:  J 
t=j+l  (l+r)t-j 
(2) 
In words,  economic  income  for  period  j  is measured  ex  ante by the expected 
net  cash receipts,  Rj  plus  (or minus)  the net  increase  (decrease)  in wealth 
during  the period,  where wealth is expressed  as  the present value of 
prospective net receipts.  The  discount rate, r,  represents  the market 
rate of  interest.  We  abstract  from  explicit allowance for  uncertainty in 
our  analysis  at this stage.  A rearrangement  of  the  two  equations yields 
(2)  Ibid,  p.l74.  Hicks  had  abstracted  from  purchasing  power  changes  in 
developing this definition.  But  such changes  do  not  significantly 
affect  the  concept. 
18 expected  economic  income  for  period  j  as  rWj-l·  Hence  maximisation of 
wealth  (Wj-l)  leads  to maximisation of  expected  economic  income.  However, 
this is not  the  only available method  of measuring the results of  economic 
activities of  businesses consistently with  standard  economic  analysis. 
The  measure  of profit which appears frequently  in neoclassical analysis 
is equivalent  to  economic  income  only in very special  circumstances. 
Economic  Profit 
A measure of profit,  which will subsequently be called "economic 
profit",  can be  shown  to be consistent with  the  theory of  the firm.  It 
has  the property that it is maximised  when  decisions  are  taken  to maximise 
wealth - a  property  shared with  economic  income.  Table  1  illustrates the 
measurement  of  economic  profit  in  the  circumstances  envisaged  in a  simple 
model.  An  account  of  the development  of  the measure  is given in the 
appendix  to this  section.  The  important  characteristics to note  are  the 
valuation of  imputs  and  outputs in terms  of  current prices  (i.e.  the prices 
prevailing in the period under  review);  the deduction for  the cost  of 
TABLE  1 
The  Measurement  of Economic  Profit: 
Revenue  {Output  sold at current prices) 
Less  Inputs valued at current prices, 
Variable  Inputs  (e.g.Labour)• 
Capital Replacement 
Less  Cost  of  finance  employed  (in real  terms) 
Add  Holding gains  (excluding  proportion 
due  to  purchasing  power  changes) 
Economic  Profit 
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XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX finance  employed  (which  is calculated by applying  the real rate of 
interest,  i.e.  the market rate of  interest adjusted for changes  in purchasing 
power,  to  the aggregate net assets owned);  and  the inclusion of holding 
gains  (i.e.  the gains  accruing  to the firm as  a  result of  increases  in 
the prices of  its net assets). 
Economic  income  and  economic  profit both attempt  to  summarise  the 
results of  the  economic  activities undertaken by business enterprises,  and 
both are maximised  when  wealth is maximised.  However,  they would  not 
normally be  identical in practical application. 
Economic  profit is a  short-run measure  in that it focuses  on  a  single 
period.  It provides  a  measure  of  the net  increase in the value of  the 
assets owned  by  the  firm.  Value  to  the firm of  a  particular asset,  in this 
context, may  be  interpreted as  the net  effect on  the wealth of  the firm of 
its being deprived  of  the use  of  that asset.  For  instance,  if the firm 
loses  the use of  a  machine  (e.g.by an uninsured accident),  it may  be able 
to replace  the asset at its current market value,  in which case the current 
market  value represents  the value to the firm of  that asset. 
Economic  income,  however,  measures  the net  increase in the  aggregate 
wealth of the firm.  It will equal  economic  profit in each period only if 
the  aggregate of values assigned  to assets less liabilities brought into 
the measurement  process  equals  aggregate wealth.  In the long-run economic 
profit will be  equivalent  to economic  income  as all future production 
eventually takes place.  The  two  measures would  be equivalent in the short-
run,  e.g.  for  individual  time periods,  only if theclassical perfect markets 
were  to exist.  In such circumstances  economic  profit would  be  zero after 
deducting  the equilibrium return on  capital  invested;  and  economic  income 
would  be  equal  to  the  equilibrium return on  capital. 
Holding Gains 
One  aspect  of  economic  profit which  requires closer examination is the 
20 treatment of holding gains.  In table 1  such gains were  included as 
componentsof  the profit accruing  to  the owners  of  the business,  after 
deducting the part which arose because of a  fall  in the purchasing power 
of money.  This  treatment may  be justified by  the assertion that an  individual 
who  owns  an  asset,  the value of which rises more  than the  increase in general 
price level,  is better off as  a  consequence.  But  for  this argument  to be 
valid,  the business enterprise must  be viewed  as  an  extension of  its owners 
so that the business assets may  be  said,  in some  senses,  to be  owned  by 
individuals.  This view of  the nature of  the business  enterprise may  be 
termed  the "proprietary view". 
An  alternative view of  the nature of  the business enterprise is the 
"entity view"  which regards  the business as  separate and  distinct from  the 
owners.  The  view is worthy of  consideration only in the  case of public 
companies,  where it may  be possible  to view  shareholders  as  suppliers of 
finance in much  the  same  way  that other  interested parties may  be  suppliers 
of  goods  or services.  Such  arguments rely on  the proposition that  shareholders 
have  no  effective control of  the company's  operations.  The  acceptance  of 
an entity view leads  to  the argument  that holding gains  should not  be  counted 
as part of business profits.  A business which  holds  an asset whose  value 
increases  is no  better off  in consequence because  the sale of  such  an  asset 
would  necessitate a  replacement  at the new  increased price.  The  entity 
view  leads  to  a  measure  of  economic  profit which  excludes holding gains. 
The  choice between  the proprietary view and  the entity view may  be made 
by  considering which  yields the most  useful numbers  for decision purposes. 
Since relative changes  in the prices of  assets affect the wealth of  a  firm 
(or are likely to be associated with changes  in the wealth of  a  firm)  it 
aeems  that holding gains  should be  included  in income  for  purposes of 
implementing  an  incomes  policy. 
21 Accounting Profit 
The  conventional measure  of profit  computed  by  accountants  and  included 
in the  annual  financial  statements  of businesses  is equivalent  to neither 
economic  profit nor  economic  income.  The  accountant's measure  of profit 
has  traditionally been based  on  the  concept  of "historical cost
11  which gives 
the profit from  a  transaction as  the difference between  the proceeds  received 
and  the outlays originally incurred,  irrespective of  the  length of  the 
intervening period.  The  outlays may  have been  incurred many  years before 
the period  in which  the transaction was  completed  and  yet no  recognition 
is made  of  any  changes  in the value of money  or  in the relative prices  of 
inputs  in the meantime.  Furthermore,  accountants  do  not  impute  a  cost  to 
the use  of  funds  provided by  the owners  (shareholders)  of  the business, 
although interest on other  sources  of  finance would  normally be  recognised 
as  a  cost. 
Thus,  apart  from  the ~lusion of  imputed  interest in calculating 
accounting profit,  the major  difference between accounting  and  economic 
measures  of profit is in the valuation of  inputs.  Accountants  use historical 
costs whereas  economic  theory  suggests  the use of  current  (opportunity)  co~ts. 
However,  substantial freedom is given  to the  accountant  in identifying 
historical costs for  purposes  of profit calculation.  The  so-called 
"accounting  conventions"  provide  some  rules for  the identification of 
historical costs,  but  there are many  alternatives which are equally acceptable. 
The  cost of using  the  services of  an asset may  be  found  by  spreading  the 
cost of  the asset  over its lifetime according  to one  of various alternative 
rule-of-thumb formulae;  the overhead  costs of  production in a  period may 
be  associated with actual  output units  in various different ways  and  hence 
divided  between  current  and  future periods  (carried  as  part of  inventory) 
in different ways;  the costs  of  some  "remote"  inputs  (i.e.  inputs which 
are not  readily identified,  physically,  with output)  may  be deducted  from 
profits when  they are  incurred or  from  the proceeds  of  selling the output 
22 to which  they contribute,  and  so  on.  Several  accountants,  each faced with 
an  identical set of business  transactions,  may  each arrive at  a  different 
measure  of  accounting profit. 
of  accounting profit. 
Thus,  in practice there are many  concepts 
Accounting  for  Inflation 
Recent  concern about  the validity of using  the traditional accounting 
measure  of profit in a  period of  inflation has  led  some  accountants  to 
question the usefulness  of historical costs as  a  basis for  accounting. 
The  professional accounting bodies  in the United Kingdom,  through the 
Accounting  Standards  St~ering Committee,  have proposed  amending  historical 
costs by  a  factor  reflecting changes  in general purchasing  power.  The 
effect of  such proposals would  be  to measure profit  as  the difference between 
the purchasing  power  received from  a  sale and  the current  purchasing power 
of  the original outlay.  It has  been recommended  that  the published annual 
financial  statements  of  quoted  companies  should  include  supplementary state-
ments  showing  the calculation of profits on  such a  basis.  However,  this 
practice has not yet been widely adopted  and  its future  acceptance is likely 
to depend  on  the  outcome  of  the Government  enquiry  into  the  subject. 
It should be  emphasised  that  the historical cost of  an  input,  even when 
adjusted for  purchasing  power  changes, will not  equal  its current opportunity 
cost,  unless  inputs  used  by  the business  are unaffected  by relative price 
changes.  It has  been  suggested,  in general  by  academic  accountants  (although 
there is some  support  in the profession and  business  community),  that current 
values  should  be  assigned  to inputs  in the calculation of profit,  in a  manner 
similar  to that  suggested  above for  the calculation of  economic profit. 
However,  there are various ways  of  implementing  such a  proposal  and  as yet 
there is no  concensus  in favour  of  any  one. 
23 Comparison  of Accounting  and  Economic Profits 
As  was  pointed  out  above,  a  major difference between  accounting and 
economic profits relates to the valuation of  inputs.  The  accounting profit 
calculation uses historical costs, whereas  the calculation of  economic 
profit requires  the use of  current values.  These measurement  differences 
give risetovariations in the  time when  each recognises  the earning  of 
profit.  Accounting profit does  not  recognise a  profit until a  sale has 
taken place,  whereas  profits are  recognised  in the measurement  of  economic 
profit when  production takes place or  simply when  there is a  change  in the 
for  our  purposes 
market value of  the assets  owned  by the firm  (assuming  that/the proprietary 
view is preferred to the entity view). 
The  other difference between  the  two  measures  is the omission of  an 
imputed  interest cost  in calculating accounting profit.  Economic  profit, 
as  shown  in the  appendix  to this chapter,  is the  excess  of  the actual return 
over  the normal  return on  funds  used  to finance  the business activities. 
For  the  purposes  of  control over prices and  incomes,  distinction between 
the normal  (equilibrium)  return and  any  excess  or deficit is important. 
To  illustrate the relationship between accounting  and  economic profit, 
a  simple illustration will be  used.  Alpha Limited  bought  raw materials for 
£1,000  on  1st January  1973.  On  31st December  1973,  when  the cost of 
replacing  the  raw materials would  have  amounted  to £1,300,  Alpha Limited 
hired £500  worth of  labour  services  to  convert  the raw materials  into a 
finished product which  at that date would  have  sold for  £2,000.  However, 
the sale was  not made  until 31st December  1974  when  the proceeds  amounted 
to £2,500.  During  those  two  years  the  index  of  the general price level 
increased at  a  rate of  10%  per annum. 
The  calculation of  accounting  and  economic  profits for  Alpha Limited 
are  shown  in Table 2,  where  it can be  seen that there are several alternative 
measures  of profit for  this  simple set of  transactions.  There are two 
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TABLE  2 
Profits  of Alpha Limited 
Accounting Profit Calculations 
(i)  Unadjusted for price level  changes: 
1973  No  sales 
1974  Sales proceeds  less original outlays 
2500  - (1000  +  500) 
(ii)  Adjusted for  price level  changes: 
nil 
£1000  = 
1973  No  sales  nil 
1974  Sales  proceeds  less  adjusted 
original outlays 
2500  - {1000(1+10%) 2  +  500(1+10%)}  £740 
Economic  Profit Calculations 
(i)  Proprietary View 
1973  Operating profit: 
current value of  output  less 
current value of  inp~t 
= 
2000  - (1300  +  500)  £200 
ADD  Holding gain: 
increasein value  less  proportion 
due  to inflation 
(1300  - 1000)  - (1000  X  10%)  £200 
Economic  profit for  1973  £400 
1974  Holding gain only:  (no  production) 
increase in value less proportion 
due  to inflation 
(2500  - 2000)  - (2000  X  10%)  £300 
(ii)  Entity View 
1973  Current value of  output  less  current 
value of  input 
2000  - (1300  +  500)  £200 
1974  No  production  nil 
25 possible measures  of  accounting profit.  The  first has  no  adjustment  for 
price  level  changes  and  is  the measure  reported  in the conventional  financial 
statements prepared by accountants  at  the present  time.  No  sales take place 
in 1973  and  no  profit is  recorded.  In  1974  the profit is calculated by 
deducting  the original costs  of  the raw materials  and  the  labour  from  the 
proceeds  of  sale.  The  second measure  of  accounting profit  incorporates 
adjustments  for  changes  in the general  level of prices.  This measure is 
similar to  the unadjusted  accounting profit except  that  the deduction for 
original outlays  is adjusted  for  changes  in the general  price level. 
The  calculations of  economic  profit are given in the  second part of 
table 2.  In the first  instance, it is assumed  that  the proprietary view 
of  the business  enterprise is accepted.  The  calculation is made  in accord-
ance with  the  statement  given  in table  1  except  that no  deduction is made 
for  the normal return on  funds  invested  in the business;  account  of  the 
opportunity cost of  capital  could  be  taken  in the  interpretation of  the 
results.  For  1973,  the profit  from  productive activities  (operating profit) 
is calculated by deducting  the  current cost of  the  inputs,  raw materials 
and  labour,  from  the current value  of  the  output.  The  holding gains are 
added  to  the  operating profit to give  the  economic  profit.  In  1974  there 
are  no  productive operations  and  only holding  gains  are recorded.  If the 
entity view of  the business  is accepted,  holding gains will not be recorded 
in the profit calculation and  only  the operating profit earned  in 1973  will 
be  reported. 
The  relationship between the accounting  and  economic measures of profit 
can be  compared  by  a  closer examination of  these figures.  The  adjusted 
accounting profit is almost  directly comparable with  the proprietary view 
measure  of  economic  profit.  The  adjusted  accounting profit was  recorded 
as  £740  in  1974,  whereas  the proprietary view measure  of  economic  profit 
was  £400  in 1973  and  £300  in  1974.  But  the price level  changed between 
1973  and  1974.  The  rate of  increase in prices was  10%,  therefore  £440 
26 in 1974  was  the equivalent  to £400  in 1973.  In  terms  of  the  1974  price 
level,  the  aggregate  economic  profit amounted  to  £740,  the  same  as  the 
adjusted  accounting profit. 
If the entity view is accepted  the holding  gains  must  be  eliminated. 
The  holding gains  included  in the adjusted  accounting profit  amount  to £520; 
their elimination would  reduce profit to £220  in  1974,  equivalent  to  the 
entity view measure  of  economic profit of  £200  in 1973. 
This  simple  example  illustrates that  economic  profit, aggregated over 
time,  is  equivalent  to  the aggregate  accounting profit adjusted for price 
level  changes.  The  major  difference is the  time  at which  each recognise 
that  the profit has  been  earned.  In the  accounting measure  recognition 
of  the profit is delayed until the  sale has  taken place.  It should  be 
emphasized  that this  correspondence  between  accounting  and  economic  measures 
of profit applies  only when  the  accounting measure  has  been  adjusted for 
changes  in the  general  level  of  prices. 
The  Relationship with Economic  Income 
The  example  of Alpha Limited  can be  extended  to illustrate the relation-
ship of  economic  income  to  the  two  measures  of profit.  For  this purpose, 
a  distinction must  be  made  between real  and  monetary measures  of  economic 
income.  The  measure  of  economic  income  given by  equation 1  represents  a 
monetary measure  - in other words,  no  adjustment  is made  for  changes  in 
purchasing  power.  A measure  of  real economic  income  may  be  given as 
follows: 
Real  Income  j  R.  +  w.  - W.  1(1  +  g)  • 
J  J  J-
(3) 
This differs  from  equation  1  in that  the wealth at  the start of  the period, 
Wj-l'  is expressed  as  the  sum  of money  which would  have  equivalent purchasing 
power  at the  end  of  the period,  i.e. it is  increased by  g,  the proportional 
change  in the general  level of prices. 
27 The  real  and  monetary measures  of  economic  income  for Alpha Limited 
are  calculated in table 3,  where it can be  seen that the monetary  economic 
income  is equal  in aggregate  to unadjusted  accounting profit,  and  that real 
economic  income  is equal  in aggregate  to accounting profit adjusted for 
price level  changes.  It is assumed  that the market  interest rate is lSI%. 
In both  cases  the differences between the  income  and  profit measures  are  a 
matter of  timing.  Accounting profit defers all recognition until a 
realisation takes place,  whereas  economic  income measures benefits from 
the  time when  the opportunity is first recognised.  Such differences in 
timing may  be  of  great  significance to the usefulness  of  the measurements. 
TABLE  3 
Economic  Income  of Alpha Limited 
The  variables in the calculation: 
t  Rt 
Net  Receipts  =  Rj  and  Wealth =  Wj  a  L 
time 0  Ro  -1000 
1  Rl  - 500 
2  R2  +2500 
Monetary Economic  Income: 
Income  j 
Income  0 
Income  1 
Income  2 
and  Wo 
and  w1 
R·  J 
- 500  + 
(1+0.155) 
2500 
(1+0.155) 
-1000  +  1441  - 0 
- 500  +  2164.5  - 1441 
2500  + 0  - 2164.5 
t=j+l  (l+r) t-j 
2500  1441 
(1+0.155)2 
2164.5 
441 
223.5 
Total Monetary Economic  Income 
335.5 
1000.0 
Real  Economic  Income: 
Real  Income  j  R.  +  w.  - wj-1  (l+g) 
J  J 
Real  Income  0  -1000  +  1441  - 0 
Real  Income  1  - 500  +  2164.5 - 1441  (1+0.1) 
Real  Income  2  2500  +  0  - 2164.5(1+0.1) 
Total Real Economic  Income  (in 1974  prices) 
28 
Adjustment  to 
1974 prices 
441  X  1.102=  533.61 
79.4  X  1.10  87.34 
119.05  - 119.05 
740.00 In the illustration,  economic  income  of  £441  is recognised  as  soon 
as  the asset is purchased.  Economic  incomes  of  subsequent  years  represent 
the normal  return on  the wealth at  the start of  the year  (measured  in 
monetary or real terms). 
The  Alternative Measures 
There  is no  single measure which  can be regarded  as  the "correct" 
method  of  determining business profits.  There  are alternatives available, 
even if attention is focused  solely on  the concepts  of  economic  theory,  and, 
furthermore,  the economic measures  do  not  conform  to the practices  adopted 
by  the  accountant  and  reported in the  annual  financial  statements.  The 
alternatives may  be  summarised  in general  terms  as  follows: 
{1)  Economic  income:  this is a  measure  of  the economic  benefits accruing 
to  the proprietors as  a  result of  their ownership  of  the business. 
(2)  Economic  profit:  this is essentially a  short-term measure which  focuses 
on  the business  as  a  productive unit.  There  are alternative treatments 
of holding gains depending  on  the view that is taken of  the nature of 
business enterprise. 
(3)  Accounting profit:  this  comprises  the many  alternative measures,  each 
differing slightly from  another,  found  in the published financial 
statements  of  companies.  They  are based  on  historical costs  and  include 
no  allowance for  purchasing power  changes.  A measure  of  accounting 
profit adjusted for  purchasing power  fluctuations  is published by  a  few 
companies  and  such  a  measure may  become  more  widely used  in the future. 
Further modifications of  accounting procedures,  for  example  some 
recognition of  current values,  might  be made  to  yield  a  measure  approx-
imating  economic  profit more  closely. 
The  three measures may  be contrasted in terms  of  the points  in time at 
which  each recognises  the  economic benefits accruing from  business activities. 
29 Accounting profit,  adjusted for  purchasing  power  changes,  reflects the 
economic benefit only when  a  sale takes  place;  economic profit reflects 
the benefit when  production takes place,  and  economic  income  records  the 
benefit as  soon  as  the existence of  the opportunity is recognised. 
Economic  income may  be viewed  as  an  ideal measure  of  the  economic 
benefits accruing to  the proprietors  as  a  result  of  their ownership of 
the business.  However,  it suffers  from  the practical disadvantage that 
its measurement  depends  much  more  heavily than alternative measures  on 
subjective estimates of  future  events;  it cannot  be verified by  an  auditor. 
Nevertheless,  the relationship between  accounting profit and  economic 
income  may  be  studied theoretically to discover whether  the relationship 
is likely to be  stable  so  that accounting profit, with its greater ease 
of measurement,  could be used  as  a  proxy for  or predictor of,  economic 
income.  Such  a  study  is reported  in Section 3. 
30 Appendix  to  Section 2 
The  Derivation of Economic Profit 
The  measure  of  economic  profit can be derived  from  the theory  of 
the  firm,  by marginal  analysis.  If Qt,  Lt  and  It represent  levels  of 
output, variable input  and  investment  in capital stock,  and  pt, wt  and 
qt represent  the  corresponding prices,  the difference between  revenue 
and  outlay  (on both current  and  capital  account)  measures  the net receipts, 
Rt,  received at the  end  of  period t.  Thus, 
(1) 
The  objective of  the firm may  be  taken  to  be  the maximisation of  its 
wealth as measured at a  point  of  time  (say at the start of  period j), 
Max  w.  = 
J 
oo  Rt 
L 
t=j+l  (l+r)t-j 
(2) 
The  maximisation of  the firm's wealth is subject  to  two  constraints. 
First,  the  change  in  the  capital input during  each period is equal  to 
investment  less replacement.  Assuming  that replacement  is proportional 
to  the capital  stock at the start of  the period  this constraint  takeSthe 
form: 
{3) 
Second,  the  levels of output  and  inputs  are constrained by  a  production 
function: 
(4) 
It may  be noted  that capital services,  not  capital  stock,  are  an  input  to 
the productive process.  Implicitly,  capital  stock is multiplied by  a 
factor  representing the rate of service per period of time- in equation  (4) 
the iactor is normalised at unity  and  the  same  term is used  to represent 
both capital  stock  and  the  services  of  that  stock.  For  purposes  of  this 
analysis,  it may  be  assumed  that  the production function  is twice 
31 differentiable with positive marginal rates  of  substitution between  inputs 
and  positive, but decreasing,  marginal productivities of all inputs.  In 
addition,  it is  assumed  to be  strictly convex. 
The  firm's  maximisation problem as represented by  equation  (2)  and 
subject  to  the  constraints  imposed  by  equations  (1),  (3)  and  (4)  can be 
analysed by  an  examination  of  the necessary first order conditions.  This 
analysis yields  the marginal productivity conditions for  the  two  productive 
inputs:(!) 
(5) 
Pt 
1 
Pt 
{  (l+r)qt - (1-o)  }  (6) 
The  shadow  prices  of  the  inputs  can be derived  from  the appropriate 
marginal productivity conditions,  equations  (5)  and  (6).  These prices 
measure  the  cost  to  the  firm of  employing  the  last unit of  each input  and 
will  equal  the value derived  from its use.  Thus,  the  shadow  prices may  be 
written as: 
(7) 
and 
(l+r)  qt-l - qt  (1-o).  (8) 
1. 
Equation  (6)  is the discrete time  analogue of  the following,  more  familiar 
marginal productivity condition for  capital derived  from  a  continuous  time 
model: 
1,g_  =  i  (r+o-q·) 
aK  P  ' 
where  q represents  the  time rate of  change  in the price of  the  capital input. 
For  instance,  see D.W.Jorgenson,  "Theory of  Investment  Behaviour"  Determinants 
of  Investment Behaviour,  (  Universities National  Bureau Conference  series 
No.18,  1967)  pp.l29-155. 
3'2 The  measure  of  economic  profit, Pt' may  be defined using  these  shadow 
prices  to value  the  inputs  into the productive process: 
(9) 
This measure of profit is consistent with the wealth maximisation model  in 
that  the maximisation  of  (economic)  profit,  as  represented by equation  (9), 
subject to  the constraint  imposed  by  the production function,  equation  (4), 
yields marginal productivity conditions  identical to  those expressed by 
equations  (5)  and  (6).  Equation  (9)  can be rearranged  to give  a  definition 
of profit in a  measurable  form: 
(10) 
The  terms  comprising  the measurement  of  economic  profit can  be  explained as 
follows. 
The  quantity of output  sold during  the period at the prevailing 
selling price. 
The  amount  of  the variable  input used  in production at the 
prevailing buying price - for  example  the quantity of  labour 
used  priced at the current wage  rate. 
The  proportion of  the  capital stock requiring replacement  during 
the period priced at  the prevailing price for the acquisition 
of  new  investment. 
The  market  interest rate applied  to  the capital stock brought 
forward  for use in the current period,  priced at the market price 
for new  equipment which prevailed  in the previous  period.  This 
is a  measure  of  the interest cost of  investing  in the capital 
stock during  the  current period. 
(qt-qt_1)Kt  The  capital stock used  during  the  current period multiplied 
by  the  increase  (decrease)  in the price of new  investment.  This 
is the gain accruing  to  the firm by virtue of its holding of 
capital stock. 
The  rate of interest,  however,  may  be divided  into  two  components,  a 
real rate of interest,  p,  (which measures  the  shareholders'  marginal rate 
33 of  time  preference)  and  a  purchasing  power  adjustment,  n.  The  relation-
ship  between these  terms  and  the market rate of  interest may  be  expressed 
as  follows: 
(l+r)  (l+p)(l+n)  •  (11) 
Substituting this measure  into equation  (10)  yields  a  revised  formula  for 
the measurement  of  economic profit,  thus: 
This  expression differs  from  equation  (10)  in that  the  adjustment  for 
purchasing  power  changes  has  been  taken out  of  the interest rate and  deducted 
from  the holding gains.  Thus  the interest is calculated in real  terms  and 
holding  gains represent  the  increase  in value of  the business  assets over 
and  above  the  amount  required  to  keep  pace with the general price level. 
34 3.  A COMPARISON  OF  ACCOUNTING  PROFIT  AND  ECONOMIC  INCOME 
Application of  Simulation 
In this section we  attempt  a  limited  comparison of  economic  income  and 
accounting profit.  The  relationship between the  two  will depend  on  (i)  the 
type  of business  transactions undertaken  and  economic  conditions,  and  (ii)  the 
choice of  accounting  conventions determining which  of  the several versions 
of  accounting profit is measured. 
Our  study  involves  only a  small  number  of  the many  environmental 
conditions  that might be  encountered  in the real world.  As  mentioned  in 
Section  2,  accounting  p~ofit may  be  calculated in any  one  of  a  large number  of 
ways  depending  on which  combination of  the various  accounting  conventions  is 
chosen.  Given  the wide  range  of  choice of  conventions  that may  be  applied 
to  the valuation of  each of a  number  of  categories of assets,  liabilities, 
costs  and  revenues,  the number  of  combinations  that  could  be applied  to  a 
set of business  transactions  is  almost  infinite.  Our  study deals with only 
seven combinations  of  accounting  conventions.  Although our  conclusions are 
accordingly  limited,  the  analysis reveals  large differences between  the 
alternative measures  and  limited ability to predict  economic  income  from 
accounting  income.  It suggests  the  need  for  caution if accounting measures 
are  to be used  as  proxies  for  economic  ones. 
We  use  a  method  of  analysis known  as  simulation.  Accounting  and 
economic measures  of  income  are calculated for  sets of  hypothetical business 
transactions  undertaken by  a  hypothetical  firm under different  environmental 
conditions.  This  approach has been  chosen rather than  a  direct  investigation 
of real world data for  three reasons.  The  first is that it allows  examination 
of  environmental  circumstances  that maynothave actually existed  in the 
recent past,  although they may  be  expected  to occur  in the future.  The  second 
• 
is that  once  the  simulation model  is constructed  and  computerised,  the~lues 
of particular parameters may  be varied and  revised results calculated much 
35 more  quickly  than if the  same  adjustments were  attempted  to real world 
data.  The  third reason is that data may  be  assumed  that could be obtained 
only with great difficulty,  if at all,  from  real world  sources - for  example 
the future  cash flow data needed  to calculate economic  income. 
Description of  the Model  Used 
The  hypothetical firm manufactures  and  sells only one  product.  In 
other respects also  the model  is of  a  simple world:  relationships describing 
cost  and  revenue behaviour  are  straightforward and  explicit recognition of 
uncertainty is avoided.  The  relationships used  in the model  do  not  imply 
optimal decision procedures.  A simple model,  such  as  this,  is often the 
clearest vehicle for  an initial investigation of difficult concepts;  more 
refinements may  be  introduced when  the conceptual  issues are clear. 
We  now  give a  brief description of  the model  used,  in sufficient detail 
to permit  a gmeral  assessment  of  the  type of  firm being analysed,  but omitting 
detailed specification of  the relationships  assumed.  The  firm commences 
business with initial capital of  £1,000.  It is expected to be wound  up 
after 20  years.  The  market prices of all inputs are to increase each year 
at a  compound  rate,  ~, i.e.  there are no  changes  in the relative prices of 
inputs.  Unit  selling price per period,  for  a  given output,  is assumed  to 
increase at  the  same  annual  rate,  ~. 
Demand  conditions  for  the product are assumed  to be  such that,  given 
the pricing policy,  sales volume will increase at a  fixed  annual rate,  g. 
The  required  stock of  finished  goods  at  the end  of  a  period is equal  to a 
fixed  proportion of  the quantity sold during that period.  Enough  finished 
goods  must  be produced  to  satisfy demand  and  to provide for any  increase 
in required  stock.  Similarly a  minimum  stock of  raw materials must  be 
available at the  end  of  a  period,  equal  to a  fixed  proportion of  the quantity 
required for  production during that period.  Enough  raw materials must  be 
bought  to satisfy production requirements  and  to provide for  any  increase 
in stock.  Each  unit of final output requires  one  unit  of  raw material 
36 and  one  hour  of direct  labour.  Factory overhead  expenses  include  a  fixed 
element  and  an  element varying with the level of production.  Marketing 
expenses  include a  fixed  element  and  an  element varying  according to the 
level of  sales. 
Plant capacity at  the beginning  of  a  period must  be greater  than or 
equal  to the capacity required for  production requirements  during that 
period.  Any  shortfall will automatically generate the purchase  of  a  new 
unit  (or units)  of  plant.  The  productive capacity of all plant is assumed 
to decrease at  a  constant rate as it ages.  Plant is retained until its 
productive capacity is virtually exhausted at which  time it has no  value. 
Taxation is payable  each period at  a  fixed rate on  accounting profit. 
Taxation payable is not  affected by  the level of dividends. 
Receipts  and  payments  are assumed  to arise on  the last day of  the 
period  to which  they relate  (with the  exception of  initial capital and  the 
purchase  of  plant required for  the first year's production).  Sales  are on 
credit;  amounts  of  cash collections and  debtors  are  the subject of  standardised 
assumptions.  The  firm purchases  raw  materials  and  incurs factory  overhead 
and  marketing  expenses  on credit;  amounts  of  cash payments  and  creditors 
are also  the  subject  of  standardised assumptions.  Any  other costs are 
paid on  the  last day of  the period  in which  they are incurred.  The  firm 
is required  to hold  a  cash balance at the  end  of  each period,  calculated 
as  a  function of  sales  revenue  earned during  that period. 
Any  balance remaining  on  cash account  at  the  end  of  a  period,  after 
providing for  the cash balance required  to beneld at that  time,  is paid  to 
shareholders  as  dividend.  Any  negative balance is assumed  to be paid  to 
the company  by  the shareholders  as  an extra capital subscription. 
On  liquidation  (at  the  end  of  20  years),  all outstanding debts are 
collected and  all outstanding creditors paid.  Stocks of  raw materials are 
sold at the existing market price,  and  stocks  of finished  goods  at the selling 
37 price assumed  for  the  last period  of  the firm's  life.  The  liquidation 
value of  plant is calculated  according to the plant capacity remaining. 
Accounting  capital gains  arising on  liquidation are  assumed  to be  taxed  at 
the  same  rate as  accounting profit.  The  final  cash balance,  after taking 
account  of  the above,  is distributed to shareholders. 
Accounting  Conventions  Used 
Using  the  environmental  conditions  assumed  in the  simulation model, 
accounting profit figures  are calculated using  seven  combinations of  accounting 
conventions relating to  stock  and  depreciation.  The  combinations  used 
are described  in Table 4.  As  we  noted earlier,  these  seven  combinations 
are  chosen  from  a  very substantial number  available.  The  three methods  of 
stock valuation used  are FIFO  (first in,  first out),  LIFO  (last in,  last out) 
TABLE  4 
Accounting  Conventions  Used 
-----
Group  Stock Valuation  Stock Costing  Depreciation 
Method  Method  Method 
A  FIFO  Full cost  Straight  line 
B  FIFO  Direct cost  Straight  line 
c  LIFO  Full  cost  Straight  line 
D  LIFO  Direct  cost  Straight line 
E  Average  cost  Full  cost  Straight  line 
F  Average  cost  Direct  cost  Straight line 
G  FIFO  Full cost  Reducing  balance 
38 and  Average Cost.  The  three methods  are not necessarily descriptive of 
the physical movement  of  stock,  they merely  assume  a  pattern of  physical 
usage  in order  to identify the historical costs of  end-period  stock.  Under 
FIFO,  for  example,  stock is assumed  (for costing purposes  only)  to be used 
up  on production or  sales in the  order  in which it is purchased  or manufactured. 
End-period  stock is valued at  the  cost of  the most  recent purchases  or 
production.  Under  LIFO,  the most  recently purchased or manufactured  stock 
is assumed  for  costing  to  be  used first.  Under  Average  Cost,  an  equal 
proportion of  stock of  each  age held is assumed  to be used. 
End-period  stock is costed at either Direct Cost  or Full Cost.  The 
former  comprises  raw material  and  direct  labour  cost  only;  the latter 
includes  an  additional  sum  for  the overhead  cost  per unit,  i.e.  total overhead 
cost  divided by units produced. 
Two  methods  of  fixed  asset depreciation are considered:  "Straight Line" 
and  "Fixed Percentage of  Reducing  Balance".  Using  the former,  a  constant 
amount  is written off  the cost of  the asset as depreciation in each year  of 
its assumed  life.  Under  the "Reducing  Balance"  method,  a  percentage of  the 
written down  value of  the  asset at  the beginning  of  a  year  is charged as 
depreciation for  that year.  The  percentage is constant  from year  to year. 
For  the purposes  of  calculating depreciation,  plant is assumed  to have  a 
four  year life and  to be worth nothing at  the end  of  that  time. 
Results  of the  Simulation 
For  each  combination of  conventions,  accounting profit is calculated 
for  each year  of  the firm's  life.  The  calcuations are performed for  three 
rates  of  growth  in physical output  (g  =  .02,  g  =  .05,  g  =  .07)  and  five 
rates  of "inflation"  ( 7r=  •  00,  7r  =  .05,  7r  =  .10,  7r  =  .15,  7r  =  .20) • 
Thus  for  each group  of  conventions,  fifteen sets of profit figures  are 
calculated,  one  for  each combination of  output  growth  and  inflation. 
Economic  income  is also  calculated for  each  combination of rate of 
39 output growth,  rate of  inflation and  set of  accounting  conventions. 
Economic  income  depends  on  cash flows  and  thus might  be thought  to be 
independent of  accounting  conventions.  In fact,  however,  our model  assumes 
taxation payments  to be based  on  accounting profit calculations.  (Under 
U.K.  practice,  such dependence  is actually constrained by  statute.) 
Economic  income  for  each period is  calculated  from  expression  {l)  in Section 2: 
where 
Income  period  j  =  R.  +  W·  - w.  l  ,  J  J  J-
w. 
J 
n  Rt 
I 
t=j+l  {l+r)t-j 
In the  above  expression r  represents the discount rate of  shareholders in 
money  terms  (their marginal rate of  time  preference).  For  the purposes  of 
the  simulation analysis we  assume  that  the value of  r  will be greater the 
greater the rate of  inflation expected.  In particular we  assume  that the 
value of  r  will be  such  as  to satisfy the  equation 
{l+r)  ... n 
where  n  is the rate of general  inflation expected  to be  experienced by 
shareholders  (assumed  to  equal  the relevant rate of  inflation used  in the 
simulation),  and  p  is  a  constant,  the "real"  or "inflation-free" rate of 
interest.  A value of 0.15  (15%)  is assumed  for  p  throughout  the analysis. (l) 
Rearranging  the  terms  in the previous  expression gives: 
r  p  +  n  +  pn  • 
Thus  if the  expected rate of  inflation  ( n)  is 0.10  (10%)  per  period,  r 
will equal 0.265  {0.15  + 0.10  + 0.015),  or  26.5%  per period. 
l.  Values  for  p  of 0.10  and  0,20 were  also tested.  The  results of  the 
simulation were not materially affected.  These yalues are probably 
materially higher  than the actual real rate of  interest.  Their  significance 
depends  on  the relative values  of other variables  implied by the model 
rather  than on  absolute amounts,  however.  Further research will 
investigate the effects of different  assumed  relationships. 
40 To  reduce  the difficulty in comparing  and  interpreting the considerable 
volume  of  data from  the simulation,  we  make  use of  two  statistics - the mean 
squared relative error and  the mean  relative bias - to  summarise  the 
divergences  between  economic  and  accounting measures  of  income,  and  a 
third - the coefficient of determination,  generally called r2 - to estimate 
the usefulness  of  accounting measures of  income  as  predictors of  economic 
income. 
The  first  two  statistics are based  on  the relative difference between 
accounting profit  and  economic  income  (the "relative accuracy"  of  accounting 
profit).  The  relative accuracy of  accounting profit for period j, A., 
J 
is defined as: 
A. 
Accounting profit . 
J 
Economic  income  . 
J 
J  Economic  income  . 
J 
The  first statistic  (the mean  squared relative error) measures  the  average 
size of  the difference between  accounting profit  and  economic  income  over 
the  life of  the  firm.  This  statistic is calculated  from  the formula 
Mean  squared relative error  1 
n 
n 
I 
j=l 
(A·)2 
J 
By  squaring the relative accuracy measure for  each period,  the direction 
of  the difference  is eliminated so that negative differences do  not  cancel 
out positive ones. 
The  second  statistic  (the mean  relative bias)  measures  the average 
direction of  the difference between accounting profit and  economic  income 
over  the firm's  life.  This statistic is  cal~ulated from  the formula 
Mean  relative bias  1 
n 
The  third statistic {the coefficient of determination)  measures  the 
proportion of the variations in economic  income  that are associated with 
41 changes  in accounting profit.  The  formula for calculating r 2  is: 
2 
r 
[n(  ~  AP. 
j=l  J 
[  n(. ~  AP. 
2
] 
J=l  J  [ .~  AP.j
2 J [  n(.~  EI.2]  - (.I  Er.)
2
] 
J=l  J  J=l  J  J=l  J 
where  APj  represents  accounting profit for  period j, Eij  represents  economic 
income  for  the  same  period,  and  n  is the  number  of  periodsto  liquidation. 
Measures  of  the mean  squared  relative error,  the mean  relative bias 
and  the  coefficient of determination for  the data used  in the  simulation 
are  summarised  in the  appendix  to this section.  The  statistics provide  a 
basis  for  making  some  tentative comments  about  the relative usefulness  of 
particular conventions,  and  about  the  extent  to which  some  measure  of  account-
ing profit might  serve  as  a  proxy  for  economic  income  or  as  a  predictor of  it. 
The  Divergence  Between Economic  and  Accounting Measures  of  Income 
In  this  section we  consider divergences between  economic  income  and 
conventional  accounting profit,  using  the measures  of mean  squared relative 
error  and  mean  relative bias.  In  a  subsequent  section we  use measures  of 
the  coefficient of determination  to assess  the possible usefulness  of  account-
ing profit as  a  predictor of  economic  income. 
We  consider  separately the  conventions  used  in the  simulation for 
stock valuation,  stock costing  and  depreciation. 
Stock valuation  The  tables  for  convention groups  A,  C  and  E  enable us 
to  compare  FIFO,  LIFO,  and  Average  Cost,  where  stock is costed at Full Cost. 
Accounting  conventions  for  the  three groups  are  identical except  as  regards 
the method  of  stock valuation used.  The  relative error measures  for  FIFO 
and  Average  Cost  are very similar for  all growth  and  inflation rates 
considered,  and  are  lower  than  the  corresponding measures  for  LIFO.  The 
relative superiority of  FIFO  and  Average  Cost  over LIFO  increases  as  the 
inflation rate becomes  higher,  but  is_pot  greatly affected by  changes  in 
42 the growth rate.  The  size of  the relative error of all three methods 
decreases  as  the rate of  growth  increases.  The  relative bias measures 
suggest  that all three methods  result  in accounting profit figures  that 
tend  to overstate economic  income  at  low  inflation rates  and  to understate 
it at higher inflation rates  (approximately  10%  and  above).  The  degree  of 
understatement  increases  as  inflation increases.  Examination of  the  tables 
for  Groups  B,  D and  F  suggest  that  the above  conclusions  about  the relative 
merits of FIFO,  LIFO  and  Average  Cost  are not  affected significantly by 
costing stock at Direct Cost  rather  than Full Cost. 
Stock costing  Full Cost  and  Direct Cost may  be  compared  using  any  of  the 
three  stock valuation methods- FIFO  (groups A and  B),  LIFO  (groups  C and  D) 
or Average  Cost  (groups  E  and  F).  Under  all three valuation methods, 
accounting profit figures  calculated using Full Cost  are better approximations 
to  economic  income  than  those calculated using Direct Cost.  The  difference 
between  the  two  measures  tends  to be  smaller at higher rates of inflation 
and  growth.  Both costing methods  result  in measures  of  accounting profit 
that  tend  to overstate economic  income  at  low  inflation rates  and  to understate 
it at higher rates. 
Depreciation  Straight Line  and  Reducing  Balance depreciation may  be  compared 
by  examining  the  tables for  groups A  and  G.  For all inflation and  growth 
rates,  Straight Line depreciation leads  to measures  of  accounting profit that 
are better approximations  to economic  income  than are  those  calculated~ing 
the Reducing Balance method.  As  with  stock  conventions,  both depreciation 
methods  result in accounting profit figures  that overstate economic  income 
at  low  rates of  inflation and  understate it at higher rates. 
Accounting Profit as  a  Proxy for  Economic  Income 
We  now  consider whether  any  of  the  combinations  of  conventions used 
in the  simulation produces measures  of  accounting profit that  are  good 
approximations  to economic  income.  The  relevant statistic is the mean 
43 squared relative error.  This  is  the  average of  the  squares  of  the periodic 
relative accuracy measures;  its square root  accordingly has  some  interest 
as  an  indicator of  average periodic error. 
The  lowest  calculated mean  squared relative error is 0.0686  (group  A: 
g  =  .07,  rr  =  .05)  implying  an  average periodic relative error of  10.0686, 
i.e ••  2619  or  26.19%.  The  highest calculated error is 0.3322  (group  G: 
g  = .02,  rr  = .00)  implying  an  average periodic error of  57.64%.  The  average 
of all mean  squared  relative errors  shown  in the tables  in the  appendix  is 
0.1398,  implying  an  average periodic relative error of  37.39%.  In the 
internal  and  environmental  conditions  assumed  for  the  firm  in our illustration, 
no  combination of  accounting  conventions  considered  leads  to measures  of 
accounting profit that are  good  proxies  for  economic  income. 
Table  5  shows  the arithmetic average  of  the error and  bias statistics 
included  in the  appendix.  From  these figures,  we  may  draw  some  general 
conclusions  about  the effects of  inflation and  growth  on  the relative accuracy 
of  conventional  accounting measures  of profit.  The  size of  the difference 
between  accounting profit and  economic  income  (measured  by  the mean  squared 
relative error)  seems  to be  smallest  for  inflation rates between  5%  and  10%, 
increasing for  inflation rates outside this range.  The  size of  the differ-
ence  is not materially affected by  a  change  in the growth rate from  2% 
to  5%,  but declines  significantly when  the  growth rate increases  to  7%. 
The  direction of  the difference between accounting profit  and 
economic  income  is virtually unaffected by changes  in the  growth rate,  for 
a  given rate of  inflation.  However,  there is a  clear  tendency for  the 
directionto  change  as  the rate of  inflation changes.  At  low  levels of 
inflation  (5%  and  below)  accounting profit tends  to overstate economic 
income  over  the life of  the  firm. 
position reverses. 
At  higher rates  (10%  and  above)  the 
44 TABLE  5 
Arithmetic Average  of Error,  Bias  and  r 2  Statistics 
1:\ 
.02  .05  .07 
Error  Bias  r2  Error  Bias  2  Error  Bias  r2  r 
.oo 
.05 
.10 
.15 
.20 
.1799  .2430  .130  .1800  .2102  .183  .1235  .1977  .046 
.1445  .0747  .364  .1356  .0321  .662  .0915  .0301  .841 
.1392  -.0406  .720  .1334 -.0842  .810  .1012 -.0815  .902 
.1445 -.1247  .784  .1448 -.1667  .846  .1212 -.1620  .905 
.1552  -.1887  .809  .1611 -.2284  .863  .1433  -.2231  .904 
Accounting Profit as  a  Predictor of Economic  Income 
We  consider finally  the  third statistic we  have  used  to  summarise  the 
results of  the simulation- the coefficient of determination  (r2).  This 
statistic measures  the proportion of  changes  in economic  income  that may  be 
accounted  for  by  changes  in accounting profit.  As  such,  it provides  an 
indication of  the  likely usefulness of  accounting measures  of profit as 
predictors of  economic  income. 
At  first sight,  the r 2  values  in Table  5  suggest  that,  in a  large number 
of circumstances,  conventional  accounting figures  may  be  good  predictors of 
economic  income.  In a  majority of cases,  r2  is greater  than 0.8,  i.e.  in 
45 such cases  over  80%  of  the  change  in economic  income  is associated with 
a  change  in accounting profit.  The  results must  be  viewed with caution, 
however.  The  highest values  of  r 2  are associated with high rates of  inflation 
and  growth.  It is  important  to note  th~ there is virtually no  correlation 
between  accounting profit and  economic  income  when  zero inflation is assumed. 
It seems  probable that,  for  the data in our  simulation,  the  impact  of  inflation 
and  growth  is large relative to  the  impact  of other factors  affecting the 
relationship between accounting proftand  economic  income.  We  conclude that, 
in these  circumstances,  the prediction of  inflation and  growth rates may 
be more  important  than  the  identification of  the relationship between account-
ing profit and  economic  income. 
A further  reason for viewing  the high r2  values with caution is that 
they may  be  caused by  the particular relationships  assumed  in the model. 
More  extensive testing,  under  a  much  wider  range of  assumed  internal  and 
environmental  conditions,  is necessary before  any  firm conclusions  can be 
reached  about  the usefulness  of  accounting profit as  a  predictor of  economic 
income. 
Within  the  limitations outlined above,  we  may  make  some  preliminary 
comments  about  the relative predictive value of  accounting profit measures 
prepared using different  conventions.  The  r 2  values  given  in the tables  in 
the  appendix  suggest  that,  for  the data assumed  in the simulation,  those 
conventions which produce measures  of  accounting profit that  approximate  economic 
income  most  closely  (i.e.  have  low relative errors)  also produce  accounting 
numbers  having  the greatest ability to predict  economic  income.  The 
differences  between  the  r 2  values of numbers  prepared  from  alternative 
accounting  conventions  are sufficiently large to  suggest  that,  in general, 
certain conventions may  produce  accounting profit figures  that are significantly 
more  useful  than others  as predictors of  economic  income. Conclusions 
The  results  of  the  simulation exercise  should not be regarded  as 
conclusive.  The  analysis first requires  extension in several ways  and 
such  extensions  are proposed  in research which we  are undertaking.  The 
model  described  above  deals with a  simple  firm operating in a  simple  environ-
ment.  It would  be desirable to  investigate various more  complex  sets of 
transactions  and  environmental  influences.  It may  also be interesting to 
extend  the  analysis  to  investigate the  assumption  that  the firm is attempting 
to optimise its output  level when  explicit  assumptions  are made  about  movements 
in the sales  price-volume relationship for  its product.  Various  other 
combinations  of  accounting  conventions  should be  examined  including  conventions 
that  allow for  changes  in the  index of retail prices.  Our  above  analysis 
has  assumed  that prices of all inputs  and  outputs  change  at the  same  rate. 
It would  be  interesting to  investigate the situation in which  there are 
relative price  changes  of  inputs - and  to inves,igatethe usefulness,  in that 
situation,  of  accounting reports based  on  current values. 
Firm conclusions  about  the relationships between accounting profit 
and  economic  income  must  await  the results of  such further  analysis. 
In  the  circumstances  investigated,  certain accounting  conventions 
resulted in superior measures  of  accounting profit,  i.e.  some  accounting 
conventions  seemed  more  useful  than others.  However,  no  group  of  conventions 
tested  led  to  a  measure  of  accounting profit that was  a  good  approximation 
to  economic  income,  or a  consistently good  predictor of  it. 
47 Appendix  to  Section 3 
Summaries  of  the Error,  Bias  and  r2  Statistics 
GROUP  A 
\ 
.02  .05  .07 
! 
Error  Bias  r2  Error  Bias  r2  Error 
J  Bias  r2 
I 
.00  .1343  .2317  .114  .1447  .2028  .168  .1020  I  .1902  .024 
.05  .0992  .0692  .475  .1028  .0304  .739  .0686  .0294  .905 
.10  .0984  -0.0395  .796  . 1036  -0.0805  • 8671 .  .0770  -0.0763  .957 
I 
.15  .1088  -0.1185  .842  .11'75  -0.1589  .894!  .0964  -0.1526  .954 
I 
.20  .1233  -0.1788  .857  .1353  -0.2178  .905  .1185  -0.2108  .948 
I 
Accounting  conventions: 
FIFO;  Full Cost;  Straight Line. 
48 GROUP  B 
\ 
: 
.02  .05  .07 
Error  Bias  r2  Error  Bias  r2  Error  Bias  r2 
.00  .1676  .2423  .153  .1690  .2097  .201  .1123  .1965  .048 
.05  .1229  .0724  .406  .1189  .0312  .698  .0784  .0294  .883 
.10  .1165  -0.0407  .760  .1163  -0.0829  .843  .0866  -0.0795  .938 
.15  .1238  -0.1222  .816  .1285  -0.1631  .875  .1060  -0.1576  .937 
.20  .1364  -0.1841  .837  .1455  -0.2231  .889  .1280  -0.2168  .933 
Accounting  conventions: 
FIFO;  Direct Cost;  Straight Line. 
GROUP  C 
1:\11 
' 
.02  '  .05  .07  II 
II 
I  Error  Bias  r2  Error  Bias  2  Error  Bias  2  r  r 
.00  .1419  .2329  .074  .1460  .2027  .153  .1015  .1898  .017 
.05  .1606  .0766  .295  .1393  .0323  .634  .0890  .0295  .838 
.10  .1711  -0.0400  .648  .1498  -o.0859  .771  .1117  -0.0842  .872 
.15  .1786  '-0.1284  .721  .1656  -0.1722  .806  .1384  -0.1685  .867 
.20  .1882  ~.1963  .754  .1836  -o.2373  .826  .1641  -0.2332  .864 
Accounting  conventions: 
LIFO;  Full Cost;  Straight Line. 
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~-
.02  .05  .07 
Error  Bias  r2  Error  Bias  2  Error  Bias  r2  r 
\ 
.oo  .1676  .2423  .153  .1690  .2097  .201  .1123  .1965  .048 
.05  .1750  .0792  .265  .1522  .0335  .606  .1000  .0303  .806 
.10  .1785  ··0.0400  .639  .1574  -0.0867  • 760  .1197  -0.0854  .857 
.15  .1829  -0.129~  .717  .1707  -0.1735  .800  .1443  -0.1704  .857 
• 20  .1911  -0.1973  .751  .1874  -0.2388  .821  .1688  -0.2352  .858 
Accounting  conventions: 
LIFO,  Direct Cost;  Straight Line 
GROUP  E 
~; 
! 
j 
.02  .05  .07 
Error  Bias  r2  Error  Bias  r2  Error  Bias  r2 
.00  .1340  .2313  .100  .1448  .2027  .165  .1018  .1902  .023 
.05  .0997  .0691  .477  .1035  .0303  .737  .0689  .0293  .905 
.10  .0994  ... 0.0398  .795  .1046  ... 0.0807  .865  .0777  -0.0766  .956 
.15  .1101  -0.1190  .840  .1187  -0.1595  .891  .0975  -0.1532  .952 
.20  .1249  -0.1796  .855r  .1369  -o.2187  .902  .1200  ... 0.2118  .946 
~  I  -
Accounting  conventions: 
Average  Cost;  Full Cost ;  Straight Line. 
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1:\. 
.02  .05  .07 
Error  Bias  2  Error  Bias  r2  Error  Bias  r2  r 
.oo  .1676  .2423  .153  .1690  .2097  .201  .1123  .1965  .048 
.05  .1236  .0725  .404  .1195  .0313  .697  .0788  .0294  .884 
.10  .1176  -0.0407  .757  .1172  -0.0830  .841  .0873  -0.0798  .936 
.15  .1251  -0.1225  .814  .1296  -0.1635  .873  .1071  -o.l581  .935 
.20  .1380  -0.1846  .834  .1469  -0.2238  .887  .1293  -0.2176  .930 
!  I  I 
Accounting  conventions: 
Average  Cost;  Direct Cost;  Straight Line. 
GROUP  G 
~ 
.02  .05  .07 
Error  Bias  r2  Error  Bias  r2  Error  Bias  r2 
.00  .3322  .2783  .163  .3176  .2343  .195  .2224  .2242  .112 
.05  .2305  .0836  .226  .2130  .0355  .525  .1567  .0331  .666 
.10  .1929  -0.0436  .646  .1846  -0.0895  .723  .1485  -0.0886  • 801 
.15  .1825  -0.1333  .736  .1830  -0.1759  • 780  .1585  -0.1736  .831 
.20  .1848  -0.1999  .775  .1919  -0.2392  .810  .1744  ... 0.2366  .847 
Accounting conventions: 
FIFO;  Full Cost;  Reducing  Balance. 
51 4.  A COMPARISON  OF  ACCOUNTING  PROFIT  AND  ECONOMIC  PROFIT 
The  Available Data 
The  purpose of this part of  the report is to  investigate differences 
at the macro  level between alternative measures of business results.  Data 
are not  available for  the  computation of all the measures  referred  to  in 
Section 2  above.  Economic  income  cannot  be measured  at  the macro  level 
because  the measurement  process would  require  an  estimate of  the wealth of 
all businesses  in  terms  of  the present value of  future net receipts  and  such 
estimates rarely exist in explicit form  even at  the  level of  the  individual 
firm  (except,  perhaps,  as  stock market valuations).  Moreover,  estimates 
of  economic profit measured  in the manner  suggested  in  Section 2  are not 
available.  Nevertheless,  some  indication of  the extent of the differences 
between  accounting  and  economic  measures  of profit can be derived  from 
published data and it is possible  to  estimate the effects on profit measures 
of  including or excluding holding gains. 
Most  of  the data used  below are derived  from "National  Income  and 
Expenditure  1973"  (the  Blue  Book)  published by  the Central Statistical Office. 
The  data selected for present purposes  are restricted to  the  company  sector 
and  omit  businesses which  are constituted  as  sole-traders or partnerships. 
However,  conclusions  for  the  company  sector are interesting in their own 
right.  The  estimates of  accounting data  taken  from  the Blue  Book  represent 
an  aggregation of  information  contained  in tax returns  submitted by  companies 
to the  Inland Revenue,  These  estimates are  probably reasonably accurate. 
The  estimates used  to modify  the  accounting data,  in particular  stock 
appreciation and  capital consumption,  are regarded  by  the Central Statistical 
Office  as  subject  to errors in excess  of  10%. 
Accounting Profit 
Aggregate  accounting profits are presented  in Table  6.  The  gross profits 
52 from operations are reduced  by  the  amount  of  the depreciation of  fixed 
capital.  The  figures  for  depreciation represent  the statutory allowances 
granted for  purposes of  tax assessment  and  will differ from  the  amounts 
charged  in the  annual  accounts  of  companies.  This difference arises 
because  companies  can  choose  the methods  of providing depreciation in their 
accounts,  whereas  a  particular  system and  fixed  rates are prescribed for  tax 
purposes.  However,  both are based  on  the historical cost of  fixed  assets. (l) 
The  use  of  statutory depreciation allowances  eliminates  the effects of 
variations  from  company  to  company  in the method  of providing depreciation. 
The  disadvantages  of  using  these figures  are that  they differ from  accounting 
numbers,  the primary object of  our  attentio~,  and  the statutory allowances  are 
frequently altered to  stimulate or depress  investment,  i.e.  as  a  measure of 
fiscal control  independent  of  economic  costs.  The  difference between 
accounting  charges  and  taxation  &lowances will depend  on  the average  age 
of  assets. 
A particular problem associated with  the use of  statutory depreciation 
allowances  in recent years was  brought  about  by  changes  to  tax laws  in 1970. 
The  changes  permitted companies  to deduct  from  profits  a  substantial portion 
of  the cost  of  new  plant  and  machinery purchased  after 27th October  1970. (2) 
Accordingly,  substantial allowances were  claimed  in 1971  and  1972;  these were 
in excess  of  the 
11normal
11  depreciation for  one  year on  a  historical cost basis 
and,  furthermore,  they  considerably exceeded depreciation on  a  current cost 
basis - capital  consumption - as  estimated by  the Central Statistical Office. 
l.  Investment  allowances,  when  granted,  represented  an  allowance  over  and 
above  the historical costs.  However,  the figures  in Table 6  are not 
greatly affected.  Investment  allowances  granted  amounted  to only £6 
million in 1968  and  £1  million in 1969  for  the  combined  corporate and 
personal  sectors. 
2•  After 21st March  1974,  in certain instances,  the whole  cost may  be 
deducted  in the year  of  acquisition.  Further distortion is therefore 
to be  expected  in 1974. 
53 TABLE  6 
Accounting Profit 
1.  Gross  profits of  companies  1968  1969 
operating in the  United  Kingdom 
(before providing for  depreci-
ation and  stock appreciation)  5,275  5,143 
2.  Less  Statutory depreciation 
allowances  granted  for  purposes 
of  tax  assessment  1,828  2,033 
3.  Net profits of  companies 
operating in the  United  Kingdom  3,447  3,110 
4.  Add  Rent  and  non-trading 
income  1,725  1,916 
5,172  5,026 
Less  Interest payments 
5.  Debenture  and  Loan  Interest  425  495 
6.  Other  interest paid by  banks, 
etc.  416  484 
Accounting Profit:  4,331  4,047 
Source:  1973  Blue  Book  Lines  1,  4,  5  and  6:  Table  26 
Line  2:  Page  113 
Line  3:  Table  31 
TABLE  7 
Depreciation Charges 
1968  1969 
1.  Statutory depreciation 
allowances  granted  for 
purposes  of  tax  assessment  1,828  2,033 
2.  Capital  consumption at 
current  cost  1,431  1,579 
Source:  1973  Blue  Book,  Table  57  and  page  113. 
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(£ million) 
1970  1971  1972 
5,279  5,756  6,584 
2,457  3,339  4,282 
2,822  2,417  2,302 
2,149  2,460  2,946 
4,971  4,877  5,248 
554  592  630 
485  452  529 
3,932  3,833  4,089 
(f.  million) 
1970  1971  1972 
2,457  3,339  4,282 
1,791  2,049  2,309 The  figures  for  statutory depreciation and  capital  consumption  in recent 
years  are  compared  in Table  7.  In the years  1968  through  1972 
the statutory allowances  exceeded  the real capital consumption,  and  the 
difference was  substantial  in 1971  and  1972.  In a  period  of  rising prices, 
depreciation calculated at historical cost may  be  expected  to be  a  smaller 
amount  than depreciation based  on  current prices  (for  example,  replacement 
costs).  However,  the particular method  of  calculating statutory depreciation 
allowances  prescribed in the United Kingdom  has  led  to the reverse of  the 
expected result.  This  fact  should be kept  in mind  when  examining  the measures 
of  accounting profit presented  in Table  6. 
Alternative Measures  of Profit 
Direct estimates  of  the alternative measures  of profit discussed  in 
Section 2  cannot be  obtained  from  the published data.  Accounting profits 
recognise revenues  at  the  time when  sales are made,  whereas  economic  profit 
recognises revenues  equal  to current selling prices when  production takes 
place.  A strict calculation of  economic  profit would  require revaluation 
of  stocks  of  finished  goods  at  selling prices  and  information for  that 
purpose  is not available.  However,  we  can obtain some  indication of  the 
levels of  economic profit by using  information available  to revalue  stocks 
and  depreciation at current cost prices. 
First, we  suppose  that  the  entity view is accepted,  i.e.  companies  are 
viewed  as  distinct and  separate from  the  owners  of  the  share capital,  so  that 
holding gains  are  excluded  from profit measures.  This measure is then 
compared  with  that  implied by  the proprietary view of  economic  profit by 
examining  the holding gains  in each period.  As  was  noted  in  Section 2,  the 
entity and  proprietary views  of  economic profit differ only in that real 
holding gains  are  included  in the latter butexcluded  from  the former. 
55 Economic  Profit  :  An  Entity View 
An  entity view of profits is given  in Table  8.  The  two  adjustments 
which require comment  are  stock appreciation and  capital consumption. 
(a)  Stock Appreciation 
The  gross  trading profits of  companies  are an  aggregation of profit 
measured  according  to historical cost  conventions.  Both  opening  and 
closing  stocks  are valued  in the  accounts  of  companies at their historical 
cost.  However,  an  improved  estimate of  economic profit would  be 
obtained if opening  and  closing  stocks were valued at current prices. 
Stock appreciation is  calculated at  the Central Statistical Office as 
the difference between  (i)  the estimated  increase in the physical 
quantity of  stocks valued at current  replacement  costs,  and  (ii)  the 
increase in the book value of  those stocks.  The  effect of  the adjustment 
for  stock appreciation in Table  8  is to revalue stocks at current prices. 
(b)  Capital Consumption 
The  depreciation charge in the calculation of  accounting profit is 
valued  at historical costs.  In economic profit calculations depreciation 
should  be measured  at current prices.  In Table  1, which illustrated 
the  calculation of  economic profit,  the deduction  of depreciation was 
referred  to as "capital replacement",  i.e.  the  amount  required to replace 
the  capital  stock used  up  in production.  The  capital consumption, 
estimated at  the Central Statistical Office,  is the  amount  of  capital 
replacement  in current prices required for  all companies.  Thus,  it 
should be deducted  from  gross  trading profits in a  calculation of 
economic profit. 
In Table 9  our estimates  of  aggregate accounting profit and  of  an entity 
view of  aggregate  economic  profit are  compared.  It can be  seen that the 
differences between  the  two  are not  substantial except  in the years  1971  and 
1972  when  the estimate of  accounting profits may  be  an understatement because 
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2. 
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5. 
6. 
TABLE  8 
An  Entity View  of Profits 
1968 
Income  arising in the United 
Kingdom 
Gross  trading profits  5,275 
Rent  and  non-trading  income  1,725 
7,000 
Less Capital  consumption  1,431 
Less  Stock appreciation  458 
5,111 
Less  Interest payments 
Debenture  and  loan interest  425 
Other  interest paid by  banks 
etc.  416 
4,270 
Source:  1973  Blue  Book 
Lines  1,  2,  4  and  5:  Table  26 
Line  3:  Table  57 
Line 4:  Table  69 
TABLE  9 
Profits Compared 
1968 
1969 
5,143 
1,916 
7,059 
1,579 
583 
4,897 
495 
484 
3,918 
1969 
(£  million) 
1970  1971  1972 
5,279  5,756  6,584 
2,149  2,460  2,946 
7,428  8,216  9,530 
1,791  2,049  2,309 
884  834  1,057 
4,753  5,333  6,164 
554  592  630 
485  452  529 
3,714  4,289  5,005 
(£ million) 
1970  1971  1972 
Accounting profit 
Entity view of  economic  profit 
4,331  4,047  3,932  3,933  4,089 
4,270  3,918  3,714  4,289  5,005 
Source:  Tables  6  and  8 
57 of  the  increases  in statutory depreciation allowances.  In general, 
an  overestimate  of  depreciation in conventional  accounting  seems  to be 
offset by  the  inclusion of  stock appreciation.  In view of  the uncertainty 
in the depreciation estimates,  however,  these  conclusions  should be 
interpreted cautiously. 
Holding  Gains 
The  difference between  the  entity view of  economic  profits as 
presented  in Table  8  and  the proprietary view of  economic profit is that 
real  gains  from  holding  assets  should be  included  in the latter.  These 
gains  are  equal  to  the  increase in the value  of  assets  in excess of  the 
amount  required to maintain the purchasing  power  of  the  investment  in the 
assets.  Two  important  classes of asset are fixed  capital  and  stock.  The 
gains  arising from  the holdings  of  fixed  capital are estimated in Table  10. 
The  change  in  the prices of  fixed  assets has  not  in general been very 
different  from  the  change  in the prices of  consumer  goods  and  services  and 
so  the  holding gains  or  losses  are not  substantial.  Similar calculations 
could  be  performed  for  stocks.  However,  the increase in prices of fixed 
assets  and  stocks have  been  similar  and  there are unlikely to be  significant 
real  gains  at the aggregate  level  from  holding  stocks;  at the  aggregate 
level,  real gains  and  losses  experienced by  individual  firms  tend  to offset 
each other  as  the various  price increases work  their way  through the 
economy. 
A further  component  of  holding gains  can arise because  a  company  has 
borrowed  capital,  either  from  the capital market  or  from  suppliers  in the 
form  of  trade credit.  As  prices rise the purchasing  power  of  indebtedness 
falls,  and  the debtor  experiences  a  holding gain.  The  reverse  is true of 
a  company  which makes  loans  or  is  owed  money  by its customers.  Such 
holding  gains  (or  losses)  may  be  large for  the  individual  companies but 
will  be  relatively quite  small at  the aggregate  level.  If the corporate 
58 TABLE  10 
Holding  Gains  on  Fixed Capital 
(£ million) 
1968  1969  1970  1971  1972 
1.  Net  capital stock at current 
prices -measured at year  end  31,300  34,800  39,600  44,700  50,100 
2.  Less  Gross  domestic  fixed 
capital  formation during 
year at current prices  2,996  3,544  3,905  3,916  4,275 
3.  Add  capital consumption during 
year 
Net  capital stock at start of 
period  at current prices 
4.  Net  capital  stock at the  end 
of  previous  year at prices  then 
28,304  31,256 
1,431  1,579 
29,735  32,835 
prevailing  28,700  31,300 
Total gain 
5.  Less  Amount  required  to 
retain purchasing  power  of 
investment  in capital  stock* 
Real  gain 
6.  Total gain as  % of  investment 
in capital stock at start of 
period 
7.  % change  in index of  consumer 
goods  and  services prices 
*  Note: 
1,035  1,535 
1,406  1,721 
-371  -186 
3.6  4.9 
4.9  5.5 
35,695  40,784  45,825 
1,791  2,049  2,309 
37,486  42,833  48,134 
34,800  39,600  44,700 
2,686  3,233  3,434 
2,018  3,247  2,816 
668  -14  618 
7.7  8.2  7.7 
5.8  8.2  6.3 
The  amount  required  to retain the purchasing  power  of  investment  in capital 
stock is calculated by multiplying  the net capital stock at end  of  previous 
year at prices  then prevailing,  line 4,  by  the  change  in the  index  of 
consumer  prices,  line 7. 
Source:  1971  Blue Book 
Lines  1  and  4:  Table  63 
Line  2:  Table  51 
Line 3:  Table  57 
Line  7:  derived  from Table  16 
59 sector is  taken for  the measurement  of  aggregate profits,  these gains 
will be made  (or  losses  incurred)  from  the net  indebtedness of  the rest of 
the  economy  to  tbecorporate  sector.  However,  if the  economy  as  a  whole 
is taken  such gains will be offset by  losses in other sectors,  because the 
holding gains  to  the debtor  (the person owing  money)  will be offset by the 
holding  losses  to the creditor  (the person to whom  the money  is owed). 
There will be  an  exception in respect of  foreign transactions,  but  this 
may  be  offset by  changes  in the  exchange rate.  Thus,  at the aggregate  level 
gains  or  losses  from  indebtedness will not  be  significant. 
Conclusions at the Aggregate Level 
There  do  not  appear to be significant differences between accounting 
and  economic measures  of profit  as we  have  estimated  them at  the macro  level. 
However,  the position is not  completely clear because  our  estimates have 
used  statutory depreciation allowances  for  accounting profit and  because 
we  have  ignored  some  of  the  opportunity costs associated with production 
for  stock in estimating economic profit. 
The  Individual  Firm 
We  have  suggested that differences at  the aggregate level between 
accounting profit and  economic profit may  be quite small.  At  the level of 
the  individual firm,  however,  there may  well be significant  and  varied 
differences.  Table  11  presents  the  accounting profits per  share for  20 
companies  quoted  on  United  Kingdom  stock exchanges  (i)  as  reported  in their 
accounts  (unadjusted profits),  and  ~i) as  adjusted for general  changes  in 
purchasing power  (adjusted profits)  i.e.  costing  inputs  to production at 
original cost  adjusted  to the equivalent current purchasing power.  The 
results  are  taken from  a  study of  the effects of  adjusting the accounts  of 
137  quoted  companies  for  purchasing  power  changes.  The  particular companies 
for which  the measures  are reported represent  the  10  companies with the 
60 TABLE  11 
Adjusting Accounting Profit for  Price Level  Changes 
Land  Securities 
Metropolitan Estates 
Commercial  Union 
Sun  Alliance 
Royal 
St.Martins Property 
Guardian Royal 
Grand  Metropolitan Hotels 
General Accident 
Trust  House  Forte 
Tubes 
Johnson Matthey 
GEC 
Ocean 
rlowater 
Babcock  & Wilcox 
British Leyland 
Vickers 
P.  and  0. 
International Computers 
Accounting Profit 
per  share 
(as reported) 
5.2 
7.9 
12.6 
38.1 
25.6 
3.3 
14.2 
11.0 
13.1 
10.9 
25.7 
16.7 
7.9 
7.0 
5.8 
5.1 
2.9 
6.0 
5.1 
3.3 
Accounting Profit 
{adjusted  for  price 
level  changes) 
26.6 
23.4 
32.5 
78.8 
50.4 
5.7 
23.2 
17.7 
21.0 
16.8 
2.6 
0.6 
0.2 
- 0.7 
- 1.0 
- 0.9 
- 1.2 
- 3.7 
- 4.7 
- 13.8 
Percentage Change 
in reported 
Accounting Profit 
+  414 
+  195 
+  158 
+  107 
+  97 
+  73 
+  63 
+  61 
+  60 
+  54 
90 
96 
97 
- 110 
- 117 
- 118 
- 141 
- 162 
- 192 
- 521 
Source;  R.S.  Cutler  and  C.A.  Westwick,  "  The  Impact  of  Inflation 
Accounting  on  the Stock Exchange",  Accountancy  (March  1973) 
pp.  15-24. 
61 largest  surplus  of  adjusted profits over unadjusted profits and  the  10 
with the  largest  surplus  of  unadjusted profits over  adjusted profits - in 
both cases  in percentage terms.  The  table discloses  substantial differences 
between  the measures.  At  one  extreme,  the difference between the  two 
profit measures  for  Land  Securities was  four  times  the unadjusted profit. 
At  the other  end  of  the  scale,  a  small  unadjusted profit of  International 
Computers  was  equivalent  to a  substantial adjusted  loss. 
The  inflation adjustments  reported  in Table  11  are based  on  an  adjust-
ment  of historic cost for  general purchasing  power  changes  and  do  not represent 
current prices as  required for  economic  profit calculations.  Nevertheless, 
the adjustments  are indicative of  the order  of magnitude that might  be 
found  in calculations of  economic profit.  Thus,  although the alternative 
measures  of profit are not  significantly different at the aggregate level, 
the difference between particular measures may  be  substantial when  the 
individual firm is considered - an  important  consideration for  purposes of 
government  price  control. 
62 5.  CONCLUSION 
The first question raised  in our  study  concerns  the  identification 
of  the measure  of business profit which  an  incomes  policy should  seek  to 
control.  A supplementary question should be  asked  about  the practicality 
of  the  chosen measure. 
Long  and  Short Term  Policies 
If an  incomes  policy is to be  implemented  for  an  indifinite period,  it 
might be argued  that choice of  a  particular method  of measuring business 
profit may  be of  less  importance  than when  a  short  term policy is being 
considered.  This  argument  would  reflect the fact  that different measures 
will produce  similar  aggregates  over  long  periods  of  time,  and  the view that 
it may  not matter greatly if a  chosen measure  shifts benefits  from  one year 
to another  compared  to  some  alternative measure.  In measuring  economic 
income,  gains will be recognised when  the opportunity of realising  them  is 
first identified,  in economic profit when  production takes  place and  in 
accounting profit when  the ultimate sale takes  place.  This  view  s·eems 
over-simplified,  however.  The  trend  of results  from year  to year  has  a 
significant  influence on price control  and  the use  of  a  measure which yields 
"errors"  in individual years may  introduce significant distortions.  Moreover, 
the extent  to which  a  downwards  bias  in the price in one  year  may  be  compensated 
by  allowing  a  higher price later will be restricted by market  demand. 
Most  people would  agree  that  the  choice of  a  particular method  of 
measuring business profit is critical if the  incomes  policy is to be  removed 
after a  short period of  time,  or  is to be more  or  less  severe in particular 
periods.  In  such  a  case,  the date on which  the  economic  benefits are deemed 
to accrue  to  the proprietors  is important.  A policy based  on  control of 
accounting profit may  not  limit the  economic benefits accruing during  the 
period  in which control  is attempted because  the benefits may  not  be realised 
and  hence not  reported until  a  subsequent period.  This may  have  an 
63 important  implication for  the equity of  an  incomes  policy,  as wage  earners 
are not  in a  position to defer  the  counting of  the  economic  benefits which 
accrue  to  them. 
Usefulness  of  Economic  Income 
It is not  the purpose of  the present discussion to weigh all the 
economic  effects of  an  incomes  policy,  but  to  indicate the measures  of 
business profit which  are consistent with  economic  analysis,  and  to  compare 
such  measures with  the data produced  by accountants.  On  the grounds of 
equity and  efficiency, it may  be  suggested  that  economic  income  is a  desirable 
measure  of  business profit because it reflects the  success  of  attempts at 
wealth maximisation.  However,  we  have  noted  that  economic  income  cannot 
be measured  (or,  more  important,  verified) directly,  and  we  have not yet 
found  a  method  of calculating accounting profit which is a  reasonable proxy 
for  the  economic  measure  or which  is a  consistently good  predictor of it. 
It was  demonstrated  in Section 2  that  economic profit maximisation 
represents  a  short  term proxy for  the maximisation of  wealth.  As  economic 
income  represents  changes  in wealth,  a  control on  economic  profit is also 
a  proxy for  the  control  of  economic  income.  Thus,  the  economic  effects of 
controlling economic  profit would  be  substantially similar to  the  effects of 
controlling  economic  income. 
Economic  Profit - Entity View  versus Proprietary View 
Holding  gains may  be  included  in or  excluded  from  economic measures  of 
profit.  Such  gains  are  included  in economic profit if a  business  is 
regarded  as  an  extension of its owners,  i.e.  the  as~ets and  liabilities of 
the business  form  a  part of  the assets  and  liabilities of  the  individuals 
who  own  the business.  However,  if the business  is viewed  as  a  separate 
entity,  it can be  argued  that price increases  in assets held by  the business 
should  not  be  regarded  as  a  benefit. 
64 The  choice between the proprietary and  entity views  may  be  regarded, 
in part,  as  a  political matter.  However,  there are economic  consequences 
which  should  be  considered.  If  the proprietary view is accepted  for all 
businesses  and  the  appropriate profits are controlled,  individual  firms  may 
experience difficulties in financing  their operations.  If relative prices 
of  a  firm's assets  increase in some  current period,  the business will require 
additional  funds  to finance  replacement.  The  control  of  profits including 
holding gains,  may  prevent  the firm from  raising  such  finance out  of  its 
own  operations.  If it wishes  to maintain the scale of  its operations, tt 
would  be  forced  to restrict dividend payments  to its owners  or raise the 
finance  on  the capital market.  Theoretically,  the optimal decision for  the 
wealth maximising  firm would  normally be  to restrict the payment  to  owners. 
In practice,  however,  directors of  companies dislike reducing dividends 
and  would  probably draw  on  capital market  funds  or retained earnings.  If 
capital were  rationed,  the  consequence would  be  a  reduction in funds  available 
for  expansion.  This may  or may  not be  thought desirable.  An  additional 
and  perhaps more  fundamental  point  is that economic  profit excluding holding 
gains is not maximised  when  wealth is maximised.  The  exclusion of  holding 
gains  for  control purposes might  therefore be  thought  likely to  lead  to 
undesirable distortion in the allocation of resources.  There  seems  tobe 
a  strong case for  taking the proprietary view of  economic  profit. 
Accounting Profit 
The  case for  using a  conventional measure  of  accounting profit for 
purposes of price and  incomes  control depends  on  a  demonstration that  the 
measure would  represent  a  good  proxy for  economic  profit or  economic  income. 
In Section 3  we  showed  that there was  no  reason to  suppose  that  accounting 
profit was  a  good  proxy for  economic  income.  In Section 4  we  argued  that 
although accounting profit might  approximate  an  entity view of  economic  profit 
at the aggregate level,  there would  probably be  substantial distortions from 
65 its use at the level  of  the  individual  firm.  Conventional  accounting 
profit does  not  seem  to be  a  suitable basis for  control. 
Summary 
It was  suggested  above  that  economic  income  is the most  comprehensive 
measure  of  the economic  benefits accruing to the  owners  of  a  business 
enterprise,  but  that  there are  serious practical difficulties in its measure-
ment.  Thus,  some  proxy measure  should  be used.  The  economic model  given 
in the  appendix  to  Section 2  was  used  to demonstrate  that  economic profit is 
the short  run equivalent of  economic  income.  Hence,  the measurement  of 
economic  profit would  appear  to provide  a  good  proxy measure;  conventional 
accounting measures  seem  not  to be  good  proxies.  There  seems  to be  a  strong 
case,  however,  for  purposes  of  control  of prices and  incomes,  to adapt 
conventional  accounting measures  to bring  them as  close as  reasonably practicable 
to the measure  of  economic profit.  This would  involve valuing assets  and 
inputs  to production on  a  current  cost basis  and  also making  adjustments for 
changes  in the general price level.  The  arguments  given above  suggest  that 
adjustments  to  conventional  accounting profits for  changes  in the general 
price  level would  represent  some  improvement  over  present practice but would 
fall  short  of  the attainable ideal. 
More  research is needed before firm conclusions  can be  reached  on 
these questions,  however.  More  complex models  for  the derivation of  economic 
profit require investigation,  and  further  simulation studies are required 
to discover whether  economic  income  or  economic  profit can be predicted 
more  effectively by using  combinations of  accounting  conventions not yet 
considered,  or by  developing new  sets of  accounting  conventions. 
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FINANCIAL  SECTOR  CONTROLS, 
PROFITABILITY  AND  INFLATION. 
by 
Michael  Parkin and  Zannis Res. 
67 This  chapter examines  the relationship between  the profitability of 
banks  and  financial  intermediaries and  the rate of inflation.  It also 
analyzes  the effects on  the rate of inflation itself of alternative methods 
of controlling the profitability of  these institutions.  The  chapter is 
divided into  two  sections.  In the first, we  examine  the behaviour of 
interest rates  and  liability and  asset  levels in relation to the inflation rate 
in order to gauge  the effects of inflation upon  the profitability of  the 
financial  sector.  We  also examine  the movements  of real rates of interest 
as  inflation progresses~  That  is, we  examine  the extent to which  nominal 
rates of interest adjust  to reflect changes  in the rate of  inflation.  In the 
second  section we  analyze  the effects upon  the rate of  inflation of  attempting 
to control the profitability of banks  and  financial  intermediaries by  (a) 
controlling the rates of interest which  they may  pay  on  their liabilities 
and  which  they receive on  their assets and  (b)  by  controlling the overall 
scale of their activity through control of  the reserve base of  the  system. 
We  also suggest  how  the effects of  inflation upon  borrowing  and  lending and 
intertemporal resource misallocation could be  minimised. 
Our  major  conclusions are that nominal  interest rates have  not  been 
allowed  to rise far enough  to maintain positive real rates of  interest but 
that the profitability of domestic banks  and  Building Societies has  inproved 
because their borrowing rates have  been held down  relative to their  lending 
rates.  Interest rates in the more  competitive Euro-currency markets  have 
moved  to keep  up  with world wide  inflation and  those banks  which operate 
in both domestic  and  Euro-markets  have  seen a  decline in their profitability. 
We  suggest that in order  to avoid undesirable movements  in financial  sector 
profitability and  to prevent inflation from  seriously misallocating  resources 
and  redistributing wealth,  interest rates  should change  fully to reflect changes  in the rate of inflation encouraged by  competition from  index linked 
National  Savings  assets and  Government  Bonds.  Additionally we  present a  scheme 
for  indexing mortgages  so  as  to minimise  the  impact  of  changes  in the rate of 
inflation on  liquidity.  Additionally,the overall level of profits could and 
should be  controlled by  traditional techniques  of monetary control which 
place  limits on  the volume  of reserves  made  available to the banking  system. 
69 1~  The  Relationship between Profitability and  Interest Rates  in the 
Financial Sector. 
Over  the last few  years most  industrialized countries  have  experienced an 
increase in their rates of  inflation and  the U.K.  has  been no  exception to 
this.  Chart  1  gives  a  time  series account  of  this inflationary experience, 
starting from the early sixties.  Previously,  during the late fifties and 
the 
the  turn o£/decade,inflation was  not really a  problem.  Since  then,  however, 
a  series  of  inflationary waves  have  taken place,  reaching higher  and  higher 
levels in succession,  until, by  the end  of  1973,  double digit inflation 
became ·a  reality.  How  did  the different financial  intermediaries  in the U.K. 
perform in the  face  of this inflationary experience?  We  shall analyze  the 
performance  of  four  groups  of  institutions,the Clearing Banks,  the 
Discount Houses,  the Building Societies and  the  Secondary  Banks.  First we 
shall  look at interest rate levels,  second at broad  balance sheet 
aggregates  and  third at our  own  estimated profitability indices. 
We  start with an examination of  interest rates.  There  is,of course, 
a  large number  of  interest rates from which  we  have  selected three 
which  seem  to be  representative of many  more.  They  are  the  three-month 
Local Authority Loan rate as  an indicator of money  market  interest rates, 
the Bank  rate as  an indicator of  the rates on Advances  and  the Government 
"Short"  Bond  r.ate  as  an indicator of medium  term  (five years)  interest 
rates.  These  are  shown  on  Charts  2,  3  and  4.  All  three  series move  in a 
very similar fashion.  They  start at their lowest  levels  in the early 
sixties and  thereafter  seem  to broadly follow  the rate of  inflation.  The 
troughs in the interest rate cycles  seem  to  follow  the  troughs  in the 
inflation rate in the years  1963,  1965,  1967  and  1971.  They  all reach 
their historical heghts at  the  end  of  1973  as  also does  the inflation rate. 
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rate  (defined as  the nominal  interest rate minus  the rate of  inflation)  from 
inflation?  Or,  to  ask the question differently,  are changes  in the  nominal 
rate large enough  to account  for  the rate of  inflation so  that  the real rate 
remains  unchanged?  The  series in Chart  5  shows  that this is not  the case. 
It shows  the difference between  the Local Authority rate and  the inflation 
rate.  In the 1960's when  inflation was  at a  more  tolerable  level  the real 
rate was  mostly positive.  In the  1970's  the  real rate turned mostly negative. 
It seems  then that nominal  interest rates have  not  responded  quickly enough 
and  in large  enough magnitute  to  take  into account  the rate of  inflation. 
This  of  course  should ·be  no  surprise  since U.K.  interest rates are administered 
and  not left free  to reach the  levels  that would  occur  in the  absence  of 
government  interference.  An  interesting comparison can be made  at  this 
point with the Euro-dollar market,  which,  in contrast to  the U.K.  market,  is 
mostly free  of  government  interference.  Chart  6  shows  the real Euro-dollar 
rate,  defined as  the difference between the three-month Euro-dollar rate 
(adjusted for  the dollar premium)  and  the U.S.  infla  .. ion rate.  The  real rate 
is positive throughout  the period  and varies  around  a  roughly constant value 
since 1964.  These  observations do  not  change if we  take  the Euro-dollar rate 
unadjusted for  the dollar premium.  Thus  it seems  that  the uncontrolled 
euro-dollar market rate adjust better to inflationary changes  than do  the 
controlled domestic  U.K.  interest rates. 
How  have  the balance  sheets of  the financial  institutions developed  during 
the period of  the sixties and  early seventies?  We  turn now  to this question. 
As  an overall indicator of  the Banking  Sector chart  7  shows  the U.K. 
money  supply,  broadly defined;  (M3  definition).  From  1962  until  1971  the 
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6~  ~1  73 money  supply expanded  at a  rate slower  than in the period  from  1971  to  1973. 
For  the Clearing  Banks  chart 8  shows  the  level of their Gross Liabilities. 
This  group  of  banks  expanded  slowly in the sixties,  slower  than  the money 
supply indicator above  would  lead us  to believe.  Since  1971,  however,  the 
Clearing Banks  expanded  much  faster. 
The  Discount Houses'assets  expanded  slowly,  in line with the Clearing 
Banks  as  chart  9  indicates.  Since  1971  their assets have  actually 
declined  in contrast  to the Clearing Banks.  The  money  supply does  not 
give  a  true picture of their development  after 1971. 
The  Building Societies  showed  a  steady growth  in their balance sheet 
during  the whole  period of  1962  to  1973.  Chart  10  shows  the  level of 
their  Sha~es and  Deposits which constitute most  of  the liabilities of 
these financial  institutions. 
Chart  11,  lastly,  indicates  the  level of Gross  Deposit  liabilities of 
the  Secondary  Banks.  In comparison to  the money  supply and  the  balance 
sheets  of  the financial  institutions analyzed above,  the  Secondary Banks 
have  had  an  indeed  explosive  growth.  This  is true both for  their domestic 
and  their eurocurrency components  of  their portfolio.In summary  then,  the 
Clearing Banks  and  the Discount  Houses  had  the  slowest expansion in 
their balance  sheets.  The  Building Societies expanded  faster and  the 
Secondary  Banks  expanded explosively. 
Let  us  now  examine  the  interest rate differentials which are relevant 
to  the profitability of  the financial  institutions that we  are concerned 
with. 
77 We  first examine  those which affect the Clearing Banks.  Their 
major  borrowing rate is that on Deposits  and  their main  lending rates 
those  on Call Money,  Bills of all types,  Government  Bonds  and  Advances. 
Chart  12  shows  the differential between the Call  (Lending)  rate and  the 
'Deposit Account  (Borrowing)  rate,  as  a  measure  of profitability on  the 
most  liquid assets  of  the Clearing Banks.  From  1962  to  1971  the differential 
the 
has  narrowly fluctuated  around  1%.  From/end  of  1971  it has  turned against 
the Clearing Banks  and  its variability has  increased. 
The  Treasury Bill rate minus  the Deposit Account  r.ate differential on 
chart  13  is a  measure  of profitability of  the next most  liquid assets  of 
the Clearing  Banks.  From  1962  to  the end  of  1967  there was  some  variation 
around  an average  level of  1.5%.  The  period of  1968  to  1971  shows  less 
variation around  a  level of  1.8%,  which is a  change  in favour  of  the banks. 
Since  the  end  of  1971  the differential has  shown  even wider  fluctuations 
at an average of about  2%.  Thus,  over  the whole  period,this differential 
seems  to have moved  in a  direction beneficial  to  the banks. 
The  next differential,  on chart  14,  which attempts  to  show  the 
profitability of  the Clearing Banks  on more  illiquid assets,  is between 
the Government  "Short"  Bond  rate and  the Deposit Account  r.ate.  This 
differential fluctuates more  widely  than  the previous  one  but  shows  some 
otherwise  similar characteristics.  In the period from  1962  to  the  end  of 
1967  it fluctuates at about  the  2.5%  level.  From  1968  to  1971  it 
fluctuates  less than the previous period at a  level of  2.8%.  Since  1971  this 
differential  seems  to vary more  widely  around  the  level of  3%.  Overall 
then  th~ direction of  this differential has  been beneficial  to  the Clearing 
Banks. 
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64  65  66  67  68  69  70  71  72  73 The  last differential to  be  discussed is between  the rate on Advances  (the 
Bank  rate and after 1971  Base  rate)  and  the Deposit Account  rate,  shown  on 
chart  15.  This differential can usefully be  regarded as  an approximation 
to  the profitability of  the  banks  on  their Advances  and  Overdrafts.  It of 
course  underestimates  the "actual"  one  since even  the"prime"  customers  of 
the banks  borrowed  at the "Bank  Rate  plus  one"  per cent before  1971  and 
probably  "Base  Rate  plus  one" after,  and  other adjustments are made  for  term 
to maturity and  risk.  From  1962  to  1971  this differential was  rigidly fixed 
at  2%  as  part of  the established  cartel arrangements  among  the Clearing 
Banks.  After  1971,  with the  introduction of  the Competition and Credit Control 
rules,  this  constant  2%  level was  broken and  there exists large variability 
since.  The  average  level has  also moved  higher  to about  2.2%. 
Of  the  four  interest rate differentials that we  have  examined  for  the 
Clearing Banks  three  seem  to have  moved  in their favour  over  the period of 
1962  to  1973  and  one  (on the most  liquid assets)  against  them. 
Second,  we  examine  two  interest rate differentials which give  indicators 
of  Discount  House  profitability.  The  Discount  Houses  borrow at Call  (short) 
and  lend  longer  by  buying Treasury,  Bank  and  Local Authority Bills as well as 
Short  Bonds  and  Certificates of  Deposit.  Chart  16  shows  the differential 
between  the  three month  Local Authority Loan  rate and  the Call rate.  It 
has  fluctuated noticeably around  a  level of  1.2%  and  has  tended  to  increase 
after 1971.  A similar picture is conveyed  by chart  17  which  shows  the 
differential between the Treasury Bill rate and  the Call rate.  After  1971  it 
varies more  widely. 
Third,  we  examine  the movement  of  two  major rates affecting Building Societies. 
This is displayed in chart  18  as  the differential between  the Mortgage rate and 
the Gross  (of  tax)  Shares rate.  It shows  minor variations  about  a  slowly 
rising trend  up  to  1970 after which if fluctuates more  widely. 
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Banks.  These  Banks  are heavily  involved in the Euro-dollar market.  The  first 
differential,  shown  on chart  19,  is between the  three-month Euro-sterling 
rate and  the  three-month Euro-dollar rate.  It has varied very narrowly 
around  zero during the whole  period of  1962  to  1973  except  for  1967  when  sterling 
was  devalued.  The  margin of variation seems  to have  narrowed  even more  since 
1969.  This  indicator of profits  then  shows  that interest arbitrage in the 
Euro-dollar - Euro-sterling markets  has  reduced  the profits available from 
that operation to  a  neglibible amount.  Of  course this points out  the competitive 
circumstances  of  the Euro-currency markets. 
The  next differential is between the  three-month Local Authority rate  (as 
a  proxy  for  U.K.  domestic  money  market  rates)  and  the  three-month Euro-dollar 
rate,  shown  on chart  20.  This  series  shows  wider  fluctuations  than the 
previous  one  throughout  the period.  Interestingly also,  the fluctuations 
against sterling are  larger than the  ones  in favour  of  sterling which points 
out  the fact  that exchange restrictions on  the banks  are  such that  they 
facilitate  inward  arbitrage and  discourage  outward arbitrage.  Thus  the banks 
are quick to eliminate any profit opportunity that may  arise in favour  of 
sterling but  are unable  to exploit  the oportunities in the other direction. 
The  chart  shows  that during  1968  and  1969  the  gap  widened  sharply and it has 
remained wide  and more  variable since.  This  indicator then points  to  a 
deterioration of the profitability of  the  secondary banks. 
In summary,  all differentials with the exception of that  between Euro-sterling 
and  Euro-dollar  became  progressively more  variable  towards  the  end  of  the 
period.  The  exceptional  one  moved  in the opposite direction.  Two  differentials 
showed  a  tendency  to narrow,  the  Local Authority - Euro-dollar  one  since  1967 
and  the Call rate - Deposit Account  rate  since  1971.  The  other differentials 
stayed roughly constant or had  a  tendency to  increase. 
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64  65  66  67  68  69  70  71  72  73 So  far  we  have  looked at interest rate differentials as  indices of 
profitability for  the different financial  groups  that  we  are  investigating. 
However,  profitability also depends  on  the  scale of activity.  We  can allow 
for  this by  comparing  a  Net  Interest Earnings  Index defined  as  interest 
earnings  on assets minus  interest expenses  on liabilities.  This  index 
whilst  taking account  of  scale ignores  capital gains  or  losses  and  all 
other costs  and  receipts.  This  method  of arriving at a  profit index even 
though it is more  elaborate  than  simply  examining  interest differentials, 
still has  simplicity as  an  advantage.  In terms  of  realism it is not 
obviously inferior to  the published profit  statements of  the financial 
institutions since  they manipulate their reserve accounts  over  the years 
in such a  way  as  to distort their actual profits.  All  interest rate series 
are monthly  averages  for  the previous  three months  and  all asset  levels 
are as  of  the  end  of the quarter or year.  The  Euro-dollar  rate includes 
the dollar premium,  that is we  assume  that  the  Secondary  Banks  enter into 
covered arbitrage only. 
First we  examine  the Clearing Bank  Net  Interest Earnings  Index  shown 
on  chart  21.  This  index was  calculated as  interest earnings  on  Advances  plus 
interest earnings  on  Investments  plus interest earnings  on  Liquid Assets minus 
interest payments  on  Deposit Accounts.  The  Clearing  Banks  have  managed  to 
increase their profits over  the whole  period  1962  to  1973  significantly 
more  than what  would  be  necessary to just compensate  them  for  the rate of 
inflation.  After  the Competition and  Credit Control rules  in 1971  they 
have  fared  even better although the variability of  their profits  seems  to 
have  increased also.  This  profit indicator thus seems  to  confirm our 
impression obtained from  an examination of  the interest rate differentials 
above.  The  government  controls on  Clearing Banks,  particularly those  on 
Advances,  seem  to have  contained  the  growth  of  their profits to a  lower 
level  than what  they would  have  been in the  absence of controls  as  the 
post  1971  period indicates. 
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73 Second,  the profit index of  the Discount Houses  was  estimated  as  interest 
earnings  on Assets minus  interest payments  on Call Loans.  This  index,  shown 
on  chart  22,  follows  a  rising trend which was  more  than adequate  to  anable 
them to keep  up  with inflation.  It broadly agrees with the relevant  interest 
rate differentials previously  looked at and  shows  an increase in variability 
after 1971. 
Third,  the Building Society profit  index was  measured  as  interest 
earnings  on Mortgages  minus  interest payments  on  Shares  and  Deposits  (gross 
of Tax).  As  shown  on  chart  23  it is similar to  the  one  for  the Discount  Houses 
af far  as  hedging profits against inflation is concerned.  It has  however  a 
smaller variability than  the other  group  over  the whole  period.  Compared  to 
the relevant  interest rate differential it is similar in trend but  is 
smoother  and  narrower  in its variability. 
Lastly,  let us  look at the profits index of  the  Secondary  Banks.  This 
index,  shown  on  chart  24,  was  estimated by  adding  the  interest earnings  on  nine 
different assets  and  subtracting  th~ interest payments  on  five liabilities. 
It has  been declining over  the whole  period  1962  to  1973.  Prior to  1967  the 
decline was  comparatively  slow.  After  1967  it became  more  precipitous  and  with 
large  swings.  Our  observations with respect  to  the  covered interest arbitrage 
differentials that we  examine  above  seem  to be  confirmed  by  this  index also. 
In spite of  the  tremendous  growth  in their balance  sheets,  the  competitive 
environment  of  the Euro-dollar market  has  forced  these  banks  to make  losses 
as  a  group.  The  even more  precipitous decline after 1971  must  be partly 
attributed to the Competition and  Credit Control rules which  imposed  comparativecy1 
more  constraints  on  this  group  and  unleased even greater competition from  the 
Clearing  Banks.  Needless  to  say,  the  Secondary Bank  profits did not keep  up 
with inflation. 
89 Finally,  we  can  summarize  the previous discussion of this section as 
follows. 
Nominal  interest rates  have  generally been moving  upward.  In the  second 
part of  the period their variability has  increased  and  they have  reached 
unprecedented heights. 
Real  interest rates  have  shown  a  tendency in the opposite direction to 
that of  the  nominal  rates in the U.K.  During  the 1970's  they have  turned 
negative more  often than in previous  years. 
In the Euro-dollar market  the nominal  interest rates have  shown  an 
upward  trend  similar to  the U.K.  rates.  The  real Euro-dollar rate,  however, 
behaved differently.  It has  never  turned negative and  seems  to  have varied 
roughly  around  a  constant  level.  Thus,  the Euro-dollar market  has  adjusted 
better to  the rate of  inflation than the domestic  U.K.  money  market. 
Turning  to profitability indices,  the interest rate differentials have 
shown  a  tendency  towards  greater variabilitity at  the  end  of  the period, 
with  the exception of  the Euro-sterling - Euro-dollar  gap  which narrowed. 
The  levels of  the differentials have  increased in six cases  out of  the nine 
investigated,  one  has  stayed constant  and  two  have  declined.  The  Net  Interest 
Earnings profitability indices  show  broadly  similar results  as  their relevant 
interest differentials,  that is greater variability at  the  end  of the 
period  (except  for  the Building Societies),  and  increases  in the differentials 
associated with  increases  in Net  Interest Earnings.  They  also  show  an  inverse 
relationship between the profitability of Clearing Banks  and  that of 
Discount Houses  and  Secondary  Banks. 
With respect  to the rate of  inflation the  Clearing Banks,  Discount 
Houses  and  Building Societies have  more  than kept  up  with it whereas  the 
Secondary  Banks  have  not. 
90 2.  The  Effects of Alternative Methods  of Controlling Financial Sector 
Profits upon  the Rate of Inflation and  Resource Allocation. 
There  are in principle two  basic ways  of  influencing the profitability 
of  the financial  system.  One  is to control  the interest rates at which they 
may  borrow and  lend,  and  the other is to control the overall scale of  their 
activity.  There are  two  ways  of controlling the overall scale of activity. 
One  is to control  the rate of creation of central bank reserve assets,  and 
the other is to put restrictions upon  the volume  of  lending which the various 
institutions may  undert~ke.  In this section we  analyse the effects of  these 
alternative methods  of controlling the profitability of the financial  system 
u~on the rate of  inflation. 
It will be  helpful  to begin by considering  how  interest rates would  have 
to behave if inflation was  to have  no  effect upon  the profitability of the 
financial  system.  Put at its simplest, all interest rates would  have  to 
reflect fully the rate of inflation.  The  interest rates on all the assets 
(including their cash reserves)  of  the banks  and  non-bank financial 
intermediaries would  have  to be  increased by  an  amount  equal  to the rate of 
inflation.  Also,  interest rates paid on  deposit  liabilities even  including 
current  account deposits with the banks,  would  also have  to bear interest at 
a  rate which was  marked  up  by  the rate of  inflation.  If such an arrangement 
for  interest rates was  achieved,  then the real profitability of  the financial 
system would  be unaffected by inflation.  Their,  nominal profits would  grow 
but  only at a  rate equal  to the rate of inflation.  Additionally,  there would 
be  no  consequences  flowing  through the financial  intermediation system for 
the allocation of  resources.  The  real rate of return being paid to  lenders  and 
the real rate being charged to borrowers  as well as  the real profitability of 
the financial  institutions would all be  uninfluenced by  the rate of inflation. 
91 Further there would  be  no  re-distributions of  income  and  wealth.  Lenders 
would  not  be  penalised and  borrowers would  not  be  favoured.  Such  a  state of 
affairs would  presumably be  judged  to be  ideal in the  sense  that  the inflation 
would  be  entirely neutralised in its effects upon  the financial  system, 
borrowing,  lending and  inter-temporal resource allocation. 
From  our analysis of  the trends  in interest rates in the previous  section 
it is clear that  the financial  system failed to adjust  to inflation in this 
neutral way.  How  might  such an  adjustment  be  achieved?  First, it would  seem 
to be essential that there be  no  restrictions upon  the interest rates which 
competitive financial  intermediaries  and  banks  are allowed  to charge.  Second, 
there  should be  no  restrictions upon  their borrowing rates.  This,  however,  in 
and  of itself would  probably not be  sufficient.  Most  types  of  financial 
institutions are placed under  obligations  to hold at least  some  fraction of 
their assets  in the  form  of government  securities.  Also,  even in a  competitive 
financial  system one  of  the major  competitors for  fixed deposits is the 
government  itself through its National  Savings movement.  Unless,  the  government, 
therefore,  did  something quite positive in both the market  for  its own 
securities and with National  Savings  assets it is unlikely that a  freely 
competitive banking  and  financial  industry would  produce interest rate 
movements  that fully reflected  the rate of inflation.  The  additional thing 
that would  be  required to achieve  this is that the  government  issue a  series 
of  cost of  living indexed bonds  of varying  terms  to maturity including 
possibly a  perpetuity,  and  also that  the interest rates on National  Savings 
be  adjusted fully to reflect changes  in the rate of inflation.  These  moves 
would  place  the banking  and  financial  industries in a  competitive environment 
which would  require  that they also offer interest rates on  their liabilities 
that fu!iy reflect inflation and  also the fact  of  the existence of  a  cost of 
living indexed  linked  government  security would  ensure that the institutions 
would  not become  locked in to  government  assets  the market  values  of which had 
92 tumbled  in order  to produce nominal  yields reflecting the underlying rate of 
inflation. 
It is clear that  such arrangements  would  neutralise the effects of 
inflation on  the  savings  of  individuals channelled  through  the financial 
institutions and  banks.  A major  objection to  the high interest rate 
implications of  such a  scheme,  universally advanced,  relates  to  the  housing 
finance market.  The  central problem here is that high interest rates with 
fixed  term mortgages  which are amortised in equal nominal  installments produce 
acute cash flow  problems  in the early years  of the mortage.  It would  be 
necessary therefore  to ·introduce  a  mortgage option which enabled borrowers 
to repay  in equal real installments.  Such  a  scheme  has  been worked  out in 
"Housing Finance  - A Realistic Solution"  by Michael  Parkin and  Malcolm Gray 
in The  Banker,  June  1974  (Appended). 
Instead  of  adopting the neutral arrangements  outlined above  U.K.  policy 
has,  as  indicated in the preceding section,  sought to minimise  the  impact  of 
inflation by  holding interest rates  down.  This is unambiguously  a  disastrous 
policy for  three reasons.  First, it produces  a  severe misallocation of 
resources.  Low  interest rates  typically mean  negative real interest rates. 
This  induces  people  to bring forward  their consumption and  thereby causes  too 
many  resources  to  be allocated towards  those activities in which people wish 
to accumulate  simply as  a  hedge  against inflation.  Second,  it causes  gross 
re-distributions especially between borrowers  and  lenders,  the borrower 
gaining and  the  lender  losing in some  cases  substantially especially in the 
market  for  housing finance.  Third,  and  perhaps  in the  long run most  serious 
of all,  such a  policy exacerbates  the inflationary situation.  It does  this 
through  two  channels.  First,  low or negative real rates of interest induce 
excessive  demands  being placed on  the  economy's productive capacity and 
second  the mechanism whereby  low interest rates can be validated  involves 
93 printing ever  increasing money  balances.  Whether  or not  one  regards  that 
increase in the money  supply  as  the cause  of inflation, it certainly permits 
the  inflation to continue  unabated. 
An  alternative which is often been tried,  is to control not  only interest 
rates but  also  the  total volume  of  lending.  This  has particularly applied to 
the banks  lending in most  phases  of deflation over  the postwar  years.  There 
are  two  major  objections  to  this approach.  First, it tends  not  to work,  in 
the  sense  that total financial  system lending to industry and  households  is 
typically uncontrolled.  It is always  easy to control  one  part of  a  banking-
financial  system but virtually impossible  to  control  the aggregate.  Second, 
there is a  tendency for  the best risk customers  to be  favoured  by  the  banks 
and  therefore when  restrictions  and  low  interest rates are on,  higher risk 
customers  find  themselves  paying excessively higher rates of interest,  and 
therefore again the equity of  the  control is called  into question. 
Controlling the  real profits of  the banking  system by  an  arrangement  which 
encourages  the  indexation to  the  cost of  living of all interest rates is 
excellent for controlling the misallocative  and  re-distributive effects of 
inflation but  does  nothing of  course  to influence inflation itself.  Any 
inflation rate is possible under  such an arrangement.  In order to  have  a 
positive effect upon  the rate of inflation it would  seem desirable to  augment 
the  control of the real profitability of  the banking  system with control of 
their overall nominal  level of activity.  Since,  as  we  have  already noted, 
it is difficult to  achieve  by way  or control of  their  lending it presumably 
has  to be  achieved  by  the traditional  techniques  of monetary  control.  This 
involves placing a  reserve  requirement  upon  some  group  of  institutions  such 
as  the clearing banks  and  then making  available  to  them  a  stock of  reserve 
assets which  grows  at a  controlled rate.  The  critical thing here  seems  to  be 
that  the choice of  the reserve asset itself should be made  such that  the 
94 asset in question  (a)  can in fact be controlled and  (b)  is in relatively 
inelastic and  stable demand  by  the institutions in question.  The  traditional 
cash reserve base  seems  to offer the best  scope  for  control  in this respect 
rather  than the use  of wider definitions  of reserves  as  present in the 
Competition and  Credit  Control  regulations.  (For  a  full but rather technical 
discussion of this see The  Manchester  School, March  1973  specialissue on 
Competition and  Credit Control). 
One  crucial requirement  for  control of the cash base of  the banking 
system is  that the foreign exchange rate be  free  to adjust and  not be 
rigidly pegged.  This  also is necessary if domestic  interest rates are fully 
to reflect domestic  inflation. 
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• 
CONCLUSIONS 
Our  main  conclusions are as follows: 
(a)  control over domestic interest rates have prevented  those rates 
from  rising fully to reflect the rate of inflation; 
(b)  the uncontrolled Euro-dollar and  Euro-sterling rates have  adjusted 
to reflect world  inflation; 
(c)  the profitability of all the groups  examined  have,  with the exception 
of the  secondary banks,  increased; 
(d)  the  secondary banks which have  to operate in both domestic  and  Euro-
markets  have  suffered sharply falling profitability; 
(e)  the above  features  of domestic  interest rate policy have  had 
serious but unquantifiable resource missallocations  and  income 
redistributions; 
(f)  holding down  domestic interest rates has probably worsened U.K.  inflation 
relative to that of other major  countries; 
(g)  within the Banking  sector there has  been an inverse relationPhip between 
Clearing Banks  profitability on  the one  hand  and  Discount Houses  and 
Secondary  Banks  on  the other. 
96 LIST  OF  CHARTS 
1.  U.K.  inflation rate. 
2.  Three month  Local Authority Temporary  Loan  rate, 
3.  Bank  rate; Minimum  Lending rate since end  1971. 
4.  Government  ''shore'  Bond  (Bonds  of  less  than five years maturity)  rate. 
5.  Three month  Local Authority Temporary  Loan  rate minus  U.K.  inflation rate. 
6.  Three month  covered Euro-dollar rate minus  U.S.  inflation rate. 
7.  Money  Supply,  M3  definition. 
8.  London  Clearing Bank  Gross Deposits. 
9.  Discount House  Total Assets. 
10.  Building Society Shares  and  Deposits. 
11.  Secondary  Bank  Gross  Deposits. 
12.  Clearing Bank  Call rate minus  Deposit Account  rate. 
13.  Three month  Treasury Bill rate minus  Dep.  Ace.  rate. 
14.  "Short"  Bond  rate minus  Dep.  Ace.  rate. 
15.  Advances  rate minus  Dep.  Ace.  rate.  For Advances  rate the Bank  rate was 
used until 1971  III;  later the  Base  rate was  used. 
16.  Three month  Loc.  Auth.  Temp.  Loan  rate minus  Call rate. 
17.  Treasury Bill rate minus  Call rate. 
18.  Building Society Mortgage  rate minus  Shares rate  (gross  of  tax) • 
19.  Three month  Euro-sterling rate minus  three month  Euro-dollar rate. 
20.  Local Authority rate minus  Euro-dollar rate. 
21.  Clearing Bank  Net  Interest Earnings  Index. 
22.  Discount  House  Net  Interest Earnings  Index. 
23.  Building Society Net  Interest Earnings  Index. 
24.  Secondary  Bank  Net  Interest Earnings  Index. 
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*  FISCAL  POLICY  AND  INFLATION 
by 
M.T.  SUMNER 
* Thanks  are  due  to  David Laidler,  Michael  Parkin and  George  Zis 
for  illuminating comments  and helpful suggestions. 
98 1.  INTRODUCTION 
Three distinct but  closely related questions  are raised by  the 
title of this paper.  Firstly,  how  is the inflation rate altered 
by variations in demand  induced by  tax changes!  The  traditional 
anwer  that higher taxation reduces  inflation has been challenged  in 
recent  years;  the  reasons for this challenge  and  the  evidence 
offered in support of the proposition that higher taxation 
increases the  inflation rate are  examined in section 2.  Secondly, 
can taxation be  designed to  reduce  inflation not  through its 
effects on  demand  but  by  providing an  incentive to  maintain 
stable prices? Several schemes-have  been  proposed with this end 
in view;  the general principles,  though  not  the details of 
particular plans,  are  considered in section 3.  Finally,  unless 
the  government  takes  deliberate steps to offset fiscal  drag, 
inflation increases the real  yie~sof taxation.  How  does  this 
characteristic affect the stabilising properties of  the  tax 
system  and its effects on  resource allocation and  income 
distribution,  and  how  would it be modified by  indexation?  The 
paper  ends with a  brief concluding section. 
99 2.  TAXES  AS  A DETERMINANT  OF  INFLATION 
The  use  of taxation as  an  instrument  of anti-inflationary policy has 
historically been  considered so  uncontroversial as  to  require little 
discussion.  In  the traditional view  inflation is generated by  excess 
demand,  excess  demand  is reduced  by  a  tax increase;  therefore higher 
taxation lowers  the  inflation rate.  Attempts  to  refu~e this traditional 
view must  proceed either by  disputing the link between taxation and 
excess  demand,  or by  espousing,  explicitly or otherwise,  some  other 
theory of inflation in which  taxation and  the  alleged cause of rising 
prices are positively associated. 
The  first contention,  which accepts  the traditional view  of inflation 
but  disputes  the role of taxes,  can  be  dealt  with briefly.  It is not 
difficult to  envisage  circumstances  in which  a  tax increase would raise 
demand.  An  increase  in sales taxation might  generate  expectations of a 
further  increase,  and  hence  create or  augment  a  speculative  demand  for 
storable goods.  More  plausibly,  an  unanticipated,  permanent  increase 
in business taxation will raise  investment  demand if interest  payments 
are not  tax deductible  and  the  discounted value of depreciation 
deductions  exceeds  the  cost  of an  asset,  or if interest payments are 
deductible  and  the  tax  code  is more  generous  than  the standard of 
economic  depreciation;  the conditions  for  a  temporary  increase in 
business  taxation  to raise investment  demand  are weaker.  The  recent 
fiscal history of the United  Kingdom  provides  appropriate  examples 
of periods when  these  conditions  were  fulfilled for at least certain 
1  types of capital  goods.  However,  the significance of such  examples 
should not  be  exaggerated:  these  cases merely  qualify the traditional 
anti-inflationary rule in particular instances without  questioning its 
general  validity.  The  main  grounds  for  opposing the traditional view 
are not  that  an  increase  in certain taxes  in certain circumstances 
may  affect  demand  perversely,  but  that the  effects on  demand  are not 
the only relevant  consideration. 
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anti-inflationary policy is rarely stated explicitly and  comprehen-
sively.  The  origins of this belief are probably  to  be  found  in the 
doubts  frequently  expressed about  the effects of indirect  taxes. 
Students are  taught  that  the  imposition of a  tax on  a  particular 
commodity  will,  except  in special  circumstances,  raise its price; 
it appears  schizophrenic  to  assert at  a  later stage of  the  educational 
process that higher indirect  taxes will reduce  inflation by  depressing 
demand.2  Yet  the apparent  paradox is superficial:  the price of  a 
taxed  commodity will rise relatively to other prices;  the  effects 
on  the  general  price level  depend  on  the  government's  use  of  the 
additional  tax revenue.  If the  proceeds are  used  to  reduce  the 
money  supply,  the price level  cannot  remain  the  same  (or  a  fortiori 
higher  than before)  without  a  contraction in the  scale of  economic 
activity,  and it is this decline  in  demand  which,  in the traditional 
view,  causes prices to  fall  relatively to  their level  in the  absence 
of the tax increase.  The  time period necessary  for  full  adjustment 
to  a  tax  change  cannot  be  specified a  priori;  moreover,  the  impact 
effect of  an  increase in indirect  taxes might  well  be  a  higher price 
of taxed  commodities  and  an  unchanged price of other  goods,  and 
hence  a  temporarily higher level of prices.  However,  the  logic  of 
the  traditional analysis as  a  statement  of the  eventual  effect of 
a  change  in indirect  taxes is not  affected by  the nature of the 
adjustment  path. 
Whereas  confusion  about  the  role  of indirect  taxes  has  a  long 
history,  doubts  about  the  impact  on  inflation of  changes  in direct 
taxes  have  been  expressed only in the  recent  past.  At  one  time it 
was  thought,  presumably  on  the basis of the partial equilibrium 
analysis of indirect  taxes,  that  an  increase in  income  tax  accompanied 
by  a  cut  in indirect  taxes  would  enable  the  government  to  maintain 
price stability without  sacrificing full  employment  (even  temporarily) 
when  wages  were  pushed  up  by  some  unexplained  impulse.3  However, 
recent  commentators  have  been sceptical about  the  implicit assumption 
101 that  workers will not  react  to an  increase in their income  tax 
liabilities.4  At  a  slightly higher level of sophistication,  recent 
U.K.  trends  in nominal,  real and net  real wages  have  been  described 
and  compared  by Jackson,  Turner  and Wilkinson L2f,  who  draw attention 
to  the  generally - increased incidence of wage  - taxation;  and 
suggest  that  the  growing  discrepancy between  increases in pre-tax 
nominal  wages  and  in post-tax real wages  may  have  been responsible, 
at least in part,  for  the  wage  explosion at  the  end of the 1960's. 
Despite  the  wealth of descriptive statistics presented in this 
study,  the  authors  refrain  from  testing or  even  formulating  any 
hypotheses,  and  therefore in their conclusion they are restricted to 
mentioning  a  possible  connection between taxation and  inflation. 
Nevertheless,  their contribution serves  the  valuable,  if limited, 
function  of  emphasising that  the  employee will be  concerned with 
the  spending power  conferred by  his wage  net  of income  tax and social 
security contributions,  deflated by  the  (weigthed)  prices of the 
goods  he  buys.  Their argument  can  readily be  extended  to  the  employer's 
side of the  labour market,  where  the  relevant  magnitude is the  money 
wage  plus  employer's social security contributions,  deflated by  the 
price of the  goods  which  the  firm  produces.  In other words,  taxation 
drives a  wedge  between either the  employer's  and  employee's perception 
of the  nominal  wage,  or their respective perceptions of the price 
level:  at  the  aggregate  level,  workers are affected by  the retail 
prices of their consumption  bundle,  employers  by  the  wholesale 
prices  they receive  for  their output. 
Wage  bargaining can  dtermine  only  the nominal  wage,  but  that is 
only  one  component  of the  real wage  on  either side of the  labour 
market.  In  consequence,  the  nominal  wage  which  an  employer is 
prepared to  pay  or at  which  a  worker  is prepared to accept  employment 
will be  changed by  changes  in the  taxes they are  required to  pay or 
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in the prices which  confront  them.  These  ideas provide  the  basis 
for  a  recent  investigation of wage  behaviour in the  U.K.  by  Parkin, 
Sumner  and Ward  Ll~. Their model  incorporates three hypothesis: 
demand  for  labour  depends  on  the  real  wage  paid  (partly to  the 
government  in the  form  of employer's social security contributions) 
by  the  employer;  supply of labour  depends  on  the  real  wage  (net 
of taxes)  received by  the  employee;  and  the  money  wage  is adjusted 
so  that  the  expected  change  in  excess  demand  for  labour  (which 
depends  on  expected price  and  tax changes)  will  eliminate  any 
existing excess  demand.  These  assumptions  yield a  wage  equation 
of the  form 
where w = 
PE 
p  =  c 
Tl  = 
T2  = 
X  = 
rate of  change of nominal  wages 
expected rate of change  of wholesale  prices 
(including an  export  component  in an  open  economy) 
expected rate of change  of retail prices 
expected rate of change  of unity plus  the  effective 
rate of  employers'  social security contributions 
expected rate of  change  of unity minus  the  employee's 
effective personal  (income  plus social security)  tax 
rate 
lagged  excess  demand  for  labour. 
It will be  noticed that only anticipated tax  and  price  changes 
enter the  wage  equation explicity;  unanticipated changes  would 
be  reflected in the  excess-demand  term.  Furthermore,  the  coefficients 
of the  tax and price variables are subject  to  a  priori restrictions 
as  a  direct  result of the algebraic  derivation of the  wage  equation: 
the  sum  of the coefficients on  expected price  changes is unity,  so 
that  a  uniform  change  in the  anticipated rate of price inflation 
would riase  the  rate of wage  inflation by  the  same  amount.  In other 
words,  the Phillips relation between  excess  demand  for  labour  and 
the  rate of wage  change  does  not  offer a  stable menu  for  policy 
103 choice.  The  restriction that  the  coefficient  on  each tax  change  term 
is the  negative of the  corresponding price  change  coefficient is a 
consequence  of specifying supply of and  demand  for  labour as  functions 
of  the  appropriate  real  wage:  a  given  change  in the  real net-wage 
received by  the  employee,  for  example,  will have  the  same  effect  on 
labour  supply  no  matter whether it is caused by  a  change  in retail 
prices or by  personal  taxes.  Indirect  taxes  enter the  model  implicitly 
through  the  difference between  wholesale  and retail prices. 
In  the  present  context,  the properties of the  tax  change  parameters 
are of particular interest.  However,  an  obvious  problem  arises in 
fitting this generalised expectations model  empirically,  since  only 
anticipated tax  changes  appear  as  an  independent  variable.  While 
considerable progress  has  been  made  the  measurement  of price  expec-
tations,  there is at present little alternative to  using a  measure 
of expected  tax  changes  derived  from  ex post  actual  changes.  This  may 
be  one  of the  reasons  why  in the unrestricted results reported by 
Parkin,  Sumner  and  Ward  the fiscal variables perform badly:  tax 
changes  on  both sides of the  labour market  are statistically insigni-
ficant,  and  for  employees  are  incorrectly signed.  This  could mean 
that  the  participants in wage  negotiations  simple  do  not  form  expec-
tations  about  tax  changes,  regarding  them  rather as  a  random  variable, 
or,  more  plausibly,  that  such  expectations are  formed  but  the  attempt 
to  proxy  them  by  actual  tax  changes  introduces  severe  measurement 
error which  obscures  their role  in wage  setting. 
Other  studies which  incorporate  a  relation between  wage- and  tax-
changes  have  yielded more  positive conclusions.5  It is therefore 
important  to  establish how  much  could be  inferred  from  a  positive partial 
relation between  increases in say,  income  tax  and  increases  in wages. 
This  problem of interpretation is more  subtle  than  many  students of 
the subject  have  appreciated. 
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taxes  and  inflation completely  ignore  the  indirect links between 
taxation,  excess  demand  and  the  inflation rate that constitute the 
essence of the traditional view.  This  rather serious omission is a 
natural  consequence  of focussing  on  a  single aspect  of an  extremely 
complex  problem  in verbal  discussions,  a  mode  of analysis which  is 
not  well suited to  the  consideration of multivariate relationships. 
More  seriously,  there is grave  danger  of,  and  indeed precedent  for, 
making  the  same  mistake  in interpreting the results of regression 
d.  f  th  t .  6  It  t  b  h  .  d  t  t  1  stu  ~es o  e  wage  equa  ~on.  canno  e  emp  as~se  oo  s  rong y 
that  the  coefficient of  (say)  an  income  tax vaiable  in  a  wage 
equation provides  an  e~timate only of the  direct effect of a  tax 
change  on  wages;  to  this direct  effect  must  be  added  any  indirect 
effect operating through other arguments  of the  wage  equation,  and 
particularly through  the  excess  demand  for  labour.  To  analyse  the 
total effect of a  tax  change  on  inflation therefore requires  a 
carefully specified model,  not  one  isolated structural equation. 
To  date,  models  large  enough  to  incorporate  the  relevant  relation-
ships have  been designed with more  attention to  econometric 
convenience  that  to  economic  theory. 
The  indirect effects of taxation through  excess  demand  provide  an 
alternative explanation  for  the  failure of the fiscal variables  in 
the tests conducted by  Parkin,  Sumner  and Ward.  Their model  is 
based,  as  noted above,  on  the  assumption  that  supply of and  demand 
for labour are  functious  only of the relevant  real wage:  inability 
to sell planned output  at  expected prices pushes  firms  off their 
labour  demand  curves,  on  the  lines suggested  by  Patinkin Ll9  ch.  li/. 
If,  however,  the  effect of taxation in reducing  demand  is anticipated 
by  firms,  but prices  do  not  respond  immediately,  the  labour  demand 
function  would  be modified.  Hence  the predicted direct  effect of 
anticipated personal  tax  changes  becomes  ambiguous. 
105 In  an  attempt  to  make  inferences  from  the  wage  equation alone,  a 
number  of writers7  have  assumed that  the  indirect  effects of a  tax 
change  through  excess  demand  are offset  by  a  change  in government 
spending.  This  procedure  invites  two  comments.  The  first is that  this 
assumption  opens  a  Pandora's  box  of analytical problems,  which  have 
been  widely  ignored.  If government  spending were  increased by  the 
same  amount  as  tax revenue,  then  aggregate  demand  would  increase in 
accordance  with the  well-known balanced budget  multiplier theorem: 
in the  simplest  case,  since part  of the initial cut  in disposable 
income  is reflected in a  fall  in saving,  national  income  must  increase 
to  induce  the  same  volume  of saving as before.  While  there are  innu-
merable  qualifications  to  and  extensious of the  theorem,  they affect 
only  the magnitude,  not  the  direction,  of  income  change,  provided 
consumers  do  not  exhibit  money  illusion.  However,  if demand  is supposed 
to  remain  unchanged  then  the  government  surplus must  increase rela-
tively to  what  would  otherwise  have  happened.  In  consequence,  some 
other change  must  occur  in the  government's  accounts:  either bond 
sales or  creation of money  must  be  reduced.  If the  new  tax and  expen-
diture policies were  maintained,  cumulative  changes  in the  stocks of 
money  and/or  bonds  would  result with  further  repercussions  on  private 
spending.  To  trace  the  process  further  would  try the  reader's patience 
unnecessarily,  for  enough  has  been  said to  show  that maintaining a 
constant  level of aggregate  demand  when  taxes  are  changed is a  much 
more  complicated matter that  has  been  assumed  elsewhere.  The  second 
comment  is shorter and  simpler:  if,  by  whatever  policy measures  are 
necessary,  demand  is maintained constant after a  tax increase,  there 
will be  no  opportunity for  the  traditional mechanism  to  operate; 
therefore,  whatever  the  outcome  of  the  intellectual gymnastic  per-
formed  by  the  analyst,  they will be  simply irrelevant  to  the  central 
question. 
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services  remains  unchanged,  it is still the  case  that  some  other 
accommodating  change  must  occur  elsewhere.  The  resulting surplus 
must  be  financed  by  reductions  in bond  sales or in money  creation. 
The  corresponding stocks will continue  to  fall,  with effects on 
private spending which  reinforce  the  tax increase,  as  long as  the 
surplus persists,  i.e. until prices or real  income  have  fallen 
sufficiently to  reduce  real tax  revenue  to its former  level. 
Provided markets  clear eventually,  prices must  be  reduved  in the 
long run.  As  always,  comparisons  must  be  interpreted in relation 
to  what  would  otherwise  have  happened. 
To  conclude  this part of the  argument,  the  current  rash of 
studies claiming to  demonstrate,  at  various levels,  a  positive 
relation between  taxation and  the price level or inflation rate 
has  in fact  presented no  evidence  in  support  of that proposition. 
The  analysis is far  more  subtle  than  many  of the  contributors 
have  realised.  Whether  a  government  elected for  a  short  period 
would  be  prepared to  sacrifice its employment  objectives  for  an 
unspecified,  and  in the  present state of knowledge  unspecifiable, 
period in retur for  the promise  of slower inflation in the  long 
run is another question.  Apart  from  electoral considerations,  it 
is not  clear that  such  a  policy would  be  socially desirable. 
However,  these wider  issues  do  not  affect the  result of this 
section,  that there is no  reason  to  doubt  the  traditional view 
that higher  taxes  lower  the  inflation rate.  Conversely,  a  tax 
cut  has  no  place in an  anti-inflationary policy. 
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Despite  the  faith in direct  controls over prices and  incomes still 
to  be  found  in various political quarters,  the  evidence of past 
experience  overwhelmingly  denies their efficecy.8  As  demonstrated 
in the previous sections,  there is a  large,  if incoherent  and 
incomplete,  body of literature which  argues  that  a  restrictive 
fiscal policy is more  likely to  increase  than  reduce  the  inflation 
rate.  It may  therefore  appear  paradoxical  that  the proposal  to  use 
fiscal policy as  a  means  of  enforcing direct  control  is enjoying 
more  attention than  ever before. 
The  suggestion to  employ  the  threat  of fiscal action as  a  bargaining 
weapon  appears  to  have  originated with  Hansen  L-~, who  envisaged 
the  government  offering to  trade unions  a  sharp  reduction in 
disposable  income if they failed to  select  the  declared level of 
average  money  wages  consistent with stable prices at full  employment. 
As  the  author of the  scheme  pointed out,  there would  be  awkward 
problems  of timing declarations  and  tax  changes  in relation to  the 
necessarily centralised and  discrete  wage  agreements.  Furthermore, 
the  distribution of  income  between  wage  earners  and  the  rest of 
the  community  would  have  to  be  varied to  reward or punish  the 
unions  as  appropriate,  whatever  was  appropriate  for  the residual 
and  irrespective of the  wider  implications of the redistributive 
methods  adopted.  Two  problems not  mentioned  by  Hansen  are  the 
translation of an  average  wage  into  a  wage  structure,  and  the 
difficulty of distinguishing between  wage-earners  and others  on 
the basis of  income  or  any  other tax base.  More  fundamentally, 
he  implicitly attributes blame  for inflation to  organised labour, 
an  admittedly popular but  unsubstantiated view. 
Subsequent  writers have  not  followed  Hansen  in regarding the 
existing tax structure as  an  instrument  capable of any variation 
required by  the  bargaining situation.  Instead,  it has  been 
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courage price increases or to  strengthen  employers'  resistance 
to  wage  increases,  depending  on  the writer's view  as  to  the  source 
of inflation.  Examples  include Nevin's proposal  for  a  factor  tax 
to  replace profits tax Li&f,  Scott's  scheme  for  a  tax  an  price 
increases L2i/,  and Weintraub's  plan  for  a  supplementary profits 
tax geared  to  wage  increases  above  a  stipulated level  L2~. Instead 
of discussing the  details of  these  or other schemes,  attention will 
be  confined to  two  general  questions,  viz.  their probable  effec-
tiveness  in the light of alternative theories of inflation,  and 
their side effects.9 
Frequently the authors  base their advocacy  of fiscal  controls  on 
the  view  that  inflation is caused by  the  exercise  of market  power. 
Those  who  believe that  this view  originates in a  confusion between 
high  and  rising prices  and  that  inflation is caused by  excess  demand 
and  expectations,  find it just as difficult to  defend  fiscal  appen-
dages  to  direct  controls as  the  controls themselves.  They  cannot 
reasonably be  regarded as  operating through  demand,  since existing 
instruments are capable of controlling demand.  They  may  serve  as 
a  means  of talking  down  price  expectations without  maintaining as 
large  a  degree  of  excess  supply  as  would  have  been necessary without 
them,  but  any  expression of anti-inflationary intent  which  carries 
conviction  would  serve  the  same  purpose. 
The  similarity with direct  controls carries over  to  side-effects. 
Three  familiar  consequences  are  worth  reiterating.  Firstly,  the 
effective price of a  commodity  can  be  altered in a  variety of ways, 
even if the  nominal  price is controlled.  Secondly,  the  diversion 
of effort which  the first  consequence  implies is compounded  by  the 
misallocation which  derives  from  the inability of controls,  whether 
or not  supported by  fiscal  sanctions,  to  distinguish between  relative 
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direct  controls  introduce  more  possibilities for misallocation 
than  the  usual  fixing of relative prices associated with prices 
and  incomes  policies.  For  example,  Nevin's proposal  for  a  factor 
tax would  provide  an artificial incentive for  vertical integration.10 
The  scheme  proposed by Weintraub  would  make  the  rate of profits tax 
a  function  of the  excess  of actual over  guidepost  wage  increases in 
the  individual  firm;  in the  face  of an  "excessiven increase in the 
wages  of a  particular group  of workers,  the  firm  would  have  an 
artificial incentive to  disintegrate,  even if the  outside  source 
of supply  involved  some  additional real costs,  provided  the  lower 
rate of tax  on  the  smaller gross profit left a  larger net  profit. 
Finally,  such policies require real  resources  for administration 
and  compliance. 
Thus,  the  case  for  taxation as  a  means  of making  those  responsible 
for  inflation pay  for their misdeeds  is no  more  compelling  than 
the  case  against  taxation as  a  means  of controlling inflation 
indirectly through  demand.  It is dependent  for its appeal  on  the 
inflation theory  caricatured in  the  previous sentence;  and  whatever 
the  effect of a  tax  on  inflation itself, it is difficult  to  imagine 
a  scheme  which  would  not  introduce  new  distortions  in the allocation 
of resources. 
llO 4.  EFFECTS  OF  INFLATION  ON  THE  TAX  SYSTEM 
In  discussion of inflation a  distinction is generally made  between 
the  effects of anticipated and  unanticipated inflation.  The  latter 
is undesirable because it causes arbitrary redistributions of  income; 
in particular,  borrowers  benefit at  the  expense  of their creditors. 
In  a  fully anticipated inflation,  however,  contracts will be 
negotiated by  mutual  consent  to  preserve  the  same  real position 
as  would  have  existed had prices  remained  constant;  in particular, 
nominal  interest rates will rise by  the  rate of anticipated in-
flation.  The  undesirable  effects of this  type  of inflation are 
concerned with  resource allocation:  demand  for  real  money  balances 
will be  reduced by  the  implicit  tax of inflation;  and  resources 
must  be  diverted  from  more  productive  tasks  to  the  socially sterile 
function  of changing prices  and  economising on  the use  of money. 
Sinceeconomic  or  any  other theory  can  say little about  the character 
of the  redistribution generated by  unanticipated inflation,  analysis 
of the  consequences of inflation has  been  largely confined to  the 
tax on  money  balances  imposed  by  an  anticipated inflation,  and 
especially the  relation between  the  revenue  derived by  the  govern-
ment  and  the  welfare  losses suffered by  the private sector.  Rare 
attempts  to  widen  the  scope of the analysis of the  allocative 
effects of inflation have  typically  juxtaposed the  two  forms  of 
inflation,  assuming part of the  community  to  be  aware  of inflation 
and  the  rest blissfully ignorant.11 
Unfortunately,  this distinction breaks  down  once  the  existence  of 
a  conventional  tax system  is recognised.  In  general,  it is no-
longer true that  a  perfectly anticipated inflation,  characterised 
by  a  sufficient  increase  in nominal  interest rates to  preserve 
the  corresponding real rates,  will leave  the  distribution of  income 
unaffected;  and  the  effects of inflation on  resource  allocation 
will not  be  confined to  those  which  result  from  the  substitution 
of other stores of value  for  money.  In this section the  combined 
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bution are illustrated,  and  the reader's attention is drawn  to 
the  simple  solutions which are readily available  for  some  aspects of 
the  problem,  and  to  the intractable difficulties which  appear 
elsewhere.  For simplicity the  argument  proceeds  on  the  assumption 
that,  for  the  firm,  the prices of output  and all inputs  are affected 
equally by  inflation,  and  that  rates of return required by its 
shareholders  and  creditors rise by  the  rate of inflation;  similarly, 
for  the  household,  nominal  pre-tax  income  and prices rise at  equal 
rates.  Thus,  ignoring the  effect  on  demand  for  money  emphasised  in 
traditional theory,  such an  inflation would  be  neutral  in a  model 
with no  tax  system.  Suppose,  however,  that  a  tax system  does  exist, 
and  consists of a  tax  on  corporate  income,  and  a  tax on personal 
income;  since  the  characteristics of indirect  taxes are well  under-
12  stood  ,  they will be  ignored here. 
First,  the  allocative effects of the  interaction between  taxes  and 
inflation will  be  illustrated by  examining their impact  on  a  profit-
maximising  firm  liable to  pay  corporation tax.  In general,  the  firm's 
input  decisions will be  altered by  inflation,  even  though wages  and 
the prices of raw materials,  capital  equipment  and  the  firm's  output 
all rise proportionately.  Employment  decisions will not  be  affected 
in the  circumstances  Rssumed,since  labour costs are  a  straightfor-
wardly  deductible  expense  in  the  computation of corporation tax 
liabilities;  but  the  firm's  profit-maximising stock of fixed 
capital may  be  increased or reduced,  depending  on  the  proportion 
of interest paid to  creditors and  imputed  to  equity holders  which 
is tax  deductible,  and  on  the rules  governing  depreciation.13  Even 
if,  on  average,  the  firm's  desired  capital stock remains  unchanged, 
the  optimal  composition will be altered if depreciation rules are 
not  identical for all types  of asset.  Apart  from  accidental off-
setting of stimulating and  depressing  effects,  there are  two  special 
rules  which  guarantee  invariance of  investment  decisions  in the 
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for  independence  of investment  with respect  to  different  tax rates: 
either investment  expenditure must  be  wholly  deducted  from  taxable 
income  in the year of acquisition and  no  interest  payments  deducted; 
or all interest  payments,  including the  opportunity cost  of share-
holders'  funds,  must  be  tax-deductible,  together with  true replace-
ment-cost  depreciation,  but  capital gains  on  assets would  have  to 
be  taxed  on  an  accruals basis.  Implementation of either rule  would 
involve  important  changes  in the  tax system,  with repercussions  on 
firms'  financial policies,  and  would  require  detailed provisions 
for  the  transitional phase.  Subject  to  that  qualification,  however, 
the first  rule is extremely simple,  would  create minimal  accounting 
complications,  and would  leave  the  accounting profession  free  to 
present  financial  statements to  shareholders in whatever  form  was 
deemed  appropriate.  The  alternative  requires knowledge  of  the  physical 
depreciation and  nominal  appreciation rates of each of the  firm's assets, 
and  separation of payments  to  shareholders  into opportunity cost  and 
pure profit  components.  This  second rule is the logical  end  of the 
current  debate  on  inflation accounting,  but it suffers  from  the 
obvious  handicap  of being infeasible.  The  first rule  would  have 
an additional advantage,  since it would  make  investment  decisions 
largely independent  of inflation14,  without  serving as  a  precedent 
for  the  extension of inflation-proofing to  other sections of  the 
fiscal  system,  a  possibility which  a  recent  contributor to  the 
accounting literature considers as  worse  than  the  inequities of the 
present  system,  considered below,  on  grounds  of administrative 
cost.15 
The  firm's  choice  of  fixed  capital stock is not  the only  decision 
influenced by  inflation under  current  fiscal arrangements;  as  the 
debate  on  stock appreciation in  the  financial  press  during the 
period  immediately prior to  the  third  (November)  budget  of 1974 
emphasised,  the  tax  treatment  of inventories raises similar problems. 
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neutrality with  respect  to  fixed  investment  and  the appropriate 
treatment  of stock appreciation.  At  present,  stock appreciation 
is taxed  and  interest  payments  are  deductible;  neutrality would 
require,  as  before,  deductibility also of the  opportunity  cost 
element  in  the  return  to  shareholders.  Alternatively,  the  tax 
system  would  not  affect  inventory  decisions if interest deducti-
bility and  taxation of stock appreciation were  both abolished. 
Again,  there is a  striking difference between  the  two  rules  in 
terms  of the  implementation costs;  notably,  the  second would result 
in  a  major  simplification of current practice. 
To  summarise  the  argument  of this section so  far,  under  the present 
tax  code  inflation affects corporate  decisions  in a  manner  which 
was  certainly unintended  and  for  which  no  economic  justification 
is evident.  It would  be  possible  to  eliminate  such effects in  two 
alternative ways,  only  one  of which  is feasible.  Under  this neutrality 
rule  the  corporate  tax base  would  be  simply  sales revenue  minus 
outlays  for  wages,  materials,  equipment  and structures.  As  is well 
known,  neutrality requires full  loss offsets in certain cases;  to 
the  extent  that  provisious  for  carrying losses back  are  incomplete 
or irrelevant  (e.g.  in the  case  of new  firms),  distortions would 
still arise,  but  on  a  considerably smaller scale than  under  the 
present  arrangements. 
Distortions in resource  allocation are not  the only  consequence  of a 
tax system  designed  in  an  era of relative price stability.  The  pro-
gressivity of  the  personal  income  tax  ensures that  real  revenue  from 
this source  increases  during an  inflation,  assuming a  fixed  tax 
structure.  Because  the  tax structure is not  continuously progressive, 
there is in principle no  reason  to  except  an  equitable distribution 
of the additional  tax  payments  across  income  classes;  in practice, 
the  effects are  concentrated near  the  bottom  of the  income  scale, 
where  marginal  tax rates  increase  most  rapidly.16  Further inequities 
arise  from  the  fact  that  the  incomes  of the  employed are  taxed at 
source,  but  the  self-employed are  taxed in arrears.17 
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could  be  offset by  discretionary tax  changes.  The  objection  to  this 
pragmatic  solution is the opportunity it provides  for  chancellors 
to make  surreptitious changes  in the  tax structure or in the  real 
aize of the budget.  A more  satisfactory solution would  be  to  legislate 
for  an  automatic  adjustment  of personal allowances  and of  the  income 
alices which attract  a  particular rate of tax,  on  the basis of move-
ments  in a  consumer price  index.  Such  a  scheme  was  enacted  in  Canada 
in 1973  and  in the  Netherlands  in  1971,  though  in the latter case 
provision was  made  for  downward  adjustment  of the correction factor 
by  up  to  25  per cent,  in  the  light of budgetary  requirements. 
No  further  problem arises in the  case  of labour  income.  The  same  is 
not  true,  however,  of property  income.  Even if inflation is fully 
anticipated and interest rates rise immediately  to  maintain  real rates 
constant,  the  tax system will prevent  maintenance  of real  consumption 
in perpetuity.  In  a  no-tax world  with  a  real  interest rate of 5 per 
·cent,  the  (correct)  expectation of a  5 per cent  inflation rate would 
raise nominal  yields  to  (approximately)  11  per cent;  interest recipients 
who  maintained their real  consumption  unchanged  and  devoted  the 
additional  'income'  to  preserving  the  real value of their wealth  would 
enjoy  an  unchanged  real consumption  in perpetuity.  In  the  presence  of 
an  income  tax such  a  choice is no  longer feasible because  the  whole 
of nominal  'income'  is taxed,  including the  amount  needed  to  preserve 
the  real value  of initial wealth.  There  is a  corresponding  gain  to 
debtors  whose  nominal  interest  payments  are  tax deductible.  To  deal 
with this problem  ftwould  be  necessary  to  introduce  a  personal 
'depreciation'  allowance,  or,  more  drastically,  to  change  the  base 
of the  tax system  from  income  to  consumption  or wealth,  with personal 
allowances  and  the slices subject  to  successive tax rates  indexed.18 
These possibilities of reform raise issues far  beyond  the  scope  of 
this essay. 
While  there is widespread  agreement  that  the  existing tax  system  has 
undesirable effects  on  resource  allocation and  income  distribution 
in the  presence of inflation,  there is less  agreement  that  indexation 
115 provides  an  appropriate  solution to  the  problems  surveyed  in this 
section.  Indeed,  an  apparently strong argument  against  indexation 
is provided by  the  role of fiscal  tools as  instruments of stabili-
sation policy.  However,  the stabilising properties of  the  existing 
tax system  are  more  complex  and  less clearly desirable  than is 
generally  supposed. 
The  stabilisation aspects  of  the  tax  system  are usually discussed 
in the  context  of  a  fixed-price  Kenesian  model.  A standard result 
is that  the  impact  on  a  real  income  and  employment  of an  exogenous 
disturbance will be  reduced  but  not  eliminated by  the built-in 
stability afforded  by  the  tax system;  unless  the  disturbance is 
transitory,  discretionary action will be  needed  to restore full 
employment. 
In  fact,  real tax  revenue  depends  on  the price level as well  as 
real  income,  and it was  argued  above  that  the price level changes 
in  response  to  excess  demand.  Suppose,  therefore,  that  an  exogenous 
increase  in aggregate  demand  disturbs  an  initial equilibrium.  Real 
tax revenue  will rise because of the resulting inflation as  well  as 
the  higher level of real  income;  if the real value  of  government 
spending  remains  constant,  the  effects of higher  taxation  on  aggre-
gate  demand  will be  reinforced by  reductions  in the  nominal  stocks 
of money  and/or bonds  in accordance  with  the  government's  budget 
constraint.  Since inflation will  continue at least as  long as  excess 
demand  persists, it is clear that  the initial level of  demand  must 
eventually be  restored;  but,  with  the  now  higher price level,  the 
government's budget  surplus will be  higher or its deficit  lower  than 
initially,  with  further repercussions  on  the nominal  money  supply 
or stock of bonds.  The  conlusions  that  demand  will  overshoot  the 
equilibrium level,  and  that  the initial expansionary shock will be 
followed  by  a  period of induced deflation,  would  be  reinforced if 
the  inflation generated by  excess  demand  created anticipations of 
continuing inflation,  for  in that  case  the price level would still 
be  rising when  the  level of  demand  returned to its initial level. 
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in stabilisers involves at best  fluctuations.  Whether  the  equilibrium 
level of  income  is stable,  and if so  whether it is attained within 
an  acceptable period,  are  questions  to  which  no  general  answer is 
possible;  it all depends  on  the  parameter values of the particular 
case.  Imperfections  in the automatic stabilisers could, ofcourse, 
always  be  offset by  discretionary action,  but  there  seems  singularly 
little virtue in constructing a  system  containing strong possibili-
ties of instability.  In large measure,  the  problem  stems  from  the 
ambitious  target of zero  excess  demand  at  a  constant  level of prices: 
full  equilibrium,  in the  absence  of further intervention,  requires 
that  any  price changes  are rolled back  to  the  initial level  (or, 
more  generally,  to  the  level they  would  otherwise have  attained).19 
An  alternative target,  less ambitious  but  probably more  generally 
acceptable,  would be  zero  excess  demand  at  a  zero  inflation rate; 
any  price  changes  caused by  a  disturbance in the  level of demand 
would  not  be offset by opposite  changes  induced by  the  fiscal 
stabilisers. 
Indexation  schemes  reduce  the probability of overshooting and 
oscillations in response  to  a  temporary  disturbance,  and  hence  they 
may  well  increase  the stability of real  income20,  though  they  would 
retard the  complete  correction of  a  permanent  change  in  demand: 
indexation validates the  fixed-price  assumption of the  elementary 
models,  leaving only the  monetary  changes  induced by  a  deficit or 
surplus  to  act  as  a  cumulative  influence  on  a  disequilibrium.  Any 
net  gain  on  the real side  should be  compared with  the  loss  from 
reduced resistance  to  continuing price changes.  Once  excess  demand 
has  been  eliminated,  any  inflation which  has  been built into 
expectations  could continue  indefinitely. It may  be  objected that 
the  implicit  model  underlying these  speculations presupposes  instan-
taneous  indexing,  whereas  any practicable schemes  will necessarily 
incorporate substantial lags;  but  it would  be purely fortuitous if 
the  excess  supply produced by  institutional delays  in indexing was 
just sufficient to  deal  with  any  expectations problem.  Discretionary 
action could be  proposed as  an  alternative counter-argument,  but if 
discretionary action could be  relied upon  there  would  be little need 
for  indexation. 
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be  stimulated by  fiscal  indexing,  the  residual  costs of inflation 
might  be  sufficiently small  to  be  ignored.  No  further action would 
then  be  required.  The  burden of the  present  argument  is simply that 
if full  indexation is expensive  to  implement  or if even  a  fully 
anticipated inflation imposes  non-negligible costs,  an alternative 
worth  considering would  be  the  construction of  a  scheme  which 
recognises  zero  inflation along with  zero  excess  demand  as  a  fiscal 
objective.  This  would  imply  that  an  excess  demand  episode  would  be 
followed  by  the  deliberate but  automatic  creation of  excess  supply 
in whatever  volume  and  for  whatever period was  necessary to  rectify 
inflationary expectations.  A natural possibility to  examine  would 
be  to  limit the  adjustment  of tax schedules  for  changes  in the price 
level in the  light not  of  revenue  needs  but  of the  inflation rate. 
Full  consideration of the  details of such  a  scheme  is,  however,  well 
beyond  the  scope  of this essay. 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
It would  be  unreasonable  to  subject  the reader to  a  summary  of an 
already lengthy paper.  The  sole  purpose  of this concluding section 
is to  emphasise  the  need  for  extensive  empirical  work  if the 
questions  raised in the  survey of existing knowledge  on  the  relation 
between  taxation and  inflation are  to  be  answered  fully.  Attempts  to 
cast  doubt  on  the  traditional view  that higher  taxation  reduces 
inflation  have,  it is hoped,  been  shown  to  be  fundamentally  unsound; 
but  whether,  for  example,  inflation varies monotonically  in response 
to  a  particular tax  change  requires  much  fuller  investigation than 
it has  yet  received.  Similarly,  however  obvious  their appeal  on 
grounds  of equity,  alternative  schemes  for  indexation,  and  indeed 
the  present system,  call for  detailed examination  to  determine 
their effects on real output  and inflation in a  stochastic  environ-
ment.  The  present  effort has at best  provided  a  research  agenda. 
118 FOOTNOTES 
1.  For  the derivation of these  results and  an application to  the  U.K., 
see Sumner  L2~l the  current  system of investment  incentives is 
examined  in L21(. 
2.  Cf.  Hotson's  statement L-17  that "··· economists  must  strive mightly 
to  integrate their micro  and  macro  price theories,  and  develop  the 
macro  implications of their micro  theories". 
3.  The  most  articulate  exponent  of this view  is Hansen L2j. 
4.  For  example,  Cockfield L-~ asserts: 
"If taxes are  increased the ordinary man  and  woman  set out  to  recoup 
their loss in higher wages  and  salaries and this is true whether  the 
increase is in  income  tax or  in purchase  tax or in any  other tax." 
5.  See  Gordon L-2/  for  the u.s.,  and  Wilson L2i/  for  Canada. 
6. cr.  Gordon L-i/. 
?.  Wilson L2i/ is one  example. 
8.  For  the  U.K.,  see Parkin,  Sumner  and Jones L1i/.  For  the u.s.,  the 
most  recent  evaluation  was  performed bz lhe Council  of Economic 
Advisers;  for  discussion  see  Laidler Ll2/. 
9.  Weintraub's  proposal is_examined in detail by  Isard L-~  and  by 
Kotowitz  and  Fortes Ll~. Both  discussions  are  essentially micro-
economic,  and  in  consequence  do  not  cover  the  broader  issues 
considered here. 
10.  Nevin  explicitly claims  that  the  factor  tax  "would  avoid  the  snow-
balling effect of  a  crude  turnover tax system",  but  the  base  of the 
tax would  be  labour  costs,  capital consumption  and purchases  of 
materials;  there is no  reference  to  the  exclusion of intermediate 
goods,  and  indeed  Nevin later contrasts the  factor  tax with  a  V.A.T. 
The  proposal was  primarily  intended as  a  contribution to  growth  by 
reallocating the  tax burden in  favour  of efficient  firms,  but  "a 
second advantage  of such  a  change  would  be  that it would  discourage 
and  not  encourage  the  inflation of costs". 
11.  Kaldor Lli/,  for  example,  appears  to  believe that  inflation raises 
the  (nominal)  rate of return on  new  investment  relative to  rates 
on  financial assets. 
12.  Notably,  any  'distortion'  (which  need not,  of course,  be  undesirable) 
of relative prices caused by  a  system of ad  valorem  taxes levied at 
unequal  rates will not  be  compounded  by  inflation,  whereas  specific 
taxes will  not  be  neutral  in this respect. 
13.  See  Sumner  L2~. The  neutrality rules discussed below are readily 
derived  from  the  general relation between  inflation and  implicit 
rental price of capital services. 
119 14.  In  the  period 1963-'73,  the  corporate sector accounted  for  about 
85  per cent,  of both private fixed  investment  excluding dewellings, 
and of private inventory investment,  discussed below.  The  allowances 
available  to  unincorporated businesses are the  same  as  in the 
corporate sector,  but  they are subject  to  the progressive  income 
tax; hence the neutrality results would not  apply where the  marginal 
tax rate varied over  time  because of variations in total  income. 
15.  See  Morley Lii/,  ch.  3. 
16.  See  Bossons  and Wilson L-i/ on  Canada,  and  Matthiessen L-1~ 
on  Sweden. 
17.  See  Prest L2£7. 
18.  A personal  expenditure  tax was  advocated by  Kaldor Li£7  many 
years  ago.  It would  involve  similar administrative problems  as 
the  wealth  tax recently advocated by  Flemming  and Little L-i/ 
to  replace,  inter alia,  the  tax  on  unearned  income  and capital 
gains  tax. 
19.  Friedman L-i/ is one  of the  few  writers who  have  appreciated this 
point;  he  regarded it at  that  time  as  a  virtue. 
20.  See  Bossons  and  Wilson L-i/ for  evidence  that  the  performance of 
Canadian output  and  employment  in response  to  an  exogenous  shock 
will  be  improved  by  the  indexation  scheme  adopted  in 1973. 
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PRICES  AND  INCOMES  POLICY  AND  THE  U.K. 
NATIONALISED  INDUSTRIES  IN  THE  POST-WAR  PERIOD 
by 
Robert Millward 
124 1.  INTRODUCTION 
An  increasingly accepted  view of  the way  that governments  implement 
price and  income  restraint is that pressure  inevitably is placed  on  the 
public  sector.  Certainly in the U.K.  in the last few  years government 
intervention in the pricing of nationalised industry goods  and  services has 
raised much  comment.  There are  some  who  believe such  intervention has  been 
going on  for  a  long time  and  - to take another  example  - the pay  pause of 
1961/2 was  seen as effective only in so far  as there was  some  temporary 
"leaning" on  certain wage  and  salary groups  in the public  sector.  Most  of 
these observations  have  been impressionistic and  little if any  substantive 
research has  been  performed  in this area.  This  paper attempts  a  preliminary 
examination of this problem from  the point of view of an  important  sector of 
the public  sector,  namely  the public corporations - a  sector  embracing  the 
nationalised industries and  other much  smaller corporations  (see Statistical 
Annex,  Note  (a)~ 
The  approach  involves first of all considering to what  extent U.K. 
governments  have  attempted  to put more  pressure on public corporations than 
on  the company  sector - either by  any explicitly declared features of their 
general policy or  through the machinery developed  to  enforce  such policies, 
or by  "back-door"  persuasive pressure developed  (consciously or unconsciously) 
for  the purposes of prices and  incomes  policy.  Secondly data is analysed 
to  see whether  such attempts  have  been successful,  whether for  example 
there has been any  discriminatory impact  on  prices and  incomes.  Thirdly 
the  implications of this type of  policy for the nationalised  industries 
and  for  wider  issues  such as  the  size of the government  budget are 
considered. 
125 2.  GOVERNMENT  POLICY 
There is not complete agreement  as to the precise periods over  which 
prices and  incomes  policies have been deemed  to be in force  in the U.K. 
Following  the argument  of  the 1968  Brookings Report(l)  the post-war  period 
up  to  1964  saw  three periods where  the target was  a  freeze  on  money  incomes, 
1948,  1956  and  1961/2,  supplemented  by a  price plateau  in 1956  and  the 1961 
pay  pause embraced  dividends.  The  latter was  then followed  by  the development 
of criteria for  wages  and  salaries based  on the guiding light of a  2A%  p/a 
increase, with however  public exposure by  the National  Incomes  Commission 
as the only  sanction.  Little can be  deduced  about  these periods to  suggest 
any discriminatory policy towards  public corporations aside from  the 1962 
incomes  policy white  pap.er  where warnings  to public authority employees 
might  have  had  implications for  the corporations. 
"In the past  comparisons with levels of  income  in other anployments 
have  played  a  large part in discussions leading to wage  and  salary 
increases  especially in the public  services.  [But]  in the 
immediate future more  regard will have  to be given to the general 
economicconsideration set out  in this paper.  The  government  will 
emphasise the need  for  this in their negotiations with their own 
employees."  (2) 
In fact,  any  emphasis  on  wage  restraint in the public  sector  seems  to have 
fallen on  bodies like the Civil  Service and  National Health Service,  that is 
outside the corporation part of  the public sector. 
So  far as price restraint is concerned  the government  had,  in April  1961, 
published its reassessment of "The Financial and  Economic  Obligations of the 
Nationalised  Industries~(J) which would  if anything  tend to have  the effect 
of raising the industries'  prices relative to  those of  the private sector. 
The  paper noted  the  low  financial rates of return in the public corporations, 
the "excessive" use of  the economy's  savings for their  investment  programmes, 
and  "excessive" absorption of resources  from  the prevalence of  "low" prices. 
Although  the government  of  the  time did not  say  so  in so many  words,  there 
126 was  also  same  embarrassment for  the goverment's monetary policy caused  by 
the need  to finance the industries'  investment  programme  by  central  government 
loans  backed ultimately by  the issue of  government  stock.  The  White Paper 
theDfore proposed,  amongst  other things,  that the industries'  statutory 
requirement  to break even  should  be  interpreted as  a  requirement  operative 
over  five years  and  no  longer.  Together with the requirement  that depreciation 
proviaons  should  be  casted  on  the replacement basis,  the establishment of 
target financial rates of return on  net assets and  with no  qualifications 
relating to  the general  problem of  inflation,  government  policy was  clearly 
to raise the price level and  self-financing ratios of  the nationalised 
industries relative to the private sector. 
In terms  of official policy little changed  in this respect during the 
1964-70 period  of office of the Labour  Government  and  the first 2!  years of 
the  subsequent  Conservative Government.  No  distinction was  made  between 
public and  private sectors during the freeze  on all incomes  and  prices in 
the last six months  of  1966,  the six months  of  "severe restraint" opening 
1967,  and  the  subsequent  "standstill" until March  1968.  In the two  flanking 
periods  of  Labour  office,  prices and  incomes  guidelines were  supplemented 
by  early warning and  delaying  powers  as well  as public exposure by  the 
National  Board  for  Prices and  Incomes  - all of which had  more  teeth in the 
period March  1968  to June  1970  - but the large public corporations were 
officially to be treated on  a  par  to  large fiOns  in the private sector. 
Explicit  statements to this effect can be  found  in the Prices and  Incomes 
White  Papers of  1965,  1966  and  1967. (4)  Indeed  the Treasury,  conscio~s of 
the suspicions harboured by  the Select Committee  on Nationalised Industries, 
1to 
declared that Committee  in 1967  that: 
"Nationalised  industries have not been singled out for more 
stringent treatment under  the prices and  incomes  policy  •••• 
The  reason is that if nationalised industries'  prices got 
significantly out of line with their costs this would  lead  to 
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amounts  having  to be  provided  by  the Exchequer  for  new 
investment."  (5) 
In November  of that  same  year the government  had  published(G)  an  important 
review of its policy towards  the nationalised  industries.  The main features 
of this paper were  a  IDove  towards  a  closer alignment ofprices and  costs at 
the margin,  the evaluation of  investment  by  DCF  techniques and  more  social 
accounting and  compensatory finance for unprofitable services, all of  which, 
if executed would  make  nonsense of  any use of,  for  example,  pricing policies 
to serve wider  inflation policies. 
Finally, it should  be noted  that the one  year  interregnum from  June 
1970  was  followed  by  the Confederation of British Industry Initiative asking 
200  of  its members  to  sign a  declaration covering  the 12  months  ending 31st 
July 1972,  in order,  amongst  other things,  "···  to limit the weighted 
average of  price changes  in the relevant range of  products to  5%  or less."(7) 
The  Chancellor of  the Exchequer  followed  this up  quickly by  a  statement which 
implied that nationalised industries would  do  exactly the  same,  but no  more 
was  promised;  moreover  the Chancellor assured  the Chairmen  of the Nationalised 
Industries'  Boards  that this would  lead  to neither cuts in the  investment 
programme  or more  governmental  control,  and  any reductions in the industries 
accumulation of  internal finance would  be matched  by finance  from  the National 
Loans  Fund. (S) 
The  Price Codes(9) 
In November  1972  the Conservative Government  prefaced  stage  I  of  its 
counter-inflation programme  - the pay and  price standstill - by  suggesting(lO) 
that the C.B.I.  initiative had  caused  financial  problems for  those participating. 
In January 1973  the statutory policy to succeed  the standstill was  outlined, 
and  here  important  changes with respect  to  the public corporations were first 
described - though the basic philosophy may  well,  as will be considered later, 
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which  commenced  operation in April  1973  continued  previous policies on 
incomes  in so far  as  employees  of nationalised and  private industries 
were  to be treated on  a  par. 
The  government's  policy on prices was  in general to restrict increases 
to an amount  reflecting certain "allowable" cost  increases,  the latter 
deemed  to arise from  approved  pay  increases and  rises in raw material prices, 
interest charges,  etc.  This was  to be reinforced - through the Price 
Commission  - by  holding net profit margins  at certain reference levels; 
that  is,pre-tax trading profit net of depreciation and  interest as  a 
percentage of turnover,  or net assets,were to be  pegged  to  some  agreed 
average of  the last five years'  levels.  One  qualification to this was 
that firms making  losses  in the  base period would  be allowed  to raise prices 
to eliminate these losses.  However,  the government  would  not 
"  •••  for  the  time being permit  the nationalised industries 
concerned  to  increase prices by more  than their cost  increases 
in order to reduce deficits.  Subject  to  that,  the Price 
Commission will not under  the Code  withhold  increases which it 
would  allow to  a  private undertaking facing  similar cost  increases."(ll) 
There was  a  tiny ray of hope  for  national~sed industries in deficit and 
, this arose from  the way  in which  allowable costs were  to be calculated. 
If the Price Commission  were  to allow firms  to  incorporate all approved  pay 
increases  into price increases,  then any  subsequent productivity growth 
would  raise the profit margin.  The  Price Codes  therefore assume  firms~ll 
achieve a  certain minimum  productivity growth and  only part of any  approved 
pay  increase ccuntsas  an  allowable cost.  Indeed  close examination of  the 
Code  invites the interpretation that it is in part a  self-policing system 
ha  f .  ld  11  d  .  .  d  .  h  .  .  (l2)  so  t  t  1rms  wou  pass  a  pro uct1v1ty a  vances  on  1n  t  e1r  pr1ces. 
Its relevance here is simply that the productivity deduction clause may  be 
waived  for  a  nationalised  industry in deficit so  that if its productivity 
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then the deficit would  to this extent be reduced  by  the approved  price 
rise.  Finally, however,  and  a  most  important  point,  these opportunities 
for a  nationalised industry to raise prices - see for  example  paragraph 
83  of  the  Stage 3  Code  - are explicitly subject  to Ministerial vetting. 
Thus  paragraph 85  of the Stage 3  Code: 
"Where  the responsible Minister notifies the Commission  that a 
a  price increase resulting from  the application of  paragraph 83 
would  have  an unacceptable effect on  the general  le~ of prices, 
the Commission will  limit the permitted price increase to the 
amount  specified as acceptable by  the Minister but not  so  as  to reduce 
the increase below.what  is needed  to reflect the allowable cost 
increases of  the industry  •••  " 
The  Stage 2  Code  had  similar provisions and  so  the Price Commission  could 
well  find  itself sanctioning an  increase in the size of a  public corporation's 
deficit. 
The  government  did  openly recognise that problems would  be caused for 
the nationalised  industries  and  by  the  time the Stage  2  Code  was  practically 
ready for  legislative enactment  in March  1973,  the government  was  making 
noises  about  reviewing its policy through consultations in the coming  summer. 
The  Code"  •••  can be modified  to  take account  of  the growing  requirements 
of  investment  in the private sector and  the need  of  some  nationalised industries 
to return to commercial viability."(l3)  Come  October  the  idea of  encouraging 
private sector  investment  was  confirmed  by its incorporation into the main  aims 
of  the  Stage 3  policy but no  change  in policy towards  the nationalised  industries 
was  apparent.  It was  claimed  that the commercially unjustifiable level of 
their prices had  made  a  significant contribution to the reduction in the 
national price level,  that compensation would  be  provided  and  that in the 
longer run a  restoration of profitability was  desirable so that more  self-
financing  of  investment  could take place and  the requirement  for  borrowed 
funds  reduced. (l4)  In fact quite apart from  the situation where  a  nationalised 
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ations receive differential treatment and,  moreover,  they get little if any 
mention in the sections of the White  Papers outlining government  policy. 
Only  a  close examination of  the Codes  reveals these issues which may  be 
summarised  as follows: 
a)  Should  a  firm face  the prospect  of existing profits turning into deficits, 
the Price Commission  is empowered  to approve  any  price  increases which 
might  prevent this occurrence.  For nationalised  industries,  however, 
this is again subject  to  the kind of Ministerial vetting mentioned  above. 
b)  Some  relief from  the Codes'  definition of allowable costs was  afforded 
for  so-called  low profit firms.  Paragraphs  49,  61  and  75  of  the Stage 2 
Code  provided  two  kinds of relief for firms,  whether  public or private. 
Firstly for a  low profit firm whose  productivity growth was  expected  to 
be greater than that assumed  in the Codes  (or which  turned  out to be 
greater),  the Price Commission  could allow the profit margin to rise, but 
only to  the extent of  the "excess" productivity growth and  with a  ceiling 
of a  5%  return on net assets.  Secondly,  reference profit margins were 
to be calculated as  the average of the best  two  of  the last 5  years  so 
it was  quite possible for  even  a  low  profit firm to have a  base-period 
profit margin above  the reference level.  Normally  the Price Commission 
would  so  determine approved  price increases that the profit margin would 
fall to its reference level.  Where  the former was  less  than  5%  in the 
base period  (i.e.  at April  1973)  this reduction would  be waived  by  the 
Commission  - though this argument  could not be used  to raise the profit 
margin ~  to 5%. 
The  move  from  Stage 2  to Stage 3, dramatically changed  the financial 
protection afforded to private enterprises whilst public  corporations 
were  put  in a  worse  financial position.  The  Stage 3  Code  cannot  ever 
be used  to push private sector net profit margins  below an  8%  return on 
capital or prevent their rising up  to  8%. 
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Private firms  are therefore effectively given a  min~um profit level of  8%,  but public corporations 
are specifically excluded  from  this provision.  A public corporation 
whose  productivity growth is bigger  than that assumed  in the Codes  can 
no  longer pull low  profits of  say  4%  up  to the  5%  level,  let alone the  8% 
level;  it cannot  even pull them  up  to its reference profit level,  should 
that  be  say  6%,  since there are no  general  provisions in the Codes  to 
permit  this.  Moreover,  were  its reference level  to be,  say,  2%,  price 
increases would  be abated  to push  the  4%  profit margin down  to  2%  so 
that it loses  the other  small  element  of relief in the Stage 2  Code. 
Although this was  never  stated  in the White  Paper,  the rationalisation 
for  not  specifying a  minimum  profit  level for public corporations may  well 
be that the proportion of their  trading profits devoted  to fixed  interest 
debt is much  higher  than  for  the private sector and  interest charges are 
specifically treated in the Codes  as an allowable cost. 
c)  The  effect which  the Codes  might  have  on  investment has clearly been of 
concern to the  government  and  under  Stage 3  a  number  of  loopholes are 
provided which would  allow private firms  - and  especially those with high 
past profit levels to which these  loopholes  are particularly meaningful-
to  hold  their profit levels  independently of  the cost and  productivity 
provisions of the Codes.  Again this  is denied  to public corporations. 
d)  Finally it should be noted  that the Codes  recognise  that a  firm's 
productivity growth may  outstrip that assumed  in the  Codes  or  that forecast 
on  the occasion of an application for  a  price increase.  There are 
provisions for  "clawing back"  such "excess" profits - though their execution 
raises many  problems  - and  these provisions are much  less stringent for 
private enterprise than for  public corporations.  The  latter could  find 
their present profits being pushed  below their reference level right 
down  to zero and  under  Stage 2  these clauses could  even have converted 
present profits into deficits.  The  clawback clauses can never under 
Stage 3  be used  in connection with private firms  to  push existing profit 
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up  to  8%. (l5) 
3.  MACHINERY  AND  IMPLEMENTATION  OF  POLICY 
Outside  the  ambit  of official policy,  governments  in the U.K.  have 
always  tried to  influence  economic  decisions within the public corporations 
either through the prac.tical way  in which  a  policy is implemented  or  through 
informal  persuasion.  Thus  Ministers traditionally had  no  statutory powers 
in connection with pricing but  a  gentleman's  agreement  involved prior consult-
ation of  Ministe~by the  industries'  Boards.  The  latter were,  from  1958, role 
to request a  letter from  the Minister  should  there be disagreement,  and  from 
1961  were  entitled to ask for  an  adjustment of  their financial  targets.  In 
assessing to what  extent  governments  have  "leaned"  on  the public corporations for 
purposes  of prices and  incomes  policy,  there is a  severe problem in disentangling 
three potential threads of  government  influence: 
a)  The  restraint on prices and  incomes  which arises  independently of  any 
national prices and  incomes  policy,  such as  the existence of unprofitable 
services and  reorganisational  issues or the pressure from  the  industries' 
Consumer  Councils,  and  which  is not  to be  found  in the private sector. 
b)  Those  extra strains on public corporations arising from  the particular 
machinery developed  to monitor  and  implement  the national prices and  incomes 
policy. 
c)  The  informal or "back door"  pressure exercised on  the Corporations by 
governments  (even when  unconscious  or misplaced}  in pursuit of  their national 
prices and  incomes  policy. 
Machinery 
Attention here is concentrated on  the experiences  of  the 1960s  and  1970s 
133 and  first of all the machinery of prices and  incomes  policy is examined. 
Three potential instances of discrimination are to be found: 
i)  The  monitoring and  investigative system introduced  in April  1965  required 
that  large private manufacturing  firms  - to  take a  group  compable  to 
public corporations- give the  government  one month's notice of  an  intended 
price change.  At  the expiry of the month,  if further  study is required 
the government  would  then have  a  further  two  months  for more  detailed 
enquiries  including any  by  the National  Board  for  Prices  and  Incomes. 
In later developments of the Labour  Government  policy,  including the post 
1967  period,  the total standstill period was  lengthened.  The  machinery 
as developed for  public corporations contained  two  further factors. 
Firstly the Boards  had  to  give Ministers 3  months  notice of  an  intended 
price change: 
"The  longer period of notice is to  enable the Minister,  in 
consultation  with his colleagues,  to decide whether  the proposals 
should be referred  to  the National  Board  for Prices  and  Incomes 
before the  Boards refer their proposals  to the appropriate 
consultative or  consumers'  council."  (16) 
Secondly  the  advance  warnings are channelled  through the Minister.  This, 
(a)  tended  to formalize  the procedure for Ministerial vetting or  price 
changes,  (b)  according to the Select Committee  on  Nationalised  Industries 
raised  the potential degree of Ministerial scrutiny over prices relative 
to  the private sector,  and  (c)  in practice led to more  detailed control 
in at least one  Corporation,  namely  British Railways.  As  a  result of 
this  the Select Committee  did  recommend  that in future advance warnings 
be made  direct  to  the Department  of  Employment  and  Productivity,  but this 
was  rejected  in 1969  by  the  Government.  Thirdly,  the  introduction of 
the N.B.P.I.  has meant  an  industry like the National  Coal  Board  had  to 
seek approval  for price increases  from  four  groups:  the N.B.P.I.;  two 
consumer  councils,  and  the Minister.  Specific evidence and/or 
complaints  of delays arising bP.cause  of  these factors have been made 
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1965,  a  number  of  Gas  Boards  in October  1965  (costed by  the Gas  Council 
at £2!  million),  and  the Electricity Council  (l7)  and  further  evidence 
could be produced  for  the 1968-70  period. 
ii)  In~tember 1967  the government  announced  that all major  price increases 
proposed by  the nationalised  industries would  be referred to the N.B.P.I., 
Which  would  be  empowered  to carry out an  efficiency audit.  The  Select 
Committee  on  Nationalised  Industries felt that,  in principle,  this  involved 
discrimination against  the public  sector  since only selected price increases 
in the private sector were  to be  examined. (l8) 
iii) To  back up  its Initiative on  prices  in July 1971,  the C.B.I.  declared  its 
intention to monitor  the performance of companies.  It had  of  course no 
power  of  sanction savethat  the signatories of  the declaration would  be  asked 
to agree to discuss  their difficulties with the Director General  of the 
C.B.I.  were  there to be a  prospect of an inability to meet  the targets. 
There are other members  of  the C.B.I.  aside from  the  200  signatories and 
and  these were  to be approached  later.  This may  be contrasted with the 
degree of  influence Ministers could  exert on  the Nationalised  Industries 
and  the relative ease with which  the Public Corporation Sector  could  be 
covered - viz.  at the end  of  1973  eight  large  corporations,  nine  smaller 
ones  in transport  as well as  the Passenger Transport Executives,  13  small 
ones  in various fields plus the New  Town  Development  Corporations and 
Commissions  for  the New  Towns.  There  seems  in fact  to be  enough  evidence 
that  the nationalised  industries did  comply with the initiative.  The 
Chairman  of  the Electricity Council reports that,  "  •••  the nationalised 
industries were  ordered to comply  strictly with the C.B.I.  initiative 
so  there was  no  increase in tariff during that period.
11  The  Treasury 
admitted  in January 1973  of  the existence of "price restraint policies of 
the last two  years or  so"(l9)  and  the annual reports of British Railways 
and  the Post Office for  1971/2 describe how  price increases were  kept within 
the  5%  limit.  135 Informal  Pressure 
As  already suggested,  government  informal restraint on prices and 
incomes  is not  only difficult to detect but for  public corporations  could 
be  exerted for  reaons  unconnected with prices and  incomes  policy,  though 
the statements of Ministers  and  Board  Chairmen need  not be  taken at their 
face value.  Looking first at the period  of  Labour's  1965-70 prices and 
incomes  policy,  one  finds  for  example  that the National Coal  Board  in 1965 
had  two  applications for  price increases delayed;  after the first one  in 
February  the Board's  annual financial  target was  waived  and  the declared 
reasons  were  a  review of  the Board's prospects;  the  second  set of proposals 
in July were deferred  by  the government" •••  in view of  their  ~plications 
for  prices  and  incomes  policy and  of  the consideration then being given to 
other measures  to assist the Board's finances".  The  London  Transport 
Board's application for  fare  increases  in May  1965  was  delayed until January 
1966- compensation was  paid  and  the argument  advanced  was  that the Board's 
operations were  to be  reviewed.  In November  of that year  an applicatim 
for  fare  increases to become  effective after the severe restraint period 
(i.e.  from  Summer  1967)  was  shelved,  this time because of  the considerations 
raised by  the reorganisation of London  Transport,  all of  which  sounds fairly 
susp\cious  given the open declaration by  the Permanent  Secretary of  the 
Ministry of Transport  that  the Board's fares were closely influenced by 
considerations of prices and  incomes  policy.  In 1966  one  Electricity Board 
had  informal  discussions withthe Minister  before the freeze  period  and  these 
were  terminated  by  the freeze.  The  Select Committee  on  Nationalised  Ind11stries 
also quotes  experiences of  one  Area Gas  Board  and  the  Elect~ity Council 
but  these were during the 12  months  following July 1966  and  were  therefore 
difficult to assess since price increases were  not unknown  in this period 
and  government  policy did provide for  exceptions,  for  example  where  import 
and  raw material costs had  risen. (ZO)  Enough  has,  however,  been said to 
suggest that  informal pressure on prices for  purposes of general prices and 
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significance is not clear from  the evidence deduced  so far. 
None  of  this should  perhaps  be  surprising given the interpretation 
of policy by  the government.  Although at pains to declare - cf.  section I 
above - that nationalised  industries are treated on  a  par with the private 
sector,  the Treasury has said"  •••  they must  observe and  if necessary be 
seen to observe  the criteria applicable to industry in general," and 
in explaining in September  1967  why  all the major  price increases of  the 
industries were  to be referred  to  the N.B.P.I.,  the Treasury  invoked  "  the 
importance of  the industries to  the  economy  and  the need  to demonstrate that 
·the public sector is co-operating to the full  in carrying out  the Prices and 
Incomes  Policy."  This  stress  0n  the public relations aspect  of nationalised 
industry pricing echoed  the suggestion made  a  month  earlier by  the N.B.P.I. 
in its 2nd  General Report.  Indeed  the Chairman  of  that Board  has  argued 
that the industries are "basic"  to  the economy,  that for this and  other 
reasons  they are different from  the private sector,  and  that governments  have 
dragged  their feet  in approving price increases for precisely this reason. (2f) 
Turning now  to the experiences of the 1970s,  it has  already been argued 
that,  as  a  matter of  the mechanics  of  implementing policy,  it looks  as 
though many  of  the nationalised  industries strictly adhered  to the CBI  initiatb,e 
but whether  any  further  pressures were  exerted  in that  1971/72 period is 
not known.  What  is apparent  is that restraint was  operative before the  CBI 
initiative.  The  previously mentioned  statement of  the Electricity Council 
Chairman  - made  in January  1973  - included  tle remark that "... the restraint 
on prices in this  industry commenced  about  three years  ago,  well  in advance 
of  the start of  the CBI  initiative •••  "  In its Report for  1970/1  the Post 
Office  argued  that certain of  its services were underpriced,  that postal price 
increases made  slow progress, were  eventually modified by  the Minister  and 
introduced,  at an inadequate level,  in February 1971.  The  1970/1  Report 
of  the Coal  Board  records delays by  the government  in approving price rises 
137 for  industrial coals.  Finally,  an application by  the gas  industry in 1970 
for  a  price increase to meet  increased costs of  labour  and  raw materials was, 
according  to  the Corporation's  1973/4 Report,  ~elayed for  one year. 
Little evidence has  been adduced  so  far  in this paper  of  government 
attempts  to restrain wage  incomes  of public corporation employees  relative 
to the private sector.  It is possible that delays  and  vetting of  price 
increases in the Corporations  in the post 1964  period  led ultimately to pressure 
on  earnings.  The  Post Office,  in its Annual  Report  for  1972/3 did  suggest 
that as  a  result of  the slow growth of  prices there"  •••  is already  some  evidence 
that postmen's  pay  and  conditions  in some  parts of the country are insufficiently 
competitive to attract and  retain enough  people of  the right quality for 
the  job  to be done."  In so far,  also,  as price restraint leads  to 
Corporation deficits which necessitate Exchequer  support,  a  gate is provided 
for  government  influence on  wage  bargaining.  Finally one must  note the 
view of some  observers  that Conservative policy from  1970  was  to exert 
wage 
restraint on  public  sector/increases.  Clearly this  impact  need  not be 
uniform over all industries.  The  same  point applies also  to price restraint. 
It is now  approriate to consider whether  any of  these attempts did actually 
manifest  themselves  in the pattern of  prices and  incomes. 
4•  WAGE  AND  PRICE  INFLATION  IN  MANUFACTURING  AND  NATIONALISED  INDUSTRY,l950-73 
The  arguments developed  so  far may  be briefly summarised  as follows. 
There  is no  evidence that  governments  attempted  to apply their prices 
and  incomes  policies more  strictly to the public corporations than to the 
company  sector in the three periods of restraint in the post-war  period 
preceding the 1964  Labour  Government.  From  1964-1972 official policy was 
to apply criteria for  increases ~  incomes  and  prices and  to execute policies 
138 in such a  way  as  to make  no  distinction between private and  public  sectors. 
Since then the development  of  the Pay  and  Price Codes  have  so  proceeded 
that  the ability of public corporations to raise their prices is considerably 
more  circumscribed  than is the case for  the private sector.  So  far as  the 
mechanics  of  policy are concerned  there .s some  evidence that the monitoring 
and  inve~tigative procedures  associated with the early warning  systems 
and  N.B.P.I.  subjected  the nationalised  industries to much  closer  scrutiny 
and  longer delays  than the private sector,  and  that the CBI  initiative on 
prices of 1971/2 had  a  much  greater  chance  of  success for  the public corporations 
than for  the CBI's members.  There is evidence that Ministers have  exerted 
restraint on  public  sector prices - quite apart  from  official policy or  its 
mechanics  - both in the 1965-70  period and  in the 12  months  period  following 
June 1970  when  no  determined  national policy as  such was  in operation,  and 
governments  appear  in part  to have been conscious of  the psychological effect 
of  holding down  the prices of what  were  seen as basic industries.  Finally 
one  ought  to bear in mind  the possibility that price restraints fed  indirectly 
into wages;  the possibility that the 1961/2 pressure on  public authority 
employees  may  have  extended  itself to public corporations;  also the feelings 
of  some  observers  that the Conservative policy from  1970  was  to  exert 
pressure on public sector wages. 
Have  incomes  and  prices  in the post-war  period moved  in such  a  way  as 
to  suggest  the existence of  a  discriminatory design and  application of 
prices and  incomes  policies?  That  is, have prices and  incomes  in public 
corporations been  lowered  relative to,  say,  a  comparable part of  the private 
sector like manufacturing,  taking into account all factors other than prices 
and  incomes  restraint?  Such restraints have varied in their intensity and 
duration,  and  so  both long-run and  short-run effects may  be  considered. 
Considering  long-run factors first,  Chart  I  shows  annual rates of  changea 
the prices of manufacturing and  public corporation goods  and  services  infue 
period  1955-73.  Noofficial series are available for  the public corporation 
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72  73  YEAR sector  and  the  ones  developed  for  this paper are weighted  averages  of 
the data in the Annual  Reports  of  the  following Corporations:  N.C.B.; 
British Railways;  Electricity Boards  in England  and  Wales;  British Gas 
Corporation;  the  Post Office,  and  B.E.A.  They  account at present for 
roughly  73%  of  the Corporations'  employment  and  fixed  investment,  the 
balances being largely accounted  for  by  steel which  has  only been  in the 
sector for  a  few  years  in the early 1950s  and  since  1967.*  The  data on 
manufacturing prices excludes  those products  exported  or retailed by 
manufacturing firms  but  this will not  significantly affect its represent-
ativeness. 
If the short-terru oscillations in the  top  two  lines of  Chart  I  are 
ignored  then the  longer  term trends can be discerned.  They  reveal that both 
sectors experienced  the now  well  known  trend  of  falling price inflation from 
the Korean  War  period(Z2)  down  to  the late 50s,  thereafter  showing  a 
consistent but gentle rise until the  late 60s  whence  inflation accelerates. 
It will be noticed  that  in the  1950s  prices are rising at a  faster rate 
in the public corporation sector but  that,  after an overlap  in the late 
50s  /mrly 60s,  it is  manufacturin~ which  from  about  1964  shows  the greater 
inflation.  Various  explanations might  be offered  for  these  trends: 
a)  It might be  argued,  cf.  Aubrey Jones  and  the Select  Committee  on 
Nationalised Industries,  that  from  1964  or  thereabouts although official 
prices  and  incomes  policy treated the  two  sectors  on  a  par,  the mechanics 
of  implementation together with informal  pressure from Ministers meant 
fiercer price restraint in the public corporations.  The  earlier 
period's trend would  of  course also  have  to  be  explained.  In fact  an 
il1uminatory measure  of  the  trend  in both sectors'  prices is given by 
the growth rate of  the relative price level  in public corporations. 
This  is shown  in Chart  I  in the  lowest  line which  is derived  from the 
other  two. (Z3)  In a  manner  of  speaking it involves calculating for 
1954  the price level in public corporations,  dividing by  the price 
*  see footnote  on next  page 
14( level in manufacturing and  then plottjng for  each year  the rate of  growth 
of  this relative price.  From  1964  this relative price inflation has 
been negative but what  is noticeable is that 
it  has  beendeclining  and  the rate of decline shows  a  long-run 
constancy throughout  the post-war period - at least up  to  1973. 
]Ut otherwise,  the post-war  period  shows  a  constant  long-run growth rate 
of manufacturing inflation relative to public corporations.  Thus  the 
post  1964  experience of manufacturing inflation rising relative to that 
in public corporations  involves  a  trend which  can also be  seen in the 1950s 
and  early 1960s  when  prices and  incomes  restraint was  weak  if not non-
existent and  discriminatory aspects not apparent. 
b)  The  persistency of the trend  in the relative price of manufacturing might 
alternatively be  explained  in more  dramatic  terms  such as  those of  Glyn  and 
Sutcliffe: 
"The  state may  •••  use the nationalised industries to subsidise 
the private sector;  low  prices and  profitability amount  to a 
subsidy  to production.  In practice this has  always been the 
role of  the nationalised  sector  in Britain....  Even  though they 
sell nearly half their output direct to  the consumer,  private capital 
may  still gain from  the  low  prices charged  since they help to 
moderate wage  pressure."  (24) 
This  approach however  has  to be reconciled with what  was  happening to profits. 
~he rate of profit in public corporations has  shown  a  consistent long-run 
increase from  the early 1950s  to  the late 1960s.  Relative to the private 
sector  the rise is even more  noticeable.  Chart  II shows  annual rates cf 
profit in the Company  and  Corporation Sectors for  the 1950-73  period,  and 
since this data is to be referred to again  some  brief explanation is in 
* (footnote from  previous  page) 
A similarco;erage applies  to the earnings,  output,  employment  and 
productivity data discussed later on.  Many  thanks are due  to R.Ward 
who  drew  up  these series and  Charts I, III and  IV.  Note  that the 
manufactuii~g data includes steel, and  tht public corporation figures 
include the Post Office for all the post-war  period.  For full details 
of  sources  and  methods  see StatiHtical Annex  Note  b. 
142 order,  (see also statistical annex note c).  The  profitrate in Chart  II 
is measured  as the  share of  trading profits in value-added,  or  net output. 
A more  usual measure would  be  the rate of  return on capital.  The  latter is 
simply  the rate of profit on net  output divided  by  the capital/net output 
ratio.  Owr  the post-war period  the available data  suggests that the 
capital net output ratio has risen gradually,  consistently and  without 
oscillations in both sectors at not  too dissimilar rates.  It is the  share 
of profits in value-added which has differed  in the  two  sectors in such a 
way  that the profit rate variations in Chart  II match very closely those 
of  the rate of return on  cap1tal  and  since a  longer  time  series is 
available for  the former  this has been used.  In fact the variety of 
measures  of profit rates all show  similar trends  and  short-term oscillations. 
Thus  the deductions  for  stock appreciation and  capital consumption have 
little effect  in this respect for  public  corporations  and variations in 
their rate of profit on  turnover  follow closely the variations of  the Chart  II 
measure.  The  company  sector  is not  an  ideal unit for  present  purposes 
since financial  companies  are included but  estimates of capital consumption 
are available only for  the former  sector.  In fact  estimates of profitrates 
in manufacturing  industry, of  proft rates using different depreciation rates 
and  of  post-tax proft rates - all summarised  in a  recent  piece of  work(
2
S)  -
all  show  similar  long-run trends  and  close correspondence  of  shorter-term 
oscillations.  ~inally it should  be noted that  the  explicit  treatment of 
subsidies  to public corporations is done  to bring  out  their role in the post 
1970  period.  There  is  a  complication however  arising  from  the fact  thatftom 
1969  onwards  certain subsidies to British Railways  for  unremunerative  services 
and  track maintenance were reclassified  in the official statistics as  grants 
and  treated  as  part of  trading profits net  of  subsidies.  Allowing  for  this 
would  lower  the bottom line of  Chart  II by  roughly  2.2  percentage points 
from  1969  but does  not  affect any  of  this paper's conclusions. 
Chart  II therefore clearly shows  the persistent long-run decline in the 
post~war period up  to  the late 1960s  of  profitability in the  company  sector 
and  the rise in public corporations with  the  trends particularly noticeable 
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Annex  Note c. from  the early 1960s.  The  rate of return on  capital  in the  company  sector -
again measured  net of  stock appreciation and  capital consumption - fell 
from  17%  in 1955  to  9%  by  1968/9,  whilst  in the public corporation sector, 
and  railway grants 
measured  with the additional deduction of  subsidies/ it rose from  zero to 
0.8%. This  latter trend  is incompatible with the Glyn/Sutcliffe notion; 
if governments were bent on  always  holding down  the prices of nationalised 
industries,  they would  not have allowed  the profit rate to rise in the way 
it has done. 
e)  Perhaps  the trend  in price inflation can be  explained by  government 
restraints on wages?  Chart III shows  wage  inflation in the  two  sectors 
in the post-war  period.  More  specifically,  the top  two  lines in the 
Chart  show  annual  rates of growth  of  earnings:  for manufacturing this 
relates to weekly  earnings of adult males;  within the public corporations 
aggregate,  the coal and  railways data is on  a  weekly basis but for  the 
others only annual  earnings figures are available.  This data must  therefore 
be treated with caution.  It will be recalled  from  the earlier parts of 
this paper  that little evidence  could  be  found  of  any  attempt by  governments 
to restrain wages  in public corporations relative to wages  in the private 
sector  over  a  long-run period.  At  the most  the closer scrutiny and  control 
of public  sector prices from  1965  onwards might  perhaps  have  led  to  some 
squeeze  on  wages  particularly with the post 1960  policy of  raising  the 
self-financing ratio of  the Corporations.  Chart III shows  the growth 
rate of average  earnings  in both sectors declining to the late 50s/ early 
60s,  risingthereafter and  accelerating from  the end  of  the 1960s  - cf. the 
trend  in prices.  In the 1960s wage  inflation in public corporations, 
far  from  being less than manufacturing  is in fact greater.  Indeed,  over 
the whole  post-war period,  as the lowest  line in Chart III shows,  there is 
a  long-term trend  for  public corporation relative wage  inflation to rise, 
a  rise which  is only slight  in the 1950s but clear in the 1960s.  Much 
of  this makes  sense if productivity trends are considered.  Chart  IV  plots 
the rate of change of output  per employee  in the two  sectors and  this~ows 
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73  YEAR that the productivity advance  of manufacturing  industry was  superior to 
that  of  public corporations up  to the late 1950s  but thereafter the latter 
moved  well  ahead.  This distinction between the  two  decades  has  been 
analysed  in some  depth by  Richard  Pryke  in his book  on  "Public Enterprise 
in Practice". (Z6)  For  present purposes  one  need  note only two  things. 
One  is that output  growth rates  show  similar long-run trends to productivity 
in both sectors,  but whereas  employment  hardly changes  in public corporations 
initially and  from  the late 1950s falls off at an increasing rate,  in 
manufacturing it grows  in the 1950s  and  declines  in the 60s  in both cases 
at fairly gentle long-run rates.  Secondly as  t~  lowest  line in Chart 1!V 
shows,  the post-war  period as  the whole  shows  a  fairly constant  long-run 
growth rate of  public corporation productivity advance relative to 
manufacturing. 
d)  Pulling the various  strands  together  one finds  that in the 1960s  wage 
inflation in public corporations  is greater  than in manufacturing,  but ~ 
also is productivity advance and  to a  much  greater degree  such that  the 
annual  growth rate of unit  labour  costs is rising in manufacturing and  falling 
in public corporations.  If one  assumes  that changes  in non-labour costs 
were,  per unit of  output, very similar in the two  sectors then one  can 
conclude  that part of  the  trend  in labour  costs manifests itself in a  lower 
price inflation in public corporations and  part in a  rise in the relative 
profit rate.  In the 1950s wage  inflation was  slightly less in public 
corporations  but productivity advance was  even more,  with the net result of 
unit  labour costs growing relative to manufacturing.  A disproportionate 
amount  of  this effect manifested itself in a  lower  price inflation in 
manufacturing  so  that the relative profit rate of manufacturing actually 
fell.  Although unit  labour costs were  growing  in public corporations in the 
1950s uiative to manufacturing  they were  growing at a  declining rate so 
that over  the whole  post-war  period up  to the late 1960s relative labour 
cost inflation in public corporations was  declining at a  fairly constant 
148 rate - perhaps more  in the  1960s  than before - and  this manifested  itself 
partly in public corporation relative price inflation declining at a 
constant rate and  partly in its relative profit rate rising particularly 
in the 1960s. 
The  economic  trends resolve themselves then into  two  fundamental  factors. 
One  is the  trend  of productivity;  the other  is the trade-off  between 
prices and  profits,  in particular the decline in the profit rate in 
manufacturing in the 1950s  and  the rise of  the profit rate in public 
corporations  in the 1960s.  For  the last mentioned  one  perhaps  need  only. 
look at the government  policy  towards  the nationalised  industries contained 
in the 1961  and  1967  White  Papers.  Pryke points to rationalisation and 
greater control,  amongst  other things,  to explain thettends in productivity. 
Certainly large issues are involved,  as for  the decline in company  profitability, 
but this is not  the place to explore them  and  for  our  purposes  the productivity 
and  profit trends have  to be treated  as datum. 
In sum,  though a  more  sophisticated statistical analysis might  find  some 
role for  government  prices and  incomes  restraint in  explaining  long  term 
trends in price and  wage  inflation up  to the end  of  the 1960s,  that role, 
on  the basis  of  the prelDninary investigation here,  would  appear  to be 
minimal. 
149 5.  THE  INCIDENCE  OF  PRICES  AND  INCOMES  POLICY 
Attempts  to  iapose  incomes  and  price restraint have varied  in 
intensity throughout  the post-war  period  so  that fairly short-term 
variations could be  important.  The  long-term trends  in output  and 
productivity discussed  in the last section,  have  in fact  continued  in 
the  1970s  - with  the one  change of less  labour  shedding in the public 
corporations - and,  though wage  inflation has accelerated,  the relationship 
betwee.n  nationalised and  private industry has  continued  so  that the 
relative trend  in labour  costs has  been maintained with perhaps  small 
rises of the growth rate of  public  corporation relative wage  inflation 
and  the decline of relative labour  costs  losing its momentum.  However, 
whilst price inflation in both sectors in 1971  was  in the  9-11%  range,  it fell 
only slightly in 1972/3  in manufacturing  to7Rverage of  6%,  whilst  in public 
corporations it fell to  2.5%.  Thus  the  long-term decline in public 
corporation relative inflation seems  to have  significantly steepened  in 
1973.  Moreover  the very slight changes  in productivity advance  and  wage 
inflation in 1970  and  1971,  given the price trends,  were  sufficient to cause 
the profit rate to actually decline in these years  so  that the post-1969 
profit trend  in public corporations is a  reversal of the long-term trend, 
whereas  the  experience of manufacturing  industry is quite consistent with 
its long-term profit  decline~  All of  this points to a  closer  examination 
of  shorter period  trends not  only in the 1970s but also in earlier periods 
when  prices and  incomes  restraint varied  in its intensity. 
First of all it is noticeable from Chart III that the growth rate 
of average  earnings falls off for  both sectors in 1961/2  and  1966/7  when 
government  attempts were made  to restrain income  increases.  However, 
the~e were  also periods of general  economic  decline with big decreases  in 
the growth rate of  output  and  productivity in both sectors and  manufacturing 
150 employment;  the growth rate of  public corporation employment  actually 
rises in these periods - perhaps as an  aE of  government  counter-cyclical 
policy or because of a  greater willingness to hold  on  to  labour - but 
the fall in output  is sufficient to give a  substantial fall  in productivity 
(cf.  Chart  IV).  There are similar  troughs  in 1958  and  in 1970  when  incomes 
policy was  dormant  and  earnings also decline in no  less significant a  way 
for manufacturing so  that the role of  incomes  restraint is minimal. 
On  the other hand  the  improvement  in earnings  in public corporations 
relative to manufacturing is substantial in 1962  and  196~.  This  lends 
itself to the idea that the strength of discriminatory restraint on  public 
sector  incomes  is biggest outside the freeze periods,  on  the grounds  that 
it is only  in the freeze periods that  incomes  policy really bites on  the 
private sector.  Again,  however,  the relative improvement  of  public 
corporation earnings  occurs  in all trough periods - see 1971  in particular -
and  is quite consistent with the  long-run trends.  The  relative rise in 
public corporation earnings in 1971  and  1972  is particularly interesting 
bearing in mind  the view that Conservative policy in this period was  to~an  • 
on public  sector wages.  Again,  however,  one  should  stress that the earnings 
data is far  from  ideal and  these results must  be regarded  as provisional. 
Finally,  the years  1972/3  involve  statutory incomes  policies but  earnings 
in both sectors are not falling to any  significant degree and  manufacturing 
earnings are gaining relative to public corporations;  in fact it is a 
pe~iod of rising output  and  productivity in both sectors. 
Secondly,  it might  be  asked  if there is any  evidence of discriminatory 
price and  profit restraint associated with the different  intensities of 
prices and  income  policies.  Here  one  has  to  be more  careful.  As  Chart II 
shows,  the profit rate did fall off in public corporations in 1960/1 and 
1966/7  when  incomes  restraint was  being attempted,  and  Posner  (27 )  has 
pointed to prices and  incomes  policy as  an explanation for  the decline in 1966/7. 
In the case of the company  sector,  the decline in the profit rate accelerates 
151 in thes·e  periods.  Again,  however,  the'e are periods of general  economic 
decline and  s~ilar changes  in the profit rate occurred  in 1958  and  1970/1 
when  incomes  restraint was  not  in operation at least in theprivate sector. 
Similarly the growth rate of relative inflation in manufacturing falls 
off in the mid  60s,  suggesting perhaps that that sector suffers from prices 
restraint only in freeze periods,  but this cannot  be  sustained  since the 
relative price inflation tends to fall off  in all the periods of general 
economic  decline.  Inflation in fact does  not fall  in public corporations 
in the exact years of output and  productivi¥ decline,  and  the  same  point 
can be made  about manufacturing.  Partly this is because  such periods are 
often - though not always  - associated with rising unit labour  costs.  Prices 
also reflect changes  in outlays on bought-in materials and  the profit 
rate,  as defined,  will also reflect the degree of depreciation.  In so far 
as  the profit rate reflects the margin between prices  and  unit costs we 
can  perh~ps infer  something  about  prices  from movements  in the profit rate 
and  in this  context  there are  two  things worth noticing:-
a)  The  change in profit rate in the mid  1960s  in public corporations was 
both sharp - an absolute decline occurred - and  extended.  It is true 
but this decline 
that the output  and  productivity decline started in 1965/was  not large, 
and  distinct recovery occurred  in 1967  whilst  the profit rate decline 
was  spread  out  over all the three years  1965  to  1967.  Manufacturing 
in contrast had  a  widetrough  embracing  1965-7  but  the profit rate moved 
from its long  term trend really only in 1966.  There is therefore a 
suggestion that price restraint bit more  effectively on public corporations 
than on manufacturing  in the 1965-67  period. 
b)  A  s~ilar discr~inatory restraint  seems  to be operating in the period 
after 1969.  Though  1970  is the productivity trough year for  public 
corporations,  the change  in the profit rate is even more marked  - a 
very steep absolute decline.  In the 1972/3  recovery ofmtput and 
152 productivity,  profits do  not  recover but continue to decline. 
In manufacturing the 1970 fall in the profit rate is quite consistent 
with the long-run trend  and  the cyclical fall-off  in productivity; 
in the recovery of  1971/2/3,  the profit decline follows  the long-run 
trend. 
153 6.  THE  EFFECTS  OF  PRICE  RKSTRAINT 
Having  e~tablished that public sector prices have  in certain periods been 
more  restrained than  the private sector, it is now  relevant to  ask of  the 
effects of this on  the  corporations  and  the  economy  and,  second,  to  ask 
whether it matiers.  To  the extent  that price restraint has  depressed 
profitability some  impact  on  the sources  of finance  for capital investment 
programmes  might  be  felt and it is this  issue  ~hich is first considered. 
The  Flow  of  Funds  in  Public  and  Prtvat·e  I'ndustry 
The  growth  rate of  gross  domestic  fixed capital formation  in both real 
and  money  terms  in  the public corporation sector in the 1950s  was,  if 
anything,  declining slightly but since  then it has been rising with  a  lull in 
the  1968/9  post-devaluation  phase.  (28)  In manufacturing  the  long-run 
trend is very similar to that of the profit rate so  that in the early 
postwar period the  annual  growth  rate of  investment  in real terms  was 
roughly  10%  and  by  the early 1970s  this had  fallen to  3%.  Within these  long-
run  trends  there  are  declines  during  the periods  of decline in output  and 
productivity - with  something of a  lag in manufacturing.  Now  the private 
sector tends  to fund  a  major part of its investment  from  internal resources. 
bl.  .tradine: prnfits  "d"  b  f  k  •  •  In pu  1c  corporat1ons  \n~t ol:suos1 1es  ut gross  o  stoc  apprec1at1on  ,...,... 
and  capital consumption)  plus other income  (net)  on  appropriation account 
has,  up  to the early 1970s,  tended to account  on  average  for just over a 
quarter of the  finance  for capital formation with a  falling trend in the 
1950s  followed by  a  rising one  in the  1960s.  This  'saving share'  (or self-
financing ratio)  in the  company  sector has  matched  the  long-run decline in 
the profit rate falling from  350%  in the  early 1950s  to below  100%  in the 
early  '70s. 
The  financial  sources of public corporations  take  on  an  extra 
significance insofar as  they are  intermeshed with  the  saving of the public 
sector as  a  whole  and  hence with  the  government  borrowing requirement.  In 
Chart V therefore  the major  funds  categories  for  the public corporation 
154 sector are  shown.  In addition to saving,  issues  of nationalised stock 
were  impor.tant  in the pre-1956 period.  Difficulties  in placing this  stock 
largely accounts  for  the  size and  fluctuations  in bank  lending in this 
period and  also  for  the  switchover,  from  1956,  to  central  government  loans 
as  the main  'external'  source of finance. 29  The  'other funds'  category 
covers  trade credit,  similar miscellaneous  receipts  (net),  small  amounts  of 
capital transfers  and  borrowing  from  the overseas  sector,  the last mentioned 
taking on  significance only  in the  1970s.  Thus,  although  investment has 
fallen off in  the periods  of general  economic  decline identified earlier 
in this paper,  profits  and  other income  have  fallen more  so  that  the  saving 
share dips  in 1958,  1961,  1965/6  and  1970/1.  The  balance is generally  taken 
up  by  central government  loans  and  in fact  for much  of  the  postwar period 
the  share  of  the latter moves  asymmetrically  to  the  saving share.  More 
immediate  points  of interest are 
a)  The  decline in the self-financing ratio in the mid-1960s E  very  sharp  -
given  the  longer run  trend of the  1960s  - suggesting that  the 
discriminating price restraint which  operated in this  period did not 
affect the  investment  programme  but  rather the way  it was  financed. 
b)  In  the  1970/1  recession the public corporation investment rate actually 
rises - from its post-devaluation fall - but in real  terms  the  growth 
onty_ 
rate actually averaged  Z7o  p.a.  Thus  part of  the price restraint may  ,, 
have slightly affected the investment  programme.  The  saving share  takes 
its expected fall but  central  government  loans  do  not  fully  take  up  the 
slack,30  and  banking  and  the  overseas  sector make  up  the balance. 
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72  1973 c)  By  1973  investment  had  fully  recovered  but  during  the  1972/3 
period of rising output  and  productivity the  saving share  continues  to 
fall absorbing in other words  the price  and  profit restraint documented 
before.  Self-financing therefore falls  in a  'recovery'  period for  the 
first time  for  a  very  long  time.  Moreover  central government  borrowing 
falls  - in contrast to what  a  number  of observers have  suggested has 
happened with price restraints31  - and  its share of  financing  for  the 
first time  provides no  offset to  the  trend in saving.  The  balance is 
made  up  by  bank  lending and  central government  subsidies. 
d)  Finally,  availablP  data  for  the early part of 1974  suggest that,  though 
investment has fallen,  profits have  fallen  away  disastrously.  In the 
first quarter of  1974  savings  in absolute  terms became  negative - and 
these  seasonally adjusted figures have  in the past  corresponded fairly 
closely to the first quarter adjusted figures32  - and with  the continuing 
decline in central government  loans buttressed by  a  decline  in bank 
lending,  subsidies  rose  to  astronomical  levels. 
e)  Hence  the post-1969  period which has  already been  characterised as  one  of 
discriminating price restraint on  the  public corporation is associated 
not with more  government  borrowing but with less.  Ever since 1956, 
subsidies  and borrowing  from  the banks  and  overseas had  formed  only 9-14% 
of  the  funds  for  investment.  Since  then  the share has  been  17%  in 1970, 
13%  in 1971,  28%  in 1972,  67%  in  1973  and  80%  in the first quarter of 
1974. 
f)  Finally it is worth noting that  the  savings  amounts  referred to  above 
are measured before depreciation.  Put  otherwise  the profit rate referred 
to earlier on  in the paper was  measured net of capital consumption so 
that not all of its changes would  be necessarily reflected in the savings 
figure - even ignoring non-profit  income.  The  price restraint policies 
could manifest  themselves  both in a  decline in measured  savings or in a 
157 decreased ability of savings measured net of capital consumption  to meet 
demands  for non-replacement  investment.  In fact  an  indirect manifestation of 
this is  the amount  of writing-off of assets  that has  taken place.  Certainly 
the Annual  Reports  of the Post Office  and  the  Coal  Board  for  1972/73 show  the 
writing-off of  accumulated  losses.  The  data in Chart  V which  are  taken from 
government  accounts  disguises this element of finance  to  some  extent insofar 
as  the  capital  gran~s -made  by the central  government  for this purpose  are not 
shown.  In  the accounts  of the public corporation the grant is  a  notional 
entry balanced by  a  notional  repayment  of government  loans.33  If one  therefore 
took  the Chart V data on  central government  loans net of these particular 
repayments,  the central government  capital grants  for writing off debt would 
have  to be  counted  as  an  explicit source of finance  and  one  more  akin  to a 
subsidy than a  loan.  In most  of the postwar years  such grants have met  less 
than  1%  of the finance  of the public corporation gross  investment programme. 
Where  they have been important is  1951  (8%),  1963  (44%),  1965  (39%), 
1969  (81%),  1970  (14%),  1972  (18%),  1973  (27%).  Some  of the  reasons  for 
writing-off assets no  doubt  go  back  to  the policies of the 1950s but  their 
increased role since  1968  suggests  they are  an  element of  the  counterpart to 
the profit rate decline promulgated by  the price restraint policies. 
Impdct  on  the  Government  Budget 
Insofar  as  a  fall in the public corporation's internal sources  of finance 
.means  more  central  government  finance  and  insofar as  its own  borrowing has 
increased - and  in particular from  the banking and  overseas  sectors - there 
appears  to be some  basis  for thinking that  the  discriminatory  price restraint 
policies may  have  important macUTeconomic  effects.  This  has  additional int~rebt. 
at present  for  those who  regard  the size of the  government  borrowi~g 
requirement  as  a  key economic  variable and  for  those who  regard  the method  of 
financing that requirement  as  being of equal, if n~  more,  importance.  The  role 
158 ,of public corporations  in this  context has not,in the UK,  been examined  in 
this way  before and  so,  to begin,  a  brief assessment of the  link between 
corporation and  government  finance is necessary.  The  first column  of Table  1 
shows,  for one particular year,  the same  data as  Chart  V slightly reclassified. 
Simi~ accounts  are shown  for  the other two  branches  of the public sector. 
The  saving of the central government  is its current account  surplus  gross  of 
the subsidies  to public corporations  (and  to local authority housing)  and  so 
such subsidies  appear in row  (4)  as  a  negative entry.  In fact  items  5  and  6 
and  a  and  b  are also intra-public sector transactions.  Hence  when  each of 
the entries  are  summed  over the three branches  of  government  we  are left with 
the  sum  of 1,  2,  3  and  (c)  as  the  aggregate  sources of finance  to meet  the 
consolidated total of public sector expenditure on  capital account. 
TABLE  1  Sources  of  Finance  for  Public  Sector 
Capital  Formation  and  Lending  1972  (£  million) 
Public 
Corporations 
1.  Saving  504 
2.  Capital Transfers  from 
Private Sector  23 
3.  Miscellaneous Receipts  (Net)  (-)  66 
4.  Subsidies  385 
5.  Capital Grants  from  Central  Gcwt  73 
6.  Accruals  adjustment  (-)  57 
1013  7.  Borrowing* 
*  Met  by 
TOTAL 
a)Central  Govt.Loans 
b)Other intra public 
sector borrowing 
tra.DBctions 
c)Borrowing  from  outside 
1875 
1088 
(-)229 
the public sector of  155 
which 
i) Banking  147 
ii) Overseas  20 
iii) Increase in notes  and 
coin in circulation 
iv)  Other non-bank 
private sector  (-)11 
See  Statistical 
annex note  d 
159 
Local 
Authorities 
588 
(-)25 
246 
218 
(-)15 
1396 
2408 
875 
98 
423 
31 
149 
243 
Central 
Government 
2010 
744 
10 
(-)  631 
(-)  291 
72 
(-)  351 
1560 
(-)1963 
131 
1480 
( -)1203 
1395 
495 
793 
Public 
Sector 
3102 
767 
(-)  81 
2055 
5843 
2055 
(-)1026 
1564 
495 
1025 As  an  accounting identity the public sector borrowing  requirement 
(= deficit)  is  therefore entry  (c)  summed  over  the  three branches  and  totalling 
£2055  million in 1972.  The  public  corporation~ contribution to this is  7%.  The 
public sector accounts  in the National  Income  Blue  Books  and  the Annual 
Financial Statements  certainly invite this  assessment  of the share of public 
corporations  in the public sector deficit.  However  such  a  sub-division shows 
only which ~  of  government  undertake  the borrowing needed to meet  the deficit. 
Public corporations borrow heavily  from within the public sector and  so it might 
be better to  aggregate over the borrowing total for  each sub-branch- item (7). 
Public corporations would  then be  credited,  on  the 1972  figures, with  49%  of the 
same  total.  This  approach  corresponds  closely to the sectoral  flow of  funds 
statements in the Blue  Books  which  records  the net aequisition of financial 
assets by  each branch  of  government  - as  well  as  other aector$ of the  economy. 
The  net sale of financial  assets  for Public  C~porationsdiffers only  from 
the borrowing figure by  small  amounts  - viz.  it adds  in miscellaneous  receipts 
and accrualsl  adjustments  and  deducts  the  small  amount  of long-term lending 
included in our  investment  total.  But either of  ~hese figures  is also 
misleading insofar as  subsidies  and  capital grants originate  from  central 
government  and  hence  raise the  central government  financing needs  and  the 
public sector deficit above  what would  have been the  case if Corporation saving 
had been higher,  albeit that  these  are decisions  taken by  the  governm~nt and 
not  public corporations. 
In other words  the public corporation sector's  investment net of saving 
and  its other small  receipts  from  outside the public sector give  a  much  better 
representation of its claims  on  the public sector budget.  Such  "external 
finance"  (£1425  million)  forms  69%  of the same  total public sector borrowing 
requirement  in 1972.  Whether  this external  finance  ought  to be  compared ·to 
that public sector deficit is however  dubious  since it would  then be 
characterised as  an  addition  to  an  independently determined central  government 
borrowing  target whilst in practice the latter would  take into  account  the 
160 public corporations'  needs  for external  finance.  In  effect  the 
public  corporations'  external  financial  needs  are  but  a  part  of  the 
total of public expenditure,  on  current as well ~  capital account  and  decisions 
are  taken,  with  a  view  to macro-economic effects,  o~ both  the total itself and 
on  the various ways  in which it is to be  financed,  including taxes  as well  as 
borrowing.  Indeed  the rate of Corporation  saving is, on  the  evidence of this 
paper,  a  variable entity not  too dissimilar to  an  indirect tax.  Insofar as  we 
are interested in the effects of price restraint on  the  level  of public 
corporation investment  as well  as  on  the "tax receipts" it seems  preferable to 
retain the  concept of external  finance. 
To  what  extent then has  this  claim on  the public budget  increased as  a 
result of the price restraint policies  ?  The  first line of  the table which 
follows  shows  the  'external finance'  as  a  percentage of total public 
expenditure.  Now  there  are various ways  of conceptualising a  total of public 
expenditure.  The  Blue  Book  figures  include public corporation investment  and 
lending but  there is no netting-off of saving;  they also include  subs~dies, 
that part of debt interest which  is paid out direct by  public corporations  and 
also  that debt interest which  corresponds  - in a  loose  sense - to  the public 
sector borrowing which  facilitates  central government  loans  to  the  corporations. 
The  latter's contribution to public expenditure is better measured by  the 
'external finance'  concept  discussed  above.  Hence  from  the official figure we 
have  deducted the Corporations'  subsidies,  saving and  total interest payments. 
Of  that revised total of public expenditure,  public corporation's external 
finance  occupies  a  very small proportion,  ranging,  as  Table  2  shows,  between 
5%  - 8%  in the 1960s  and  70s.  Nor  is there  any  relative growth  of this  claim on 
the public budget  in periods  of~ice restraint.  Such  small  amounts  need 
therefore have  no  effect on  the overall way  in which  the  government  decides  to 
finance public expenditure;  the  suggestion that rising nationalised deficits 
mean  more  government borrowing is wrong  in logic and  empirically.  This  does  not 
mean  that price restraint policies c~  not have  any  important effect.  Were 
161 prices  and  saving to drop  steeply so  that little of the Corporations'  current 
acc01.m.t  expenditure were  being matched  by  revenue  then the "external  finance" 
could rise up  to one  third of public expenditure. 
Another  aspect  of  the 1970s  period is  that public corporations have 
become  an  important  outward manifestation of public borrowing by acting as  an 
arm  of government  through which  lending is  channelled.  Corporation borrowing 
from  outside  the  public sector  (af.  item  (c)  in Table  1)  is shown  in the 
second  line of Table  2  as  a  percentage of the  public sector borrowing 
requirement.  For much  of  the  postwar period since  1956  this  share has  been 
negligible,  but  since  1968  its borrowing  from  the banking sector and  overseas 
has  increased considerably and  this manifests  itself in the figures  for  the 
1970s  in the  second  line of Table  2.  Moreover  the banking part of this 
borrowing is  an  element  in the  lending  counterpart to increases  in the money 
supply.  The  major  developments  here  are  that borrowing  from  the banks  in 
TABLE  2  PUBLIC  CORPORATION  SHARE  OF  PUBLIC  EXPENDITURE!DOMESTIC 
CREDIT  EXPANSION  AND  MONEY  SUPPLY  CHANGES  (Percentages) 
Year 
Shares  of  1963  1964  1965  1966  1967  1968  1969  1970  1971  1972  1973  1~~
7~tr 
unadjusted 
Public Expenditure  5.6  5.7  6.3  2.1  8.1  7.4  5.3  5.3  6.2  5.6  5.8  6.0 
Public Sector 
borrowing 
Domestic  Credit 
expansion 
Money  Supply 
changes  (M3) 
Sources 
5  1 
<~b  0.5  .5 
1 
0.5 
1  (-)1  1 
2  (-)1  (-)2  (-)8  •  11  7  20 
2  (--) 0 • 5  (-) 3  (-) 1 7  15  13  2  9 
2  (-) 0. 5  (-)  6  (-)  4  8  1  2  14 
and  definitions.  See  text  and  notes  d  and  e in  the Statistical Annex 
00 
7 
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sterling has  increased  since  1969  and  borrowing  in  foreign  currencies 
from  the banks  rose  to  a  massive  scale in 1973  and  1974.  Thus  the  fourth  line of 
Table  2  shows  public corporation bank borrowing as  a  percentage of the  changes  in 
the  money  supply  and  this  share has  been rising consistently since 1968.  Finally 
162 the  UK  monetary  authorities have  of late35  been interested in the  'domestic 
money'  part of the total money  supply  changes.  In this  context  any  changes  in 
foreign exchange  reserves  do  not affect the so-defined domestic  credit expansion. 
Insofar as some  elements  of government borrowing overseas  - in particular that 
included in the public sector borTowing  requirement - are  accommodatary  finance 
for  the Balance  of Payments  and  prevent  the reserves falling,  then  an  increase 
in such borrowing is treated by  the authorities  as  equivalent  to  a  fall in the 
reserves  and  hence has  to be  added  to  the  conventionally measured money  supply 
changes.  Public Corporation borrowing  from  overseas  is treated in this way  so 
that this plus bank borrowing  corresponds  to  the sector's share of D C E.  This 
overseas 
is shown  in the third line of Table  2.  The  j  borrowing was  non-existent before 
1969  but is now  taking place in both foreign  currencies  and  in Sterling.  But 
note  that in all this public corporations  are  acting as  an  arm  of government. 
The  reason for this may  in part be  attempts  to widen  the  tentacles of borrowing 
for  the  government  and  there may  be other reasons which would  take  us  out of 
the scope of this paper.  Its increased importance  in this role does  not 
reflect the  changes  in price and  financing policies  towards  the public corporation 
- even  though prima  facie  it appears  to do;  pricing policy affects  claims  on 
public expenditure  and  at present  such  claims  are insufficiently large to 
affect the way  in which  the expenditure is financed. 
Other Economic Effects 
The  other main  effects of the price restraint policies relate to general 
aspects  of prices  and  incomes  policies,  to national  consumption patterns  and  to 
the management  of the Corporations.  It is useful to preface this by briefly 
exploring the quantitative size of the price restraints operating from  1970 
onwards.  One  approach  to this would  be  to examine  the decline in the profit 
rate in public corporations  relative  to  the  company  sector and  to estimate by 
how  much  prices would have  to rise in public corporations,  in say  1973/4,  to 
163 ~estore the relative poation of the  two  sectors, notwithstanding that  losses 
have  accumulated in the  intervening period. 
The  Chart II profit measure  is inappropriate in this  context  and  so we  may 
start with  the  rate of return on  capital - measured net of stock appreciation 
b  'd'  d  •  1  .  36  h'  h  1  0%  f  h  bl'  •  su s1  1es  an  cap1ta  consumpt1on  - w 1c  was  •  or  t  e  pu  1c corporat1on 
sector in 1969  and  8.5%  in the  company  sector.  On  the basis of the  long-run 
trends  in  these  rates of profit and  in the underlying differential productivity 
growth  in  the  two  sectors  one  would  have  expected that by  1973  the  rates would 
have moved  to  about  1.5%  and  7.0%  respectively.  In fact  the  Company  sector 
actually fell  to 5.1%  which  is  roughly  three-quarters of the expected level-
a  difference which  could be attributed to  the price restraint policies.  The 
public  corporation rate fell however  proportionately a  lot more,  to  (-)1.7%. 
A restoration of the relative position of public corporation would  suggest  that 
a  1973  rate of profit of  1.1%  would  represent  a  depression of profit from price 
restraint  roughly  comparable  to  the  company  sector. 
The  implications of this  for prices  can be  developed by now  turning to  the 
rate of profit  on  turnover,  data for which  are only available  for public 
corporations  and which  was  - again net of stock appreciation,  subsidies  and 
capital consumption- in 1969  at the  2.7%  level.  The  1973  expected  level is 
3.0%  and  applying  the  same  scaling down  factor  as  before,  a  similar price 
restraint  on  public corporations  as  on  the  company  sector would  push  the rate  to 
2.2%.  The  actual  level in 1973  was  (-)5.3%.  If any  changes  in demand  and  unit 
costs  as  a  result of price  changes  could be  ignored  then  to raise  the rate of 
profit on  turnover  from  (-)5.3%  ID  2.2%  would  require  that the  1973  price level 
be  raised by  roughly  7.6%.  Appropriate  data for  1974  are not yet available.  A 
rough  guess  based on  trends  in  the saving rate,  is that the rate of profit on 
turnover has  fallen  to  (-)10%  or even worse  and,  allowing  for cyclical 
downturns,  the  relevant price increase is probably rising up  to at least the 
15%  mark- quite apart  from  any rises needed  to reflect cost  increases. 
164 There  seem  to be  five  objectives which have,  at one  time  or another, 
underlain the price restraint imposed on  public corporations  :-
1.  As  a  short-run palliative to inflation, prices  are  simply held down  in 
public corporations  - in several  cases,  one  suspects,  simply to slow  down 
the  growth  of nezt month's  retail price index.  This  is to be distinguished 
from  arguments  relating to expectations  or announcement  effects which will 
be  considered later.  As  such  there is, ultimately,  probably no  downward 
effect on  general inflation - in contrast  to what  governments  have  claimed37 
- and  there  ~ould be  an  upward  effect.  By  raising public expenditure  there 
is no  impact  on  real consumption  levels.  Thus  were  one  to be  able  to  show 
that the Corporations'  reduced savings  are balanced by  rises  in taxes  then 
the neutral effect on  inflation is clear.  If instead government  borrowing 
from  the private sector (e.g.  by  gilts)  is used,  internal transfer payments 
are  made  now  to release  the  resources  for  the  Corporations'  consumers  and 
average  consumption  levels  are  therefore unaffected.  Future  repayments  of 
the debt  and  associated interest charges  are matched by  taxes  or further 
borrowing;  that is,  another set of internal transfers but without  the 
resource effects. If .overseas  borrowing is  used  then,  all other things 
being equal,  the question  arises  as  to where  resources  are  to be  forthcoming 
and  who  is to finance  the interest and  redemptions  associated with  such 
loans.  In all cases  there need be no  upward  effect on  prices;  there  could 
be if one  were  able  to  show  that the extra public expenditure is  financed 
by bank  lending  to the  government  or more  notes  and  coins  are in circulation 
and  no  offsetting effects occurred elsewhere. 
2.  Another objective has  probably been to shift the burden of higher public 
low-income 
sector prices  away  from~zonsumers.  Who  then bears  this burden  depends 
again on  the very difficult question  as  to who  meets  the extra taxes  in the 
present or the  future  and whether  there is  an  upward  effect on  the  general 
price level.  An  alternative  to  lowering prices  is  to provide extra means-
165 tested income  relief.  Although  the  latter has  certain theoretical 
advantages  the  use made  of such  relief is not  100%  and  to  this extent 
holding public sector prices  may  have  a  more  effective short-run impact. 
It should be  noted that this objective is essentially related to  the 
effects of inflation not  to its causes. 
3.  Recent  trends  in wage  inflation have  of late been partly ascribed to 
expectations held of the future  inflation rate.  Governments  convinced that 
they will  reduce  inflation could use  price restraint to  generate more 
favourable  expectations earlier.  This  seems  sensible if the  government  can 
eventually control inflation and  if the population is  also  convinced  !  Now 
all the  three objectives  discussed  so  far  could equally be  applied to the 
company  sector of the  economy  as  to public corporations.  The  first 
objective has  special  reference  to public corporations  simply because  they 
are  more  easily controlled.  The  other two  have  significance  for  the public 
sector insofar as  its products have  special characteristics.  The 
distribution argument  presumes  that it is  families with  low  incomes  who  are 
primary beneficiaries of lower public sector prices.  This  makes  more  sense in 
terms  of fuel  than  in transport where  reduced  fares  for railways,  airways 
and  airports  ~ould be  regressive  in their impact.  Moreover public 
corporation products  are quite  diffused  throughout  the economy  and  to this 
extent  low  income  families  are part of a  much  wider beneficiary group.  The 
1968  UK  input-output table  (in the 1971  Blue  Book)  provides  some  help in 
this  respect.  Although  a  precise delineation of the public corporation 
sector is not  feasible,  it is possible  to derive  from  the Table  aggregate 
f~gures covering coal,  iron  and  steel,  gas, electricity, water  and  transport. 
Of  the  total sales  at factor cost of this  'public enterprise sector',  60% 
go  to producers  (including themselves),  18%  to exports,  6%  to capital goods, 
3%  to public authorities  and  23%  to domestic final  consumers  covering 
passenger rail journeys,  domestic fuel  and  the  like.  The  latter therefore 
accounts  for less  than one-quarter of  the sector's sales;  moreover it 
166 ,accounts  for only  8%  of the total purchases  of domestic final  consumers. 
Even  manufacturing devotes  25%  of its sales directly to  this  group  (food, 
drink,  tobacco,  clothing etc)  and  in absolute  terms  the value of such 
sales is over three  times  that of the public enterprise sector.  On  the 
other hand  the  fact  that  a  large portion of public enterprise products  go 
to producers  is certainly favourable  from  the point  of view of dispersing 
price decreases  throughout  the economy.  Unfortunately such sales  are only 
16%  of total purchases by  producers. 
4.  In aiming for price restraint throughout  the economy  governments  also may 
depress  public sector prices  to show  that they mean  business  and  can keep 
their own  house  in order.  The  public relations  character of  the 
government's  attitude to  the  Corporations  in the  1960s  - cf.  section III 
of this paper - seems  to  correspond to this objective.  It has  relevance 
when  the basic attack on  inflation is being made  by  invoking public 
spirited restraint in the  economy.  But without  sanctions  - cf.  the  CBI 
ini~iative discussed previously in this paper - there is little basis in 
such  a  policy and  allkhat happens  is  a  change  in relative prices. 
5.  Finally,  controlling prices  can be part of  a  "deal" with  the Trades  Unions, 
who  promise wage  restraint.  From  the unions'  point of view,  no  gains will 
be made  if the reasoning is based on  argument  (1)  above.  If it is based 
on  (2)  then  unions would need  to watch  the tax effects  of extra subsidies 
to public  and  private industry  to be  sure of any  gain.  With  progressive 
tax levies  and  squeezes  on  profit margins,  those  union members  not 
suffering from  lay-offs  could benefit  from wage  restraint.  From  the 
government's  point of view  the policy may  be effective if the unions  are 
able  to hold wages  - on  which  one  must  have  serious  doubts  especially in 
cyclical upturns  of the economy  and  in the presence  of excess  aggregate 
demand. 
167 In addition  to  the  above  effects of price restraint there  are several other 
important effects which  have  not  received the same  attention, viz ,;-
a)  First of all there is at present,  as  a  result of the price restraints, 
no  coherent economic policy towards  the  Corporations.  The  policy outlined in 
the  1967  White  Paper involved - amongst  other things  - taat charges  be set to 
reflect marginal  co~ts,  investment  assessed by  the test discount  rate  and 
deficits  to be  avoided.  The  change  in government  in 1970  did not  affect  the 
approach  and  the new  government  confirmed its acceptance of the  fundamental 
strategy.  Clearly deficits have not been  avoided  and  even  the  provision of 
compensating  finance  - consistent with  aspects  of the  1967  policy - has  been 
inadequate.  The  rate of profit including subsidies  shows  the  same  sharp 
decline  in Chart II in 1970  as  the rate net of subsidies;  subsidies  only 
arrested the  decline in 1973.  Second,  although  an  alignment of prices  to 
marginal  costs  may  in some  cases  require price reductions  - as  Posner has 
38  suggested  was  the  case  far gas  and  electricity in the mid-1960s  - the 
requirements  of industries  like coal  and  the railways  and  the rise in unit 
costs  since  the mid-60s  suggests  that such  a  rationalisation would  have little 
basis now.  Whether  or not  the  1967  policy has  defects,  the important  point 
now  is  the  absence  of any  policy.  Prices  are being set at the whims  of the 
Minister. 
b)  To  the extent that demand  for public corporation products has been 
stimulated relative to that of other sectors in the  economy,  the question 
arises  as  to whether resources  are not being misallocated.  The  logic of 
previous  government  policy would  suggest this  interpretation.  It does  however 
presume  not only  that prices  and  marginal  costs were  in line initially in the 
Corporations  but moreover  that this  alignment  held in all other parts  of the 
economy.  This  point  can be  argued indefinitely but  a  closely allied issue has 
probably more  importance;  namely  how  is  investment planning to proceed at 
present?  One  approach would  be  to base  demand for.ecallfB ..  on  the  assumption that 
168 ~he present price level is maintained.  With  high  demand  and  low  prices 
forecast  rates of return would be  low.  British Railways  have been  cutting 
investment  and  the Gas  Corporation has  suggested that small natural gas  finds 
in the North Sea are not  commercially developable  at present price levels.  On 
the other hand,  given  the  growth  in unit costs  and  the obligation to  continue 
the provision of certain goods  and  services, new  investment may  provide  a 
cheaper way  of producing output than  the use  of existing equipment  and  the 
Treasury has  voiced concern that excessive investment may  result from price 
restraint.  An  alternative approach would be  to estimate  shadow  prices,  plan 
investment  on  that basis  and  presume  that prices will eventually be  restored. 
This  seems  to be  the official view  at present.39  The  exercise which  opened 
tns  section shows  how  many  assumptions  have  to be made  to estimate relevant 
price increases  and  the very real difficulties involved. 
c)  A third effect is  that on  management  morale  and  incentives.  In public 
industries with no  obvious profit stimulae  to Boards  and  managers,  target 
levels  of profit or rates of return  can  supply  the  inducements  to efficient 
working and  cost minimisation.  The  establishment of  targets  in the 1961  White 
Paper was  continued in the second paper  and  an  examination of these  targets 
shows  that the  gap  between  them  and performance widened  considerably in the 
1970s.  In the period since 1971  the  available~ata  suggest  that only  ~he 
British Airports  Authority  and  the British Transport Docks  Board have met  their 
targets.  The  Annual  Reports  of most  of  the  Corporations  since 1972  contain 
persistent  complaints  of such effects of price restraint.  The  targets  are  for 
all practical purposes  now  in abeyance. 
d)  Finally, it is worth noting how  price restraint can  affect the context 
in which wage  bargaining takes place.  With  the kind of policy outlined in the 
1967  White  Paper - or at least a  policy of breaking even  - management  can point 
to constraints  on  their ability to  approve wage  increases.  The  basic 
productivity and  the product  demand  situations  and  the target profit rate 
169 provide  such  constraints.  Even  though  that profit rate  could be  presaured  to 
low  levels, as  long  as it is positive  there are  limits  to wage  increases.  With 
governments  countenancing large deficits however,  managements  have no  policy 
with which  to negotiate.  Advantage  might not be  taken of this situation and 
indeed  there  is  the possibility,  as  suggested earlier in this paper,  that 
governments  might  use  the existence of deficits to put pressure on  wages.  In 
the  longer  term however  persistent price restraint can  lead to  an  open  door 
to exchequer  finance with public corporation employees  treated like the Civil 
Service or NHS  employees.  There  may  or may  not be merits  in this but it would 
mean  a  fundamental  reappraisal of wage  policy. 1•  CONCLUSIONS 
Government  intentions  to impose  extra restraints  on  public corporations, 
relative to private industry, have become  obvious  since  1972  insofar as  they  are 
an  explicit element of policy.  Looking at the postwar period as  a  whole  there is 
some  basis  for  thinking that similar intentions were  absent  up  to  1964  but in  the 
1965-72 period they were  present first of all in the way  in which  the machinery 
of prices  and  incomes  policy was  developed  and  applied in the  1965-9  period, 
second in an  even  more  disguised  form of pressure in 1970/1  and  third in the 
more  effective control of public corporations  in the execution of the CBI 
initiative of 1971/2.  The  evidence of such intentions is much  less  clear for 
wages  than prices  and  indeed over the whole  postwar period public corporation 
wage  inflation has  beaJsf~~tive to manufacturing industry  and  accelerated in 
the 1970s.  The  incidence of prices  and  incomes  policy has  to be  assessed in the 
context of long-term relative trends  in  these sectors  and  of the shorter term 
economic  cycles.  Given  this,  the data suggest  discriminatory price restraint 
was  partly effective in the 1965-7 period and  in the 1970s. 
The  analysis  of intentions  and  results  of  this price restraint suggest  the 
following  guidelines  for future  government policy :-
a)  In the 1960s  pressure on  the public sector was  probably motivated by 
the desire  to  show,  in the context of invocations  for general price  and wage 
restraint,  that it could keep  its own  house  in order.  If there  are no  sanctions 
on  the private sector this is doomed  to failure. 
b)  As  a  short-run palliative to inflation, public sector price restraint will 
probably have  no  effect in restraining the  average  level of inflation,  since  the 
former has  to be  financed  from  somewhere. 
c)  !be Corporations'  claims  on  public expenditure have  increased in  the  two 
periods  of effective discriminatory price restraint.  Such  claims  have been a 
relatively small part of the total however  and  need have no  effect on  government 
decisions  as  to  the size of total public spending,  or how  that  total is  to be 
171 'financed by  taxes  or  borrowing,  or on  how  borrowing requirements  are  to 
be  met.  If price restraint is pursued morestranty as  a  policy weapon it could 
well have  such effects since public corporation outlays  on  wages  and  materials 
are sufficiently large that  the  Corporations'  claims  could,  on  present  figures, 
rise  up  to one-third of public expenditure. 
d)  Restraint on  public sector price increases  may  have  a  part to play in 
mitigating some  of  the distributional effects of inflation.  As  it stands  at 
present  the  argument  is somewhat  tenuous  since it depends  on  how  taxes  are 
raised now  and  in the  future.  Moreover  public corporation sales  account  for  only 
8%  of purchases  by  domestic final  consumers,  some  of whom  will be middle-class 
rail and  airways  customers.  Similarly as  a  means  of reducing expectations  as  to 
future price levels, it can  be neither a  main  arm  of  counter-inflation policies 
nor,  in that minor role, would  its impact  be  large  since it accounts  for  only 
10%  of the gross  purchas~· of domestic producers  and  final  buyers. 
e)  Government  economic policy  towards  the nationalised industries is in 
disarray  and  needs  complete  rethinking.  The  change  in the relative demands  for 
goods  and  services  in the  economy  as  a  result  of discriminatory price restraint 
is  contrary  to  government  strategy of  the last ten years.  Pricing policy is non-
existent.  Investment planning shows  every sign of being in complete  confusion 
as  a  result of  the uncertainty associated with price assumptions.  The  gap 
between  targets  and  performance  is widening  and  management  morale is  low. 
Finally,  the wage  bargaining position of  the management  could be seriously 
eroded. 
Robert Millward 
September  1974 
172 ANNEX  AND  NOTES 
Statistical  Annex 
a)  Cove rage  :  The  public firms  covered in this paper are in the 
public corporation sector as  defined in the  UK  National  Income  Accounts. 
They  are  characterised by being vested by  Statute, having their Boards 
appointed by  a  Minister,  or Parliament  or the Crown,  and  having certain rights 
to  independently borrow  and  hold reserves.  The  sector as  defined excludes 
central government  and  local authority trading bodies  and  companies  in which 
the  government has  merely  an  equity interest like British Petroleum or Rolls 
Royce.  Of  late it has  accounted for  11%  of  GDP  and  17%  of UK  fixed  capital 
formation;  the  figures  for manufacturing are  34%  and  22%  respectively.  At  the 
end  of 1973  the  following  Corporations were  classified in the sector.  The 
nationalised industries have  somewhat  more  financial  independence  than other 
public corporations  and  the biggest industries  are  the National  Coal  Board, 
the various Electricity Boards, British Gas  Corporation,  British Rail Board, 
British Airways,  the Post Office, Sritish Steel Corporation  and  the British 
Airports  Authority.  The  other nationalised industries,  as  defined by  the 
Treasury,  are  the National  Freight Corporation,  National  Bus  Company,  Scottish 
Transport Group,  British Transport Docks  Board  and  the British Waterways  Board. 
There  are  some  public corporations which  are not  classed as  nationalised 
industries but whose  activities are examined by  the Select Committee  on 
Nationalised Industries,  namely  Cable  & Wireless Ltd,  the  Independent 
Broadcasting Authority  and  the Bank  of England  (excluding  the  Issue Department). 
Other small corporations  in transport are  the National Ports  Council,  the 
N.Ireland Transport Holding  Company,  Civil Aviation Authority, and  the Maplin 
Development  Authority;  the various Passenger Transport Executives,  including 
London  Transport,  were  included in the sector only in  the  1974  Blue Book  and  do 
not enter the pre-1973  figur~in thispper- aside that is  from London 
173 ~ransport which was  in the sector under  a  different  guise  up  to  1970.  This 
finally  leaves  the various  New  Town  Development  Corporation  and  Commissions 
for New  Towns  and  11  other corporations  mainly in broadcasting,  finance  and 
housing.  Since  1949  there have  been  5  other small  corporations not mentioned 
above,  all of which  had been dissolved by  the  end  of  1973.  Coverage  of the 
sector does  vary  also each year because not all the  above  Corporations had 
been established in 1949;  steel and  road haulage have  departed  and  later 
returned  and  the  activities paformed by  some  corporations  have  changed  over 
time.  See  "National Accounts  Statistics  :  Sources  and  Methods"  Central 
Statistical Office  1968,  Chapter  VIII plus  the notes  at the  end  of each 
subsequent  Blue  Book  and  the Treasury Memorandum  on  pp.  337-9  of H.C.65 
December  1973. 
b)  Productivity Prices and  Wages  :  For manufacturing wages,  the 
data  in the Department  of  Employment  Gazette was  used;  that  is,  average 
weekly  earnings of  adult males  in October  of  each year.  The  same  Gazette 
was  used  for  output  and  total employment  to derive the productivity measure. 
The  price series used  was  the wholesale price  index for all home  sales of 
manufactured  goods  in the Monthly Digest  of  Statistics. 
The  price series for  public  corporations  is averaged  from  series for 
the individual Corporations,  weighted  by  revenue.  The  individual Corporation 
series developed  from  their Annual  Reports were;- average price per  therm 
realised  (gas);  average  revenue  per kilowatt hour  sold  to all consumers 
(electricity);  an  average  of  the postal and  telecommunication tariff indices 
weighted  by  revenue;  proceeds per  saleable ton of  coal;  total revenue per 
load  ton  (passengers  and  freight)  miles  sold  (B.E.A.);  finally,  for  British Rail 
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an  average weighted by  revenue  of  average  fare  per passenger mile  and  average 
receipt per net  ton  freight mile. 
The  public corporation productivity series was  derived  from  the output 
and  employment  series.  For output an  average,  weighted by  revenue,  of the 
following series was  used  total number  of  therms  produced;  total kilowatt 
hours  supplied from power stations;  total correspondence posted and  total 
telephone  calls  connected;  saleable output of coal per manshift;  total load 
ton miles  sold by  BEA;  finally for British Rail  estimated total passenger 
miles  and estimated totalnet  freight  ton miles.  Employment  was  simply 
aggregated over all Corporations  and  covered total number  of employees  (for 
electricity and  BEA),  total staff numbers  in British Rail  and  the Post Office 
and,  for each year,  average weekly manpower  in NCB  mines. 
The  earnings  data for public corporations  is an  averag~weighted by  the 
above  employment  figures,  of the  following series  :  average weekly earnings of 
all workers  at NCB  mines  (including allowances  in kind);  average weekly  April 
earnings of all adult British Rail wages  staff  (1963  interpolated);  total 
payments  by  the Gas  Corporation to  and  on  behalf of employees  divided by  total 
employment;  total wage  and  salary costs  per employee,  including superannuation, 
national insurance etc (Electricity);  total pay  and  pensionsRer  employee:  in 
the Post Office;  total wages  and  salaries per employee  in BEA  (covering UK 
employees  from 1966). 
British Rail  and  the National Coal  Board  (up  to 1962)  produce  their 
reports  on  a  calendar year basis.  The  others  cover  the  financial year ending 
March  I  April;  such  data are attributed to the first of the  two  calendar years 
straddled.  Finally  for  the year 1973,  the unavailability of the reports of 
BEA  and  the Gas  Corporation necessitated estimates being made.  The  1973 
figures  for  gas  and  BEA  were  approximated  as  an  average  of  the previous  three 
years'  figures.  These were  then  combined  to  the known  public corporation 
aggregate  (excluding  gas  and  BEA)  by  use of revenue weights. 
175 c)  Profits  and  Rates  of  Return  :  Gross  trading profits 
exclude  rental,  non-trading  and  overseas  income.  The  sources  for profits, 
stock  appreciation,  capital  consumptio~, value-added  and  net capital stock at 
replacement  stock for both  company  and  public  corporation sectors  and  for 
subsidies  and  revenue  sales  (turnover)  for  the latter sector are  the National 
Income  Blue  Books  for  1973,  1972,  1971,  1970,  1967,  1966,  1960  and  1957  in 
that order of preference.  The  1974  Blue  Book  became  available only  as  this 
paper was  nearing completion  and it has  therefore been used  only  for  the  1973 
figures.  The  July 1974  issue of Financial Statistics was  used  for profits 
and  subsidies  in  the first quarter of  1974.  Stock  appreciation has little 
significance  for public corporations;  for  the  company  sector its inclusion 
adds  half a  percentage point  to the  rate of return on  capital in the early 
1960s,  one  full point by  1967/8 and  three points by  the early 1970s  but 
turning points  and  trends  are  unaffected.  The  disadvantage of using  the 
company  sector definition is  that it includes  financial  companies,  most  of 
whose  "trading" profits arise  as  the excess  of interest receipts  over payments. 
The  latter two  items  are,however,  treated as  appropriation account 
transactions  for national  accounts  purposes  so  that  the bulk of  the profits of 
financial  companies  will be  credited to  the  trading profits of other sectors, 
such  as  the personal sector,  public corporations etc. 
d)  Public  Sector  Finances  :  The  sources of the data on  the 
finances  of public corporations  were  as  follows.  The  total  investment  to be 
financed  covers  gross  fixed capital  formation  and  increases in stocks etc. 
together with  small  amounts  of capital grants  and  long-term lending to non-
public sector institutions;  i.e.  the expenditure part of the public 
corporation sector's  capital  account  in the National  Income  Blue  Books  referred 
to in Note  c  •  Saving is measured  as  ~distributed income  on  appropriation 
account  plus  additions  to tax and  interest reserves  less subsidies.  The 
176 subsidies  figures  are  taken  from  the operating accounts  for  the  sector 
in the Blue  Books.  The  net stock issues  include  those  redemptions  which, 
in the accounts,  are separately identified as  being  financed by  central 
government  loans.  The  data on  the banking and  overseas  sector for  1963-72 
we~e takenfiDm Financial Statistics for January  1974,  December  1966, 
January  1970  and  February  1972.  For the periods  1973  and  the first quarter 
1974  Financial Statistics July 1974  was  used  for all public sector 
financial data.  The  details of bank  lending 1952-62 were  taken  from  the 
article on  "Domestic Credit Expansion"  in the  September  1969  issue of  the 
Bank  of England Quarterly Bulletin.  The  'other funds'  line in Chart V 
corresponds  to the  following Blue  Book  entries  :  central government 
capital grants  (excluding  those  for writing-off debt),  capital transfers 
from  the private sector,  miscellaneous  receipts  (net),  the  adjustment  for 
subsidy accruals  plus  the  two  elements  of "other identified borrowing"  not 
so  far mentioned  and  whose  detail can  be  found  in Financial Statistics, 
viz  dealings  in other public sector stock and  borrowing  from  own 
superannuation  funds.  Finally it should be noted that there  are no 
figures  for  cash expenditure  on  comp~y securities  1949-63,  net  lending and 
investment  abroad  1949-54  and net lending to  the private sector 1949-55; 
all are implicitly included,  as  negative entries,  in miscellaneous  receipts 
(net)  and  to this extent this  category  and  the  total finance  are  less in 
coverage  than in  the other years. 
The  same  sources were  used  for  the first  column  of Table  1.  The 
accruals  adjustment  in Table  1  relates  to the  excess  of  cash  subsidy 
receipts over the  amounts  for which  public corporations  and  local 
authorities were  eligible that year as  recorded in entry  (4).  Item  (b) 
covers net sales  of holdings  of other public sector stock less  those public 
corporation stock  redemptions  financed by  loans  from  the  central 
government.  Items  5  and  (a)  exclude  those transactions  associated with 
writing-off debt. 
177 The  subsidy  entry  for  local  authorities  in  Table  1  relates 
only to central  government  subsidies  for  local authority housing as  shown  in 
the  Blue  Books'  separate  tables  on  housing subsidies.  Note  also that local 
authorities  themselves  have  recently made  small subsidies  to nationalised 
transport  undertakings but in the  absence of any  detail  these have  had  to be 
credited,  in Table  1,  to central  government.  The  miscellaneous  receipts 
(net)  entry relates  to transactions with non-public sector bodies.  For 
central  government it covers  receipts  from  pension  funds,  adjustments  for 
expenditure  taxes,  refinanced export  and  shipbuilding credits  and  "other 
financial  transactions  (net)".  For details of increases  in notes  and  coins 
in circulation see  the  references  in note  (e)  below. 
In order to  calculate  the  1973  and  1974  entries  for  the first  row  of 
Table  2 it had  to be  assumed  that the accruals  adjustment for public 
corporations  shown  in Financial Statistics July 1974  corresponds wholly to 
subsidies.  The  deduction  from  the official public expenditure totals,  for 
subsidies,  saving  (and Corporation Tax)  and  inteDest  payments  may  be  found 
directly as  total outgoings  on  the public corporation sector appropriation 
accounts  in the Blue  Books.  The  data for  the  second  line of Table  2 
differ from  that in Table  1  only insofar as  dealings  in other public 
sector stock are,  in conformity with  the official statistics, included as 
part of the Corporation's  share of public sector borrowing.  For 
amplification of all these  sources  §ee  "Sources  and  Methods"  op  ait 
Chapters  VIII - IX  and  the notes  to subsequent Blue  Books. 
e)  Money  Supply  :  Total Money  Supply  changes  and  domestic credit 
expansion  are  taken  from  the  September  1969  issue of the Bank  of England 
Bulletin,  op  cit.  For the years  1969  onwards  the Bulletin for March  and 
June  1974  were  used.  The  split of public corporation bank  and  overseas 
borrowing between  foreign  currencies  and  sterling may  be  obtained from  these 
later Bulletins. 
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182 In this chapter we  shall examine  the effect of inflation on  passenger 
and freight transport,  and the distributional effects of changing costs and 
of possible subsidies to transport. 
(a)  Passenger Transport 
The  Department  of the  Environment  produces price  indices for  bus  fares, 
railway fares  and  for  motor car running costs.  Both  the railway  fares  and 
car running cost  indices are derived from  figures  of consumers'  expenditure 
at current and  1970  prices,  which are published in National  Income  and 
Expenditure.  Data  on  bus  fare  levels are  derived  from  information which 
h  b  d  d  b  f  f  b  .  d  (1)  as to  e  pro  uce  e  ore  ares  can  e  ralse  .  These  three  indices are 
the basic data  source for this study and are  given  in Table  1  below, 
together with the  index of prices of all consumers'  expenditure  on  goods  and 
services derived in the  same  manner  as the railway fare  inded.  Table  2 
shows  the annual  percentage  increase  in each  index.  Figures for  individual 
years  should  be  treated with caution because  bus  and rail fares tend to be 
raised in discrete  jumps  with several months,  or years,  in between and the 
largest  single element  of the  increase  in car running costs  in the period 
was  probably fuel tax and vehicle tax which,  again,  were  raised in steps 
rather than part of a  gradual process.  For  these reasons Table  2  also 
gives percentage  increases over the  whole  period and  for  the  sub-periods 
1962-1967  and  1967-1972. 
It can  be  seen  from  this that  in almost  every year  and  over  each group 
of years,  both bus  and railway fares  increased by  more  than total consumers' 
expenditure.  Thus,  they have  been  increasing in real terms  (assuming that 
comparisons of the latter index  can be  used  for defining "real terms"). 
In cor-trast,  car running costs have  fallen  somewhat  compared  with prices of 
total consumers'  expenditure.  It should be  remembered  that these figures 
183 refer to the period prior to the 1973-1974  fuel crisis,(2)  and that the 
level of rail fare  increases and,  to a  lesser extent,  bus  fare  increases, 
have  often been  determined  by  government  policy. 
TABLE  1 
PRICE  INDICES  OF  PASSENGER  TRANSPORT  :  1962-1972 
Index numbers  of prices 1970  = 100 
Rail  Bus  Car  Total Consumers' 
Year  Fares  Fares  Running  Costs  Expenditure 
1962  69  60  72  72 
1963  71  63  72  73 
1964  72  67  73  76 
1965  78  71  79  80 
1966  82  76  82  83 
1967  84  79  85  85 
1968  87  84  91  89 
1969  93  88  98  95 
1970  100  100  100  100 
1971  117  118  106  108 
1972  136  125  110  115 
Source:  Department  of the Environment,  Passen~er TransEort  in Great  Britain, 
1972,  (London,  H.M.S.O.,  1973). 
Having set out the present situation it remains to advance  hypotheses to 
explain it.  What  follows  can only be  hypotheses  and  much  research would  be 
needed  in order to substantiate them. 
As  a  first step, labour costs can  be  examined as these comprise  a  high 
proportion of the total cost of bus  and rail operation.  Both are relatively 
labour intensive industries and whilst rail operation offers considerable 
scope  for further labour productivity increases,(3)  bus  operation does not.(4) 
184 In 1973  wages  and salaries comprised  57  per cent of British Railway's total 
operating costs and  69  per cent of the National Bus  Company's.(5) 
TABLE  2 
ANNUAL  RATES  OF  CHANGE  IN  PRICE  INDICES  OF  TABLE  1 
Rail  Bus  Car  Total Consumer 
Years  Fares  Fares  Running  Costs  Expenditure 
1962-63  2.90  5.00  0  1.39 
1963-6'+  1.'+1  6.35  1.39  '+.11 
196'+-65  8.33  5.97  8.22  5.26 
1965-66  5.13  7.0'+  3.80  3.75 
1966-67  2.'+'+  3.95  3.66  2.'+1 
1967-68  3.57  6.33  7.06  '+.71 
1968-69  6.90  '+.76  7.69  6.7'+ 
1969-70  7.53  13.6'+  2.0'+  5.26 
1970-71  17.00  18.00  6.00  8.00 
1971-72  16.2'+  5.93  3.77  6.'+8 
1962-67  21.  7'+  31.67  18.06  18.06 
1967-72  61.90  58.23  29.'+1  35.29 
1962-72  97.10  108.33  52.78  59.72 
Source:  As  Table 1. 
Over  the period 1962  to 1972 average  earnings and  weekly  wage  rates 
both rose  by  a  greater proportion than the general level of prices.  The 
percentage increases in each were,  respectively,  93,  78  and  52  according to 
(6)  figures  produced  by  the Department  of Employment.  Average  hourly rates 
of wages  in the transport  industries have  increased by  slightly more  than 
the figure  for all industries covered by  the Department of Employment  figures. 
For 1962 to 1972  the all-industry figure  showed  a  106  per cent  increase, 
whilst that for the transport  industries  showed  a  116  per cent rise.  Average 
185 hours  worked  declined by about  the  same  rate, i.e. transport  (5.41%); all 
industries  (5.47%). (7)  Thus,  transport is a  labour intensive industry 
which  has  had to increase its hourly wage  rates by  more  than the average 
for the  economy  as a  whole  and  by more  than the general level of increase in 
prices.  This will inevitably lead to an  increase in the relative price of 
its outputs unless it has  been  accompanied  by an  increase in productivity. 
Because it is so  fragmented,  no  figures  for productivity increases in 
the bus  industry are available for  this period.  Some 
data can  be  obtained for  British Railways,  however.  If an  index of loaded 
train miles per employee  is constructed this showed  an  85  per cent  increase 
between 1962  and 1972.(8)  No  indices of the increase in railway pay,  as 
opposed to pay  in other parts of the transport sector were  available, but it 
can be  seen that the  increase in productivity has  not  been sufficient to offset 
the rise in hourly wage  rates for the sector as a  whole.  Earnings of 
(adult male)  railway workers rose between 1965  and  1972  by  90  per cent,  so 
that total labour costs  have  outstripped productivity.  During the period 
analysed at least two  major productivity agreements  had  been made  on  the 
railways  which resulted in large increases in wage  rates and it seems  likely 
that railway wage  rates will have  risen by more  than the average for the 
transport  sector. 
In the bus  industry the main  source of increased labour productivity is 
one-man  operation.  This  was  negligible at the beginning of the period studied 
and accounted for  about  SOp.%  of all bus miles run by 1972.  However, 
national agreements  with trades unions  have  resulted  (a)  in high pay  increases 
for all staff in order to gain acceptance of one-man  operation in principle, 
and  (b)  the return of 40%  of the net  savings  from  actual schemes to the 
staff concerned.  Furthermore,  one-man operation reduces operating speeds, 
186 necessitating the provision of more  vehicles and  crews to maintain a  given 
level of service. 
It would  appear from this, therefore,  that whilst there  have  been 
increases in labour productivity in both the bus  and railway  industries 
between 1962  and 1972, this has  only been achieved by  increases in real wages 
and has  probably still resulted in a  need to  increase fares  by  more  than the 
general level of prices. 
A second factor to account  for this increase  in the relative price of 
public transport is the cost structure  of  the industry.  Both  bus  and 
railway operators have  costs which  cannot  be altered very quickly in response 
to short-run changes  in demand.  On  railways the costs of track,  signalling 
and terminals are of this nature.  (Train operation comprised only  46%  of 
British Railways'  total operating expenditure  in 1973.)  Bus  operators are 
fortunate  in not  having to maintain their own  track,  but still had  about  18 
per cent of expenses  which  would  not  vary directly with output  in 1969.(9) 
On  both modes  this is accentuated by  imbalances  between peak and off-
peak demands  although the problem is more  acute in the bus  industry where  a 
twice daily work-peak  has to be  catered for.(lO)  This  can result  in the 
number  of buses  in use at peak  hours  being up  to twice the number  in use 
outside the peak.(ll)  If peak  demand  is to be met  there will be  no  reduction 
in the number  of vehicles required if off-peak demand  falls.  In addition, 
labour cannot  be  hired by  the  hour and must  be  employed  in eight hour units. 
Thus,  a  reduction in off-peak demand  will usually result in a  less than 
proportionate  saving in labour costs.  A fall in off-peak demand  will thus 
not  lead to a  proportionate reduction in operating costs. 
187 As  a  result of both factors  (fixed costs and  peak/off-peak  imbalance) 
there is no  guarantee that any fall in demand  will result in a  proportionate 
reduction in costs and  can thus result in an increase in average cost per 
unit of output. 
Over  the period studied there has  been a  secular decline in demand  for 
bus  services in particular.  Passenger miles travelled by bus fell by  24 
per cent  between 1962  and  1972  partly as a  result of increasing car ownership. 
For the reasons outlined in the preceding paragraph it has not  been possible 
to reduce costs in direct proportion to the reduction in demand  and thus an 
increase in average  costs and prices has  ensued. 
The  two  factors  discussed above  have  combined to give an  increase in 
public transport fares greater than that in the prices of consumer  expenditure 
as a  whole  and,  more  relevant,  greater than the  increase in private car 
running costs.  In a  future period of wage  inflation public transport will 
be  badly placed if wages  rise more  than price levels in general, as  scope for 
immediate productivity increases is limited and any shift to the left in 
the  demand  curve is likely to cause  increases in average costs and,  hence, 
in prices.  The  net overall effect would  be a  continuation of the trends 
apparent  in Table 1  and  a  further rise in public transport fares relative to 
prices in general. 
Finally, it is necessary to explain the slight decline in real terms 
in private car operating costs.  There  has  been little systematic research 
into this, but the following points seem  of relevance. 
(1)  The  price of petrol has declined in real terms during this period.  It 
rose by about  47  per cent compared  with the increase  in prices generally 
of 60  per cent. 
188 (2)  The  rate of vehicle excise duty  has only risen by  about  43  per cent and 
has thus declined in real terms.  Petrol and vehicle excise duty 
accounted for 46  per cent of car running costs in 1972.<12) 
(3)  The  labour of driving the car does not enter cost calculations. 
Increases  in wage  rates and therefore in the opportunity cost of a 
person's hire thus do  not affect car running costs;  indeed, as the cost 
of other modes  rise faster than car running costs, the  savings which 
may  be  imputed to driving oneself will rise accordingly. 
(4)  It is possible,  as the price of labour  increases, to substitute one's 
own  leisure time  for that of hired labour for repairs and maintenance. 
It is also possible to have  lower  standards of maintenance to reduce 
costs.  Such action is not available to public transport operators, the 
standards of whose  vehicles are strictly regulated by  law. 
(5)  During the period there have  been technical improvements  which  have 
increased the efficiency of cars, for  example  more  efficient engines and 
tyres,  inter alia, have raised potential speeds and  reduced  specific 
fuel  consumption.  Urban  congestion may  constrain some  of these benefits, 
but  must  be set against the growth of motorways. 
The  above  points  show  that in the period under discussion certain 
important elements in car running costs failed to rise in price by  as much 
as goods  and  services generally and  also that car owners  have  some  opportunity 
to mitigate the effects of increases in prices. 
In contrast, public transport users, at a  time of general inflation, 
are likely to be  faced with above  average  increases in fares. 
189 The  trends  shown  in Tables  1  & 2, thus  seem  to be consistent with these 
hypotheses.  Regardless of whether they are true or not,  however,  the 
facts are that the price of public transport  has risen by  a  greater percentage 
than private car running costs.  Thus,  one  group of the community  (public 
transport users)  have  become  worse off than others  (car users)  in this 
respect.  Whether  this has  been redistributive can only be  answered  when 
expenditure patterns and  income  is taken into account. 
Passenger Transport  Usage  and  Income  Distribution 
The  changing levels of cost inflation in public transport and private 
car transport  have  significant implications for different  income  groups. 
As  one  would  expect,  the car-owning class everywhere  is invariably the 
richer class.  The  evidence  of this is quite conclusive:  econometric studies 
of the demand  for cars in advanced countries all reveal the primacy of 
.  d  .  (13)  1ncome  as  a  eterm1nant  ;  travel survey data for traffic forecasts  show 
the  importance of income  levels;  and family  expenditure  surveys reveal that 
the ownership  of first,  second and-subsequent cars is closely related to 
household  income  levels,(l4)  as is the  ownership of other durable goods. 
Moreover,  income  influences usage  as well as ownership:  the higher the  income 
of a  car owner,  the more  likely he  is to use  his car.(lS)  The  London  Travel 
Survey of 1962  showed  that car owners  with annual  incomes  below £1,000 
generated about five trips daily,  compared  with nine trips by  owners  with 
incomes  over £3,000.  Other significant findings  were  that wealthier families 
made,  on  average,  longer  journeys by car than did less wealthy families,  and 
thatcarowning families  generated,  on average,  6.8 trips daily, but households 
without cars generated only  3 trips. 
It can thus  be  seen clearly that insofaras inflation has  tended to 
increase the cost of public transport more  rapidly than the costs of the 
190 TABLE  3 
WEEKLY  EXPENDITURE  ON  TRANSPORT,  BY  HOUSEHOLD  INCO~E GROUP,  GREAT  BRITAIN,  1972 
Income  Group  Under  10-14.99  lS-19.99  20-24.99  25-29.99  30-34.99  35-39.99  40-44.99  45-49.99  50-59.99  60-79.99  Over  All 
(£ _l)_er  week)  10  80  Groups 
Expenditure on 
Transport  £  0.25  0.67  1.13  2.26  3.26  3.55  4.27  4.61  5.74  7.24  8.60  8.60  4.97 
Total Weekly 
Expenditure  £  9.34  14.21  18.75  23.47  26.34  29.66  32.99  35.19  39.01  42.83  52.21  72.85  35.06 
% spent  on 
Transport  2.68  4.71  6.03  9.63  12.38  11.97  12.94  13.10  14.71  16.90  16.47  17.53  14.18 
of which:-
net  purchases 
of motor 
vehicles,  - ~ spares and 
accessories  (0.11)  0.56  1.01  3.07  4.59  4.35  5.03  4.89  5.79  6.68  7.01  7.62  5.6 
maintenance 
and running 
of motor 
vehicles  0.54  1.83  2.29  4.18  4.63  4.99  5.43  5.51  6.31  6.70  6.40  6.42  5.6 
Motor  vehicle 
sub-total  0.65  2.39  3.30  7.25  9.22  9.34  10.46  10.40  12.10  13.38  13.41  14.04  11.2 
Purchase  & 
maintenance of 
other vehicles 
and boats  - - (0.05)  0.13  (0.08)  0.10  0.12  0.26  0.13  0.30  0.11  0.58  0.2 
Rail fares  0.10  0.35  0.64  0.30  0.38  0.44  0.45  0.45  0.51  0.61  0.75  1.14  0.7 
Bus  & coach 
fares  1.50  1.69  l.  76  l.  75  1.94  1.69  1.49  1.62  1.46  1.47  1.30  0.91  1.4 
Other travel  0.32  0.21  0.26  0.26  (0.76)  0.40  0.42  0.37  0.51  1.12  0.90  0.88  0.7 
Note:  Figures  shown  in brackets are subject to small sample  size or to relatively high sampling errors. private motorist, its distributional effects have  been regressive.  However, 
it would  be  premature to infer from  this that subsidies for public transport 
- buses and trains - would  be progressive, quite apart  from  the question of 
who  pays  for the subsidies.  We  have  already suggested that wealthier 
families travel more  than poor ones;  and it could be that their use of public 
transport as well as private cars would  ensure that they enjoyed an element 
of subsidy.  In examining the relationship between  income  and  expenditure on 
public transport, the  Family Expenditure  Surveys  provide useful evidence. 
Table  3  shows  the relationship between  household  income  and  expenditure on 
various  forms  of transport  in Britain in 1972.  The  positive relationship 
between  income  and expenditure  on cars is clearly apparent,  and the rising 
proportion of expenditure  on  car running costs supports the earlier 
statement that usage of cars is also a  rising function of income.  The 
relationship between  income  and  expenditure on  public transport is composite. 
As  income  rises,  so  does  absolute  expenditure  on rail journeys and  so does 
the proportion of expenditure;  this accords with an international cross-
section study by Silberston(l6)  which  showed  a  positive relationship between 
rail usage  and  income,  negating the  hypothesis that railways were  a  simple 
alternative to the private car.  By  contrast,  once  weekly  income  exceeds 
about  £20  there is a  negative relationship between  income  and the proportion 
of expenditure  on  bus  and road travel. 
The  explanation of these characteristics is relatively simple.  Car 
ownership and  usage are functions  of  income,  and this has  been the generally 
preferred mode  of surface travel, as  the figuresin Table 4,  below,  show. 
Similar trends  in modal  choice are evident in North America  and  Europe, 
with the private car advancing its share,  and rail and  bus  services stagnant 
.  d  1"  (l7)  H  "1  ~  f  d  b  or  ~n  ec  ~ne.  owever,  ra~  use may  ~e pre erre  y  car owners 
192 in certain circumstances,  notably inter-city business trips and  urban commuter 
journeys into congested areas. 
TABLE  4 
CHANGE  IN  LEVELS  OF  HOUSEHOLD  EXPENDITURE  ON  TRANSPORT,  GREAT  BRITAIN 
1964/66 to 1970/72 
Ave.  weekly  As  % of total 
expenditure,  £  expenditure 
1964/66  1970/72  1964/66  1970/72 
Net  purchase of motor vehicles,  etc.  0.80  1.63  3.81  5.15 
Maintenance  & running of motor vehicles  0.97  1.  78  4.62  5.62 
Sub  total  1.  77  3.41  8.43  10.77 
Purchase  &  maintenance of other vehicles  0.44  0.08  0.19  0.25 
Railway  fares  0.15  0.21  0.71  0.66 
Bus  and  coach fares  0.39  0.48  1.86  1.51 
Other travel  0.11  0.21  0.52  0.66 
2.46  4.39  11.71  13.87 
The  Family  Expenditure  Surveys  provide a  breakdown  of transport 
expenditure on  a  regional basis in Britain,  showing that  expenditure on  rail 
journeys is highest, at over three times the national average,  in the Greater 
London  area.  It is also relatively high in North-West  England and  the 
Midlands,  where  there are large conurbations and where  the rail network is 
relatively dense. 
Hence,  any  increase in the level of rail subsidy would  have  inegalitarian 
distributional effects,  in terms both of income  and of regional distribution. 
It would  accrue more  to the wealthier,  and,  if applied as a  blanket  subsidy, 
to the long distance commuter.  It is already well established in transportation 
studies that such commuters  are members  of higher  income  groups.  It would 
193 bring much  less benefit to those areas where  the rail network is thin or 
non-existent;  and these areas,  often peripheral ones,  usually display below 
average  income  levels.  This  evidence is based  on  British data,  but probably 
has  a  wider validity,  such that rail subsidies would  benefit Parisians 
rather than the people  of Brittany,  and dwellers in the Ruhr  rather than 
German  farmers. 
Subsidies for  buses  would  have  a  more  progressive effect on  income 
distribution,  since they are used proportionately more  by  the poorer members 
of the  community.  However,  it could be  argued that  even  here,  the degree of 
progressiveness would  be more  apparent  than real,  since the absolute level of 
expenditure  on  bus  fares rises gently with  income  until the final  income 
group,  shown  in Table  3;  but if the  subsidies were raised from  progressive 
income  tax,  the net distributional effect would  probably be  progressive. 
The  use  of buses and  coaches  appears to  be  inversely related to the use of 
cars,  both on  the basis of family  expenditure data for  households of various 
compositions and  on  the basis of regional transport  use patterns.  Hence  in 
those families,  stratified according to composition,  and  those regions  where 
car use  is low,  bus  use is high.  We  have  shown  in the earlier section on 
relative cost inflation that over the past decade,  bus  fares  have  risen 
faster than train fares,  and  very much  faster than car running costs.  Over 
the  same  period,  the quality of service offered by  buses  has  declined,  as 
diminished traffic has  obliged operators to reduce  operating frequencies. 
Thus,  the bus  user has  been doubly hit, by rising costs and  by  falling 
quality of service,  and as they comprise the poorer sections of the community 
they have  had limited access to alternative modes.  We  therefore conclude that: 
if there were  to be  any  subsidisation of transport, the  strongest case on 
egalitarian grounds  could be made  for assistance to bus services. 
An  objection might  be raised to subsidies on  bus  operation because  buses 
194 have  been an  'inferior' mode,  experiencing secular decline  in the  face of 
increasing ownership of cars.  But  it is arguable that the circumstances of 
the 1960's were  unique,  with declining real prices of petrol and relative 
freedom  for motorists  from  meeting the social costs of the congestion which 
their presence  imposes  on  the road users of major  conurbations.  Political 
and,  perhaps,  technical problems of congestion road pricing are likely to 
defer its introduction,  and inferior expedients  such as  high parking charges 
and outright vehicle prohibitions are more  readily employed,  together with 
general subsidies to urban  public transport.  If the decline  in the quality 
of bus  service could be halted or reversed,  it is possible that  some  of the 
potential advantages of the bus  could be realised:  it is less fuel-intensive 
per passenger mile than the private car,  so that if fuels  continue to become 
dearer and  scarce it may  recoup  some  of the cost disadvantage it met  during 
the past decade. 
(b)  Freight Transport 
The  analysis of cost inflation in freight  transport is more  difficult than 
in passenger transport  because data on  costs and receipts are  scarcer and  less 
reliable.  Thompson  and  Hunter(lS)  suggest that over the period 1952-68 
the real price of railway freight fell,  but that road freight did not  match 
this fall, notwithstanding the  steady  improvement  in the productivity of 
road haulage.  They  cite figures,  admittedly of the most  impressionistic 
nature,  which  suggest that  between 1952  and  1965, rail receipts per ton-mile 
rose  by  7  per cent  (without  allowing for  changes  in the mix  of items carried), 
while  the cost of road haulage per ton-mile rose  by  17  per cent.  Both 
increases were  much  less than the rise in the general level of prices.  Even 
so,  road haulage  gained traffic at the  expense of the railways.  Deakin  and 
Seward(lg) attribute this to the non-price advantages of road transport, 
195 since in their study of 29  commodity  groups,  in only 5  was  road transport 
cheaper.  They  also  show  that labour productivity in road  haulage rose  by 
almost  six per cent  a  year between 1952  and 1962,  partly because of extra 
capital  inputs  in the form  of bigger more  efficient trucks. 
By  contrast, railways  and road passenger transport  showed  declines in labour 
productivity, reflecting the  problems of a  contraction of business.  This 
is a  world-wide  phenomenon,  with the road vehicle gaining traffic while the 
share of railways declined. 
There  are no  definitive indices of freight costs by road or rail.  It 
can  be  shown,  however,  that labour costs  form  a  high proportion of both road 
haulage  and rail operation 
TABLE  5 
COMPONENTS  OF  ROAD  AND  RAIL  FREIGHT  COSTS 
(a)  Rail cost structure  (per cent)  1965  1968 
Staff  63  62 
Fuel  8  5 
Materials,  supplies,  services  19  21 
Depreciation and amortization  10  12 
(b)  Road  haulage  Edwards  & Bayliss  National Freight 
(1965)  Corp.(l970)(1971) 
Wages  59  48 
Fuel  13  9 
Insurance, materials,  etc.  15  37-ic 
Depreciation and repairs  13  6 
* figure  includes extensive depot  costs and  payments to sub-contractors. 
Source:  Rail:-British Railways  Board;  Road:-S.L.  Edwards  & B.T.  Bayliss, 
Operating Costs  in Road  Freight Transport,  Dept.  of Environment, 
49 
8 
36''c 
7 
1971,  and  National Freight Corporation,  Annual Reports,  1970  and 1971. 
196 The  proportion of labour cost to total cost appears  slightly lower for 
road hauliers,  and in recent years,  truck drivers'  earnings  have risen less 
than those of railway workers,  and  of manual  workers generally, as Table  6 
shows. 
1968 
1970 
1971 
1972 
TABLE  6 
INDICES  OF  COMPARATIVE  EARNINGS,  1968-1972 
B.R.  adult males 
100 
124.7 
134.7 
153.8 
Drivers of trucks,  5-10  tons 
100 
117.3 
127.6 
143.4 
Source:  Dept.  of Employment. 
All manual  workers 
100 
124.8 
145.7 
No  definite answer  can be  offered at this stage to the question whether 
inflation has affected freight  transport more  severely than average. 
Although there are no  indices of road freight rates,  some  trade publications 
issue regular estimates of running costs for road vehicles,(2l) which  were 
the major  source of land freight traffic in 1971,  accounting for  75  per cent 
of ton mileage  compared  with 21.6 per cent  by  railway.  The  indices are of 
limited use  to the  economist,  as the figures are not totally consistent in 
the sizes of vehicles analysed;  yet they  show  some  clear trends.  It would 
appear that between 1965  and  1973  operating costs rose considerably faster 
than the  consumer price index.  The  rise was  more  pronounced among  relatively 
small vehicles,  such as  30  cwt.  vans,  where  the wage  component  of total 
cost is high,  but  diminished with vehicle size, the cost of operating 20/22 
ton trucks rising somewhat  less than that of 10/12 tonners. 
197 Railway freight costs and prices are extremely difficult to estimate  from 
published sources.  It is possible to calculate receipts per ton-mile  wagon-
"1  (22 )  h  .  d"  f  .  .  h  b  B .. h  R  "1  d  ml  e  as roug  ln lcators o  rlslng c  arges,  ut  rltls  al ways  o  not 
charge per wagon-mile,  operating rather on  the principle of charging what 
the traffic will bear.  Hence,  changes  in the capacity utilization, mix of 
traffic and the mix  of wagon  sizes may  distort the apparent price, and 
changes  in receipts per ton mile will reflect the traffic mix,  which ·altered 
in 1972  in favour  of bulk,  low-charge  loads,  such as coal, oil and road  stone 
materials.  Between  1969  and  1972  receipts per ton-mile rose little but 
receipts per wagon-mile  rose  somewhat  faster than the  consumer price index. 
Thus  in recent years,  road freight costs  have risen faster than prices 
generally,  but  we  cannot  say positively what  has  happened to rail charges. 
If the charges are passed on,  the inflationary effects of rising transport 
UP,On  •  charges will depend  on  the  incidence of transport costs7relatlve prices 
within total costs of different goods.  Periodic Censuses of Production  show 
the purchases of transport  services as  a  proportion of net inputs, as well 
as the transport  expenditure of large firms,  defined as  employing at least 
25  people. 
In 1968,  there were  several two-digit  industries with a  high element of 
transport costs as  a  proportion of net output, notably mineral oil refining 
(20.5%),  mining and quarrying other than coal  (18.2%),  bricks  (7.9%), 
distributive trades  (6.4%)  and  coke ovens  (6.3%).  Those  figures  exclude 
intra-industry transactions,  so that a  finer three digit set of the Standard 
Industrial Classification offers a  more  detailed and realistic estimate of 
the  importance of transport costs to specific product  groups.  This is shown 
in Table  7,  along with the  importance of road transport for  each product 
group. 
198 T'f 
It is evident  from  Table  7  that certain items  in the  consumer  budget 
are more  liable than others to rising transport costs, and that the cost of 
road transport  is the  dominant  element of transport costs.  Items  such as 
stone and slate, sand and  gravel,  cement  and  canvas  goods  figure little 
in their direct  impact  on consumer  expenditure,  but many  of the food products 
do  have  a  direct bearing on  consumers.  The  Family Expenditure  Surveys  show 
how  much  households  with different  income  levels  spend  on  food,  and on 
particular types of food:  data are stratified by  household  composition. 
Broadly speaking,  food  expenditure rises less than proportionately with 
income,  so that the effect· of rising freight  costs on  food prices will 
be regressive,  impinging more  upon the poor  who  spend a  higher proportion 
of their total budget  on  food.  If we  examine  the expenditure pattern of 
that group  in the survey with the highest propensity to consume  food,  namely 
households  with two  adults and  four  children,  we  observe negative  income 
elasticity of demand  for bread,  flour,  sugar and,  less clearly, biscuits. 
Income  elasticity is low  for bacon,  milk and milk products;  and similar 
relationships apply to smaller households. 
TABLE  7 
TRANSPORT  COSTS  OF  "LARGE"  FIRMS  IN  1968  CENSUS  OF  PRODUCTION 
Industry 
Stone  & slate quarrying 
Canvas  goods 
Chalk,  clay & gravel 
Milk  & milk products 
Miscellaneous machinery 
Bricks 
Anim&l  & poultry foods 
Sugar 
Transport  Costs as 
percentage of value 
of net output 
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% 
88.9 
46.7 
46.3 
33.5 
32.4 
22.6 
20.4 
19.6 
Road  Transport  Costs 
as percentage of 
total transport costs 
% 
99.9 
89.5 
90.0 
97.8 
88.6 
94.5 
90.2 
83.0 
(continued) Table  7  continued 
Industry 
Lubricating oil & greases 
Cement 
Coke  ovens  & manufactured fuel 
Grain milling 
Bacon  curing, meat  & fish products 
Brewing  & malting 
AVERAGES:  Weighted 
Transport Costs as 
percentage of value 
of net output 
% 
19.1 
16.7 
16.5 
14.5 
14.1 
13.7 
7.3 
Source:  Census  of Production,  1968. 
Road  Transport Costs 
as percentage of 
total transport costs 
% 
96.0 
86.1 
30.1 
88.9 
95.5 
95.8 
86.9 
The  impact of rising freight transport costs on the food  component  of 
consumer prices has  probably been slightly faster than the general level of 
price increase in recent years,  and since the recent rise in oil prices and 
the  continued rising trend of wages,  transport costs will probably continue 
to exceed the rate of inflation.  The  prospects for productivity increases 
are limited,  especially as road vehicles increase towards  some  sort of 
ultimate size and  exhaust the economies of scale that were  exploited through 
the nineteen-fifties and sixties. 
Since the distributional effects of rising freight transport costs are 
likely to be regressive,  subsidy measures  would  be  progressive.  The  full 
effects of such subsidies would require analysis which  probably goes  beyond 
the current state of the art in input-output analysis, and  allowance  would 
have to be  made  for the fact that any  subsidy of freight transport would 
favour  those  items and  those processes which were  geographically scattered, 
and that this has  serious implications for general productive efficiency. 
200 (l)  Levels of bus fares  in the U.K.  are controlled by  the  Department  of 
the Environment. 
(2)  This might not  have  had  much  effect on relative rates of increase, 
because it has been the pre-tax price of fuels which  have  risen.  As 
railways are  exempt  from  tax on  fuel oil and  bus operators are taxed 
at a  lower rate than general users,  the lowest 1ncrease in percentage 
terms will have  been in private car fuel. 
(3)  For  example  with automated signalling, automatic train operation,  higher 
operating speeds. 
(4)  The  main  source of this is one-man  operation which  now  accounts for  a 
high proportion of all bus-mileage operated in most  areas. 
(5)  British Railways  Board:  Annual  Report  & Accounts,  1973  (London,  British 
Railways,  1974,  p.  42),  and  National Bus  Company  Annual  Report  & 
Accounts,  1973  (London,  National Bus  Company,  1974,  p.  48). 
(6)  Department  of Employment  Gazette,  January 1971 and  July 1974. 
(7)  Ibid. 
(8)  Located train miles is an indication of supply rather than demand,  but 
there is no  unambiguous  means  of measuring demand.  See  C.D.  Jones, 
"The  Performance of British Railways",  Journal of Transport  Economics 
& Policy  (Vol.  IV,  No.  2,  May  1970), pp.  162-170.  Basic data are  from 
British Railways  Annual  Report  and Accounts. 
(9)  Derived  from  Table  29  of Passenger Transport  in Great  Britain 1969, 
(London,  H.M.S.O.,  1970)  and  substantiated by  data produced to the 
author by  several operators  (in support of subsidy applications)  since 
1971.  This comprises the costs of buildings and management,  in the main. 
(10)  Peak periods for railway passengers and freight  movements  are at 
different times of the day. 
(11)  See  W.J.  Tyson,  "The  Peak  in Road  Passenger Transport", J.T.E.P., 
(Vol.  VI,  No.1, Jan., 1972),  pp.  37-84. 
201 (12)  Automobile Association,  Schedule of Estimated Running Costs,  (London, 
Automobile Association,  1972). 
(13)  See,  for  example,  G.C.  Chow,  Demand  for Automobiles  in the United States, 
North Holland,  Amsterdam,  1957;  W.J.H.  Mogridge,  "The  Prediction of 
Car  Ownership",  Journal of Transport  Economics  and Policy,  Vol.  1, Jan. 
1967,  pp.  52-57;  P.C.  Stubbs et al, The  Australian Motor  Industry, 
Cheshire,  Melbourne,  1972,  chapt.  9. 
(14)  See  Department  of Employment,  Family Expenditure  Survey,  1972,  H.M.S.O., 
London,  1973. 
(15)  The  evidence for this is analysed by  M.Q.  Dalvi,  Distributional Aspects 
of  Investment  in Urban  Transport,  Working  Paper  26,  S.R.C.  Transportation 
Planning Project, Institute for Transport  Studies, University of Leeds, 
1973. 
(16)  Aubrey  Silberston,  "Automobile  Use  and  the  Standard of Living in East 
and  West",  Journal of Transport  Economics  & Policy,  Vol.  IV,  No.  1, 
Jan., 1970. 
(17)  See  A.H.  Tulpule,  An  Analysis  of Some  World  Transport Statistics, 
Transport  and Road  Research Laboratory Report  No.  622,  Crowthorne, 
Berkshire,  1974. 
(18)  A.W.J.  Thompson  & L.S.  Hunter,  The  Nationalised Transport  Industries, 
Heinemann,  London,  1973,  pp.  150-1. 
(19)  B.M.  Deakin  & T.  Seward,  Productivity in Transport,  Cambridge  U.P.,  1969. 
(20)  See  A.H.  Tulpule,  op.cit. 
(21)  Estimates  in this section were  made  from  data published by the  journals 
Motor  Transport  and  Commercial  Motor. 
(22)  Using statistics published in the annual Report  and Accounts of the 
British Railways  Board,  1972. 'I 
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203 I.  Owner  occupied housing is one  of the major  forms  in which  British 
households  may  hold real as opposed to financial capital.  Moreover,  one 
of the most  important types of non-wage  and  salary income  in the economy 
is that which  accrues to owner  occupiers of housing.  More  than half the 
households  in Britain own  their own  homes  and  therefore do  not  need to make 
provision from  their other income  for the payment  of rent.  Of  course,  to 
the extent that ownership is financed  by  loans  from  financial institutions 
provision does  need to be  made  for payment  of interest and  repayment of 
principal. 
In recent British history this particular form  of income  has  been 
subjected to no  form  of government  control during periods  in which prices 
and  incomes policies have  been in force,  and,  in addition,  is no  longer 
counted as  income  for tax purposes.  One  of the more  remarkable features of 
recent British inflation has been a  rise in house prices which  has  far 
exceeded that in the general price level,  and there must  have  been dramatic 
increases in the money  valu~ of this income  in kind accruing to owner 
occupiers.  The  purpose of this section of our  study is to make  some  rough 
preliminary assessments of the  sums  involved and to discuss what  measures, 
if any,  might usefully be taken to bring this form  of income  within the 
purview of government  policy towards the distribution of income  and  wealth. 
A full study of this issue would  require time  and  space far beyond that 
available in the context of the present report,  but  the broad outlines that 
Gemerge  from  our preliminary work  suggest that such a  more  thorough  study 
would  be well worth doing. 
A preliminary step to the present  study must  be  to establish the 
falsity of a  common  fallacy in discussions of the economics  of owner  occupied 
housing,  namely that the anomolous  income  tax treatment of the  imputed  income 
204 from  owner  occupied  housing arises from  the tax deductibility of mortgage 
interest payments.  It does  not.  It arises from  ignoring this source of 
income  altogether in the calculation of taxable income.  The  tax deductibility 
of mortgage  interest payments  simply ensures that those with mortgages receive 
the  same  tax treatment as out-right owners.  This  is best  seen by considering 
a  simple  numerical illustration.  The  reader who  is already clear about 
this matter may  pass directly to section III of this study without reading 
the next  few  pages. 
II.  In constructing the accounts  set out  in table 1, we  have  made  the 
following assumptions  which,  though they greatly simplify the analysis, 
do  not detract from  its substance.  We  assume  an economy  in which  the income 
tax is so  structured that tax payers may  deduct  a  flat £1,000 plus any 
mortgage  interest payment  from  their gross  income  from all sources to 
arrive at their taxable  income.  We  assume  that  income  tax is levied on  the 
remainder at a  rate of 30%.  In addition,  we  assume  that the capital market 
in this economy  is sufficiently perfect to ensure that the net rate of return 
on  capital in all investments is 10%  per annum.  Thus,  the imputed net 
rental value per annum  of any  owner  occupied house is 10%  of its market 
price.  We  then consider the accounts of two  households,  identical in every 
recpect  save  one,  that the  second of them  has  a  mortgage  debt  equal to  50% 
of the value of its house.  We  assume  that each household  has a  before tax 
income  from all sources of £2,500 per annum,  and  that each lives in a  house 
whose  market  value is £6,000 and  whose  annual net rental value is therefor~ 
£600. 
The  table should be  virtually self-explanatory.  It shows  that, if we 
ignore the rental value of the owner  occupied house  in calculating a  family's 
income,  then that with the mortgage  appears to be paying less tax on  the 
205 same  income.  However,  if we  include the  imputed  income  from  the owner 
occupied house  in our calculation of income,  it will be  apparent that the 
net  income  (before taxes) of the  family  with the mortgage is £300  per annum 
less than that of the outright owner  and that he  is equitably enough  paying 
£100  less in taxes.  Table  2  drives home  the point more  thoroughly.  Here, 
we  assume  that,  though mortgage  interest is still tax deductable, tax laws 
have  been changed  so that the  imputed rental value of the house  is subject 
to tax.  In this case the tax liability of each household  increases by  £200 
leaving the family with a  mortgage still paying less tax on  what  is still a 
smaller  income.  Alternatively, table  2 would  equally apply if our two 
households  simply exchanged ownership of, but not residence  in,dwellings 
and paid each other rent.  What  was  income  in kind would  then become  income 
in cash,  and liable to taxation. 
Finally,  in table  3  we  show  what  would  happen if tax laws  were  changed 
from  the situation depicted in table 1  to a  state of affairs in which 
mortgage  interest was  no  longer tax deductible.  Evidently,  the household 
with a  mortgage  would  end  up  paying the  same  tax as that with no  mortgage, 
despite the fact that the  "true"  income  of the former  was  lower. 
Now  the  foregoing  examples  are illustrative of general principles. 
A thorough study of the  income  tax treatment of owner  occupied  housing in 
any particular economy,  would  of course have to take account of the structure 
of tax rates in that economy,  including taxes  levied specifically on real 
property by  both central and local governments;  it would  also have  to take 
account of capital market  imperfections, risk premia and the like, that would 
undermine the simplifying assumption used in our  example that net rates of 
return on capital were  equalised everywhere  in the economy;  and  so forth. 
These  complications would  of course greatly affect the quantitative 
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of the  income  in kind accruing from  owner  occupied housing.  However,  they 
would  not affect the qualitative nature of the case made  by our very simple 
example.  This  example  illustrates clearly enough that ownership of housing 
permits the consumption of a  stream of income  which,  because it is taken in 
kind,  is not  subject to tax.  Hence  it falls outside the  scope of the  income; 
redistribution mechanisms  set  up  by  government. 
III.  Inflation impinges  upon  households  in a  number  of well-known ways. 
Money  incomes  rise faster than real incomes  and,  in the presence of 
progressive  income  taxes, the real burden of taxation increases.  The  real 
value of nominal assets depreciates, as does the real value of nominal 
liabilities (although,  once  inflation becomes  fully anticipated, these 
effects are cancelled out by  interest rate adjustments).  The  incentives 
that these consequences of inflation produce are clear enough.  Households 
are  encouraged to take  income  in forms  that are not subjected to income 
tax;  they are  encouraged to acquire real assets and to emit nominal 
liabilities.  In the British institutional framework  all of these incentives 
operate to put pressure on  the owner  occupied housing market. 
As  we  have  already seen,  the acquistition of an owner  occupied house 
gives  command  over a  stream of income  in kind that is not  subject to  income 
tax.  Moreover,  the  house  is a  real asset whose  real  valu~ does  not 
automatically depreciate with inflation.  In addition, and of special 
importance, it is possible in Britain to finance  the purchase of owner 
occupied housing on  particularly favourable  terms.  The  great majority of 
mortgages are granted by  Building Societies at interest rates which,  as a 
matter of government  policy, are kept at low levels.  Thus  their adjustment 
to inflation has been  slow and  incomplete as table 4  shows.  The  typical term 
~7 for a  mortgage  is twenty five years, and anything up  to  95%  of the purchase 
price of the house  may  sometimes  by  financed on  such terms.  It is hardly 
surprising then that the recent  inflation has  produced a  particularly 
exaggerated effect on  the owner  occupied housing market,  an effect which  has, 
as  we  shall argue below,  given a  large part of the population a  vested 
interest in having inflation continue. 
Given the nature of published data on  the  housing market it is not 
possible to quantify with any precision the effects that  inflation had  on 
the housing market, but the data are probably good  enough to give a  rough 
and ready  impression of the orders of magnitude  involved.  The  most  readily 
available statistics come  from  a  ten per cent  sample  survey of all Building 
Society mortgages  granted during each month.  In addition to Building 
Societies, mortgages are also granted by  local government  authorities, 
insurance companies,  and a  variety of finance  houses.  Local authorities tend 
to concentrate their activities on  lending for the purchase of old and  cheap 
houses where  building societies are rbluctant to lend while  insurance 
companies  and other institutions tend to concentrate their activities at 
the top end  of the market.  Thus  data based solely on  building society 
mortgages  are not  necessarily completely representative of what  is happening 
over the whole  spectrum of the owner  occupied housing market.  In addition 
to this, though the  survey in question does yield data on the  income  of 
owner  occupiers and the value of their houses,  the data in question are 
generated at the moment  of purchase of a  house.  They  tell us about  people 
now  buying houses,  about  houses  now  being bought;  this information is not 
necessarily representative of people currently owning  houses,  or of houses 
cUrrently ~·  Also the quality of the houses  being traded could vary 
from  time to time  so that average prices recorded at different times are 
not necessarily prices for houses of the same  quality. Nevertheless,  we  must  not exaggerate the difficulties with available 
data.  First we  will mainly be  concerned with changes in the housing market 
during a  period of inflation.  We  have  a  data base in which  the extremes of 
that market,  particularly cheap  and particularly expensive  housing,  are 
under-represented; this only matters if the changes at these extremes of the 
market  were  different from  those taking place in the middle.  There is no 
reason to believe that there were  any great differences here.  Second, 
though a  sample of data generated by  observing house  purchases will 
inevitably over-represent new  houses relative to the housing  stock as a 
whole,  the data we  have  do  discriminate between  new  and  second hand  houses. 
There  is no  reason to believe that the  second hand  houses being traded are 
systematically unrepresentative of the housing stock as a  whole,  and in any 
event the price behaviour of new  and  second hand  houses  seem  to have  been 
about the  same  over the period of this study.  Similarly for data on  house 
owners;  new  households must  inevitably be over-represented in data based on 
house  purchases.  Again,  however,  the data are broken down  between first time 
purchasers and others and  hence  permit us to come  to grips to some  extent 
with this problem.  Finally,  when  it comes  to the question of the quality of 
the average  house traded over the period of this study, it should be  noted 
that  housing technology does  not change very rapidly.  It would  be  surprising 
if the average  quality of houses traded had  changed  very much  over a  four 
year period.  Moreover,  casual empiricism  (based for example  on  observing 
what  has  happened  to the price of the same  houses  when  they have  been 
traded at various times over the last few  years)  tends to confirm the 
impression of the behaviour of house  prices that is given by  our  sample 
survey data. 
Thus,  the data on  which  the following analysis is based are far from 
perfect~ but they are probably not  so  imperfect as to be  unusable.  Of  course 
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be  completely confident  about this.  As  we  shall see, the results that 
are presented below are sufficiently dramatic that more  careful work 
designed to discover whether or not they are  just a  statistical artifact 
would  be well worth doing. 
IV.  The  current inflation began in earnest  ~n Britain in about  1969.  The 
last year for  which complete data of the type  we  require here are available 
is 1973;  these years therefore form  the basis of this part of our  study. 
The  first thing to establish is what  happened to the price of housing over 
this period relative to the prices of goods  in general.  Table  5  presents 
the basic data,  and as can be  seen,  house  prices rose  by  far more  than 
the general price level, slightly more  than doubling over the  four  year 
period.  As  noted above,  despite the  shortcomings of our data for measuring 
changes  in the price of a  standard quality house,  the order of magnitude 
of the change  indicated here  seems  to be roughly right on  the basis of 
causual empiricism.  Not  only did housing prices rise much  more  rapidly 
than prices in general, but as table  5  indicated they rose a  good  deal more 
rapidly than  incomes  in general. 
At  least three significant facts are implicit in the statistics 
reported in table  5.  First, anyone  who  was  an owner  occupier over the 
period 1969-'73 made  substantial capital gains.  Second,  the  importance of 
the  imputed rental income  from  horne  ownership as a  tax shelter increased 
significantly over the period.  Finally, over the period, it became  more 
and  more  expensive and difficult for first time  buyers to acquire  homes. 
This latter fact is of considerable  importance  in the British context  since 
private unfurnished rental accommodation is virtually non-existent; this 
state of affairs being a  direct consequence of over half a  century of rent 
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accommodation  - also now  being subjected to rent control legislation which 
will ensure its disappearance in due  course,  and  subsidised local authority 
housing for  which there are,  in many  parts of the country,  long waiting 
lists.  Thus  any  increase in the difficulty faced  by first time  buyers  in 
acquiring an owner  occupied  house  is a  much  more  serious state of affairs 
in Britain than it would  be  in countries where alternative forms  of 
accommodation  were  more  readily available. 
Available data enable us to say  something about  the  quantitative 
significance of these factors,  and to do  so it is crucial to break down 
our data between first time  buyers  and  previous owner  occupiers  who  enter 
the  sample  when  they buy  a  new  house.  The  reason for this is straightforward. 
As  we  noted in the previous  section of this essay, mortgages are made  available 
up  to a  certain proportion - sometimes as high as  95%  of the value of the house 
to be  bought.  Thus  a  buyer must  accumulate a  certain amount  of capital 
himself before he  is able to buy  his house.  The  availability of capital 
puts an  important constraint upon  the price which a  purchaser is able to pay 
for his  house.  In a  time of rising house.prices things  are~ore difficult 
for first time buyers,  but  the capital gain made  from the ownership of 
one  house  makes  it easier for existing owner  occupiers to  improve  the 
quality of their housing by  "moving  up"  the market. 
Now  let us consider the time path of the  imputed  income  from  owner 
occupied housing.  Table  6  presents relevant  data.  As  the reader will see 
from  Table  6a  the ratio of house  value to income  increased slightly for 
first time  buyers  over the period,  but significantly for existing owner 
occupiers.  The  correct rate of return to  impute to an owner  occupied house 
is hard to assess,  and  hence,  in table  6b  we  present figures  based on  a 
2ll range of assumptions about its order of magnitude.  5%  is surely on  the  low 
side, while  15%  is probably too  high.  The  central figure of 10%  is we 
believe, defensible,  and the figures  in table 6  speak for themselves. 
Capital gains made  on  home  ownership  enabled those owner  occupiers  who 
bought  new  houses to increase their untaxed  income  in kind from  27.3%  to 
38.2%  of their cash  income  between 1969  and  1973. 
It is already evident  from  table 5  that the differential in house 
prices paid by  first time buyers and  previous owner  occupiers widened over 
the period of this study.  Table  7  presents  information on  this matter in 
a  more  straightforward form.  Though  the  incomes  of first time  buyers 
increased more  rapidly than those of existing owner  occupiers, the value of 
the house they purchased  increased much  less rapidly.  The  fact that new 
owner  occupiers mortgages  increased in size more  rapidly than did those 
of previous owner  occupiers confirms the  importance of capital gains  on 
the sale of an existing house  as a  source of funds  for the purchase of a  new 
one  on the part of existing owner  occupiers.  Note  though that mortgages 
increased in size relative to  income  for both groups.  In table 8  we  compare 
the time path of the incomes  of first time buyers,  previous owner  occupiers 
and of income  from  employment  generally in the British economy.  That  of 
first time  buyers rose more  rapidly than the other two,  confirming the 
suggestion that rising house prices did in fact  squeeze a  significant 
number  of potential owner  occupiers out of the market  entirely.  This 
interpretation of the data receives further  support  from  the fact that 
whereas  in 1969,  57.4%  of all Building Society morL5ages went  to first time 
buyers,  in 1973  this figure  had fallen to 47.2%. 
To  sum  up  then, the picture that  emerges  from  our inspection of the 
data for the period 1969-'73 confirms the  suggestion that the  ownership of 
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and untaxed capital gains  on  a  substantial proportion of the British 
population;  we  have  already noted that over half of British households are 
owner  occupiers.  Not  only were  these benefits subject to no  taxes but  no 
attempt  was  made  to bring them  under the aegis of any prices and  incomes 
policy.  The  inequity between owner  occupiers and other members  of the 
population implicit here is obvious  enough,  and is reason enough for consider-
ing what  kind of policies might  have  prevented the situation arising.  An 
even  stronger reason for taking this particular problem seriously is that, 
when  half of the population have  so  much  to gain from  inflation, it is 
hardly surprising that the political will to bring inflation under control 
is hard to find. 
V.  As  we  have  argued in the last section of this paper,  the housing market 
has  behaved in what  many  would  regard as an  unsatisfactory fashion over the 
last few  years.  It is well worth asking  how  such behaviour might  have  been 
avoided,  not only as  a  matter of historical interest but also in order to 
draw  lessons for future policy. 
One  policy that might  be  suggested would  be to tax capital gains made 
on  the purchase and  sale of houses.  However,  such a  proposal  seems  to us to 
be at best  highly inequitable and at worst  unworkable.  To  begin with, there 
is a  standard problem inherent  in capital gains taxation as to whether taxes 
should be  levied upon  accrual or upon  realisation of a  gain.  To  levy taxes 
on  the accrual of value  of an  owner  occupied house,  when  this is often the 
only major asset  owned  by  a  household,  would,  we  suspect  force realisation 
of the asset  in a  sufficient number  of cases  - particularly among  older 
people  - as to make  a  system of taxation of accruals unworkable.  To  levy 
taxes  on  realisation of capital gains on  houses  however,  would  discriminate 
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the location of their work.  There are already many  disincentives to labour 
mobility in Britain that result  from  the nature of the rental housing market 
and  we  cannot  see that there is any  case for adding to them. 
In any event, the  problems  in the  owner  occupied housing market  in 
Britain arose from  particular causes,  and  we  earlier identified the causes 
in question as  follows:  owner  occupied housing provides an  income  in kind 
that is not subjected to income tax;  income  tax is levied progressively on 
nominal  incomes  so that,. with inflation, the  incentive to take  income  in 
non  taxed forms  increases; finally, the  interest rates at which it was 
possible to borrow for  house purchases were  held at levels which  were  so 
low as to be negative in real terms.  If these factors  were  responsible for 
what  happened  in the owner  occupied housing market,  then a  policy of removing 
them  would  presumably prevent  a  repitition of such problems  in the future. 
Moreover,  their removal,  particularly the last of them,would  bring benefits 
vis-a-vis the control of inflation far beyond  the confines of the owner 
occupied housing market. 
Consider first the exclusion of income  in kind  from  owner  occupation 
from  income  tax.  This is a  relatively recent  phenomenon  in Britain.  Such 
so-called "schedule A"  income  was  taxable until the early 1960's, but taxes 
had not  in fact been levied at anything more  than nominal rates since before 
the  second world war.  The  great difficulty with collecting such a  tax 
arises from the problem of valuing the owner  occupied house  and  then  imputing 
income  to it.  The  only feasible  way  to do  this would  be to rely on  self-
assessment as far as valuing the  house  was  concerned and using a  "rule of 
thumb"  rate of return to impute the  income  accruing from the house.  It 
should be noted that the institution of such a  tax would yield a  considerable 
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the battery of taxes already levied in Britain without anything being 
removed.  The  overall level of income  tax rates could for  example  be  lowered 
as a  result of such a  tax being instituted.  There are many  who  would 
regard this as desirable, but to argue its pros and  cons  does  not  come 
within the provenance of this paper. 
Of  course,  in a  period of inflation, with rising house prices, the 
revenue  from  such a  "Schedule  A"  income  tax would  increase even if real 
income  was  not rising.  It would  operate as a  tax on  inflationary gains. 
This is true, but, as  we  have  pointed out,  the  income  tax as currently 
levied already does  just this to  income  from  other sources.  Thus, to 
institute a  "Schedule  A"  income  tax would  simply equalise the tax treatment 
of income  from  owner  occupation with that of income  from other sources. 
The  progressive nature of the  income  tax as levied at present has given an 
increasing incentive to the ownership  of housing and the institution of this 
extra tax would  remove  the  incentive.  In any event, if the fact that 
inflation increases the real burden of income  taxation is a  source of 
worry,  then the problem is easily enough dealt with  (in principle at least). 
Income  tax regulations can be written in terms of real income  levels instead 
of nominal levels; or, to put  the  same  point another way,  nominal tax rates 
could be  indexed to the cost of living. 
The  third factor which  we  have  identified as a  cause of the particularly 
steep rise in the price of owner  occupied housing in Britain during recent 
years  has  been  the maintenance of low interest rates on mortgages.  Table  4 
speaks for itself in this respect,  (but also  shows,  with the steep  increase 
in rates that finally took place in 1973, that this was  not a  policy that 
could be maintained indefinitely).  Even  the reform of British monetary 
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to give market  forces  a  much  bigger role in the determination of the level 
and  structure of interest rate, made  an explicit exception of building 
societies.  The  interest rates which they charge to borrowers  and  pay to 
lenders were  supposed to be  insulated as far as possible from  competitive 
forces  in order to keep  down  housing costs, particularly for first-time 
buyers. 
We  have  already  seen  how  badly this policy failed.  Low  interest rates 
simply led to high capital values,  and these,  interacting with down-payment 
requirements actually led to increasing difficulties for first time buyers. 
It would  follow  immediately then,  that a  policy of letting interest rates 
find a  higher level would  have  removed  a  major  factor leading to a  higher 
houseprices thus avoiding many  of the difficulties outlined earlier. 
However  this matter goes much  deeper.  We  would  conjecture that the desire 
to maintain low  interest rates for  house  purchase  has  been  a  major  factor 
in producing the expansive monetary policy that has  contributed  so much  to 
generating inflation in Britain.  Why  this should be the case is easy enough 
to see.  The  building societies obtain their funds  by  borrowing from  the 
public.  Although much  of their borrowing is done  from  small  savers  who  do 
not  have  ready access to the whole  of the capital market  they nevertheless 
must  compete  on  the margin with other borrowers.  Any  upward  tendency of 
market  interest rates puts pressure on the building societies because they 
begin to lose funds  in such circumstances.  Their response to this may 
be either to raise both their borrowing and  lending rates, or to engage  in 
morgage  rationing, or a  mixture of the two.  In either case difficulties 
are created for would  be  borrowers.  Thus,  if a  government  wishes to keep 
mortgage  interest rates down  and prevent the  supply of morgages  contracting, 
it must  also take  steps to keep  down  the general level of interest rates. 
216 ' As  is well known,  this can only be  accomplished  through relatively easy 
monetary policy,  a  policy which must  ultimately lead to inflation, and,  as 
expectations of further inflation begin to develop,  to rising interest 
rates. 
In short,  the policy of keeping mortgage  interest rates below a  market 
determined level is inevitably self defeating.  However,  before the 
breakdown  of such a  policy takes place, and it now  has more  or less broken 
down  in Britain, it can have all the adverse effects outlined in the last 
section of this paper.  It is therefore,  we  would  argue,  a  policy to  be 
avoided. 
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HOUSEHOLD  (a)  HOUSEHOLD  (b) 
Income  before Tax  2,500  2,500 
Value  of House  6,000  6,000 
Mortgage  interest payment  0  300 
Taxable  income  1,500  1,200 
Tax  liability  500  1+00 
Imputed  income  from  house  600  600 
Taxable  income  and  imputed 
income  from  house  2,100  1,800 
TABLE  2 
HOUSEHOLD  (a)  HOUSEHOLD  (b) 
Income  before Tax  2,500  2,500 
Value  of House  6,000  6,000 
Imputed  income  from  House  600  600 
Mortgage  interest payment  0  300 
Taxable  Income  2,100  1,800 
Tax  liability  700  600 
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HOUSEHOLD  (a)  HOUSEHOLD  (b) 
Income  before Tax  2,500  2,500 
Value  of House  6,000  6,000 
Mortgage  interest payment  0  300 
Taxable  Income  1,500  1,500 
Tax  liability  500  500 
Taxable  income  plus net 
income  from  House  2,100  1,800 
TABLE  4 
BUILDING  SOCIETY  MORTGAGE  INTEREST  RATES 
Year  Interest rate 
1969  8.5 
1970  8.5 
1971  8.0 
1972  8.5 
1973  11.0 
219 YEAR 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
TABLE  5 
RETAIL  PRICE  INDEX.  AND  INDICES  OF  AVERAGE  PRICE 
OF  HOUSES  BOUGHT  WITH  THE  AID  OF  A BUILDING  SOCIETY 
MORTGAGE  1970  = 100 
RETAIL  PRICES  HOUSE  PRICES  NEW  HOUSES 
93.9  93.3  93.8 
100.0  100.0  100.0 
109.5  113.2  110.0 
117.0  148.2  138.2 
126.8  199.8  191.7 
TABLE  6  (a) 
RATIO  OF  HOUSE  VALUE  TO  INCOME  FOR  HOUSE  PURCHASERS 
YEAR  Ratio of House  Value  to  Income. 
OTHER  HOUSES 
93.0 
100.0 
114.0 
152.0 
203.1 
1st time bu;:ter  Previous owner  occuEier 
1969  2.53  2.73 
1970  2.45  2.69 
1971  2.42  2.70 
1972  2.67  3.26 
1973  2.89  3.82 
220 TABLE  6  (b) 
IMPUTED  INCOME  FROM  HOUSE  AS  PROPORTION  OF  ALLINCOME  AT  VARIOUS 
HYPOTHETICAL  RATES  OF  RETURN. 
5%  10%  15% 
YEAR  1st time  Previous  1st time  Previous  1st time  Previous 
buyer  Owner  buyer  Owner  buyer  Owner 
Occupier  Occupier  Occupier 
1969  .126  .136  .253  .273  .378  .408 
1970  .122  .134  .245  .269  .366  .402 
1971  .121  .135  .242  .270  .363  .405 
1972  .134  .166  .267  .326  .402  .498 
1973  .144  .191  .289  .382  .432  .573 
TABLE  7 
INDICES  OF  INCOMES  OF  HOUSE  PURCHASERS 2  VALUE  OF  HOUSE 
PURCHASED,  AND  SIZE  OF  MORTGAGES.  1970 =  100 
First time buyer  Previous Owner  Occupier 
YEAR  Income  House  price  Mort~a~e  Income  House  price  Mort~a~e 
1969  91.6  94.6  93.5  91.7  92.8  89.8 
1970  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
1971  113.0  111.7  113.0  113.7  114.2  114.3 
1972  129.2  140.5  143.0  126.8  153.6  143.7 
1973  154.8  182.6  176.5  143.8  203.9  162.8 
221 TABLE  8 
INDICES  OF  INCOMES  OF  HOUSE  PURCHASERS  AND  OF  GENERAL  INCOME  FROM 
EMPLOYMENT  FOR  HEADS  OF  HOUSEHOLD  IN  GENERAL.  1970 =  100 
Income  of head 
Income  of 1st  Income  of previous  of Household  from 
YEAR  time purchasers  owner  occupier  employment 
1969  91.6  91.7  88.8 
1970  100.0  100.0  100.0 
1971  113.0  113.7  112.3 
1972  129.2  126.8  127.5 
1973  154.8  143.8  143.5 
Sources: 
In the foregoing  tables all index  numbers pertaining to house 
prices and  incomes of owner  occupiers are based on data taken from 
various  ii.s.sues  of Department of the Environment  "Housing Statistics". 
Data on the Retail Price Index  in table 5,  and  that on  income 
of head of household  from  employment in table 8  cane from the 
National Institute Economic  Review. 
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1.  Introduction. 
It is only recently that economists  (in English-speaking countries 
at least)  have  shown  much  interest in the professions.  The  national 
Prices  Commission  of  the Republic  of  Ireland when  announcing  last 
year  studies of  the  fee  structure of  both the legal  and  architectural 
professions  remarked  that it had  been able  to  find  very little in the 
way  of  economic  studies  of  the professions.  In the United  Kingdom  the 
growing  concern on  the part of  the  authorities  to control  or  to 
influence levels of  wages  and  salaries has  led to  increasing official 
attention being paid  to professional  fees. 
The  main interest  so  far  has  been  in the professions  connected with 
land,  i.e.  architects,  surveyors,  estate agents  and  the  legal profession. 
There  has  also been  some  interest in the various branches  of  the medical 
profession but,  in Britain at least,  these present different problems 
in that most  medical practitioners are wholly or  largely dependent  for 
their earnings  on  the state. 
That  the professions  of  the  land  should attract attention is not 
surprising.  In most  cases  earnings  are derived  from  fees  expressed as 
a  percentage of property values.  This  means  that earnings will,  in 
general,  rise in line with the cost of  living or,  as  happened  recently, 
may  rise faster  than the cost of  living if property values  are rising 
in real  terms.  However,  the position is not  as  simple  as  this  as  the 
volume  of work  tends  to vary appreciably over  the  trade cycle.  In the 
U.K.  partly by  accident  and  partly by  design cycles  in construction 
have  had  greater amplitude  than cycles  in national  income  and  this has 
224 had  a  significant effect on  the earnings  of  the professions  concerned. 
Furthermore it is necessary to distinguish an increase in gross 
fees  from  an  increase in the earnings of  individual practitioners in 
cases where  there is freedom of entry into the profession.  In most 
cases  there  is not  complete  freedom  of entry and  by  law or by virtue of 
other restraints certain jobs may  only be  performed  by qualified  and 
registered practitioners.  In  such cases  the  size of  the profession 
can only increase in the  long run.  However,  in some  cases  there are 
few  or no  restrictions at all and  new  entrants can enter the profession, 
as  has  happened with estate agency,  or outsiders  can compete with 
established professionals  over  a  certain range  of  services.  Thus  a 
whole  range  of  skilled and  semi-skilled book-keepers,  the tax-specialists 
of  the clearing banks  and  management  consultants are all competing for 
what  once  would  have  been considered  accountancy work. 
Very  few,  if any,  professions are without  any  outside competition. 
Even  the  legal profession much  of whose  work  is by  statute reserved  to 
baristers ot to solicitors finds  itself in competition with outsiders 
for  some  of its business.  Persons doing their own  conveyancing  and  the 
trustee and  executor departments  of  the large banks  are examples. 
Having  said this it remains  the  case that this outside competition 
has  seldom been met  by  any  reduction in fees  on  the part of  the established; 
where  fees  have  risen faster  than other earnings  this has  usually 
resulted  in excess  capacity and/or  competition through the provision of 
more  services.  Estate agency is a  good  example  of this. 
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characteristic of most  of  the professions and  is worth  commenting  upon. 
Professional men  hold  to  the view  that it is the giving of  a  personal 
service to each individual client without  regard  to  the  reward 
involved in the particular case that is the basis of professionalism. 
They  much  prefer that fees  be  prescribed  from outside as it were  rather 
than their having  to set their own  charges  or  to negotiate case by  case. 
To  the onlooker  such views  appear  suspect  and  it is easy  to criticise 
them on  various  grounds;  but here we  are  concerned  solely with the fact 
that  they exist.  That  they do  imparts  a  rigidity to  the professional 
scales  and  where  the application of  these  scales results in increasing 
turnover  this may  result in greater  (and  excess)  capacity and/or 
competition on  service rather  than price. 
There  is some  surrepticious price-cutting but  this in itself is 
less surprising than is the extent  to which established scales of  fees 
are  adhered  to.  Since neither excess  capacity nor  the provision of 
more  elaborate service  (without  any  indication that the public would, 
if given a  choice,  wish to purchase  such service)  is desirable there 
would  appear  to be  a  role for  the state in regulating professional  fees. 
However,  such a  role raises many  problems. 
Chief  among  these is the difficulty in measuring professional 
services.  It would  be difficult, if not  impossible  to measure  the output 
of  a  doctor or  a  lawyer.  It is one  of  the  traditional defences  of  a 
fixed  scale of  fees  and  of restriction of entry that with many  professional 
services  the  client cannot  judge the quality of  service he  receives.  Not 
only can  the  client not  do  so  but civil servants are unlikely to  be  able 
to do  so either.  Attempts  to regulate by  statute professional fees 
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and  where  quality varies greatly among  practitioners.  This  is not  to 
say  that it could not  be  done  but rather that it would  be very difficult. 
Attempts  to measure  service  on  a  time  basis  provide  no  solution. 
Some  practitioners will be  quicker  than others  and  there is no  reason 
why  they  should  in consequence earn less for  any  given piece of work. 
Further,  payment  on  a  time basis reduces  the  incentive to  seek quicker 
methods  of  doing  things. 
Not  only are professional  services difficult to  judge as  to quality 
but  they are infinitely varying  in detail and  very often depend  on skill 
and  experience  the value of which is also difficult to assess.  Attempts 
at close control  of  fees  by  government  are  likely to produce  numerous 
problems  and  anomalies  and  are also  likely to  be difficult to 
enforce.  Existing scales of  fees  laid down  by professional  bodies 
give rise to many  problems  as it is but  there are not  totally rigid 
downwards  and  of  course are not at all rigid upwards:  higher  fees  can 
be  charged for  greater  service. 
Government  control of professional fees  would  be difficult but not 
impossible.  Moreover  the degree  of difficulty would  vary from 
profession.  It should not  be ruled out.  However,  to justify detailed 
controls it would  be necessary to  show  that professional earnings,  in 
the  absence  of  such controls were  likely to rise faster  than other 
earnings.  In general past evidence  suggests  that this is unlikely. 
It is to  this  that we  now  turn.  We  shall begin with the professions 
of  the  land,  architects,  surveyors,  engineers  and  estate agents. 
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2.  Architects'  Fees. 
Architects  are  in the main remunerated  by  a  scale  which yields 
a  fee  of  6%  of  the cost of building work  for  which  they are responsible. 
A higher  fee  is chargeable for  small contracts  (under  £  25,000)  and 
for alterations and  improvements  to existing buildings whilst  a  lower 
fee  applies  in the case of  repetitive work.  However,  the  amount  of 
work  being  remunerated at  6%  of  total building costs  is a  sufficiently 
high proportion of total work  that if we  assume  this  to be  the  sole rate 
of  commission we  shall get  an  accurate estimate of  architects'  earnings. 
Since there is then for  practical purposes  no  tapering of  the 
scale architects'  fees,  for  a  given amount  of work will rise in line with 
construction costs.  An  index of  these is given below for  the years  1963-
1973  along with  index figures  of retail prices  and  average  earnings  over 
the  same  period. 
Cost  of  New  Construction 
(1970  =  100) 
75 
84 
88 
93 
100 
108 
122 
150* 
*Provisional. 
TABLE  1 
Retail Price  Index 
(January  1962=100) 
103.6 
107.0 
112.1 
116.5 
119.4 
125.0 
131.8 
140.2 
153.4 
166.3 
179.4 
228 
Index of Average  Earnings 
(January  1966=100) 
84.0 
90.3 
97.0 
103.3 
106.7 
115.3 
124.3 
139.8 
155.2 
175.2 
198.4 Source.  Cost  of  New  Construction from  housing  and  construction 
statistics; Retail price index from  the Monthly  digest of statistics; 
Index of  average earnings  from the Department  of Employment  and 
Productivity gazette. 
From  the table it can be  seen that  over  the ten-year period 
construction costs and  hence architects'  earnings  for  a  given amount  of 
work  have  risen by  100%.  This  compares  with a  rise of  73.2%  in the 
cost of  living as measured  by  the retail price index and  a  rise of  136.2% 
in average earnings.  Thus  whilst the cost of architectural services 
has  risen faster  than other costs  earnings of architects have  been rising 
by  less  than earnings generally.  It would  be  interesting to  look at 
the  rates of  change  of  these figures  for different  sub-periods within 
the  ten-year period.  However,  rather than do  this we  shall  look at 
two  sub-periods,  those for  1963-1970  and  1970-1973 using a  different 
set of data:  that produced  by  the Royal  Institute of British Architects 
and  arising from its triennial  survey of architects'  earnings. 
Table  2  below  shows  median earnings of principals in private 
practice,  salaried architects in private practice and  other salaried 
architects for  the years  1964,  1967,  1970  and  1973.  This  shows  that 
for all three categories of architect  income  rose faster  over  the whole 
period than did  the cost of  living  (though in the case of salaried 
architects in private practice not much  faster)  but  that in all three 
cases  the rise in income  was  less than the  increase in average earnings. 
This  confirms  the picture presented by  table 1. 
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Principals in  Salaried Architects  Other  Salaried 
Private Practice  in Private Practice  Architects 
1964  2,700  1,714  1,800 
1967  3,021  2,077  2,371 
1970  3,613  2,497  2,856 
1973  5,641  3,200  3,752 
Source:  Royal  Institute of  British Architects Journal,  June  1974. 
The  rates of  increase of  earnings  for  the  sub-periods  1964-1970 
and  1970-1973 are  given  in table 3  below along with the  changes  in 
the retail price index of  average  earnings  for the  same  sub-periods.  The 
table also includes  the rates of  change  over  the whole  period for all the 
indices. 
TABLE  3.  RATES  of  CHANGE  of ARCHITECTS  EARNINGS, 
RETAIL  PRICES  AND  AVERAGE  EARNINGS 
Principals  Salaried  Other  Salaried  Retail Price  Index of 
in Private  Architects  architects  Index  average 
Practice  in Private  earnings 
Practice 
%  %  %  %  % 
1964-'70  34  46  59  31  55 
1970-'73  56  28  31  28  42 
1964-'73  109  87  108  68  120 
This  table  shows  that in the years  1970-'73 when  construction costs 
rose rapidly architects who  were  principals in private practice did  see 
their  income  rising faster  than the national average,  salaried architects 
did not.  The  rise for  the principals however  came  after a  period of 
virtual stagnation in real earnings.  There  is nothing in any  of  the 
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sustained period of  time  enabled  them  to profit by  inflation. 
If,  notwithstanding the  above  evidence it were  desired  to control 
architects'  earnings  then this could  only be  done  by  the authorities 
turning  the existing scale which is  a  scale of minimum  charges  into a 
scale of maximum  charges  and  then  reducing  this  to offset  increases in 
construction costs.  This  would  raise considerable problems  in that it 
would  rule out  departures  from  the  scale in an  upward  direction,  which 
occur  now  when  an architect  takes  on  extra work  such as  landscaping. 
If exceptions  were  made  to  allow such extra work  to  continue  the 
likelihood of  the  controls being avoided  would  increase. 
The  Monopolies  Commission is currently investigating the business 
of  architect including  the  fee  structure.  There  is  some  feeling both 
inside  and  outside the profession that this will  lead  to either the 
abolition of,  or at  least,  a  reduction in the  importance  of  the existing 
scale of  fees. 
3.  Quantity Surveyors'  Earnings. 
The  job  of  quantity surveyor may  vary  from  contract  to contract 
and  from  firm to firm.  At  its simplest it involves  drawing  up  a  bill 
of  quantities  of materials necessary for  a  building contract  together 
with estimates of  cost but  in addition the quantity surveyor may  do  the 
ordering of  the material  and  may  also exercise  some  supervision of  the 
actual construction.  Fees  vary dependent  upon work  done.  In the great 
majority of  cases  however  the  fee  is expressed as  a  percentage of total 
231 building costs  and  this usually amounts  to  2-2!%  of  such costs.  Hence 
for  unchanged  volume  and  type of work  the earnings  of  quantity surveyors 
will rise in line with changes  in building costs. 
From  table 1  above  we  saw  that construction costs had  risen by  100% 
over  the decade to  1973.  This would  have produced  a  rise in quantity 
surveyors'  earnings of the  same  percentage;  a  rise that may  be  compared 
to  the  increase in retail prices of  73.2%  and  in average  earnings  of 
136.2%  over  the  same  period.  If we  just take  the years  1970-'73 we 
find that earnings  rose slightly faster  than the average  (50%  as  opposed 
to  42%)  but  this was  only a  partial compensation for  increases in 
earnings  having  lagged  behind  the average during the preceding seven 
years. 
As  with architects it is apparent  that a  fee  scale based  upon  a 
percentage of building costs has  not produced  a  secular rise in 
quantity surveyors'  earnings  relative to other earnings. 
4.  Consulting Engineers'  Earnings. 
Consulting engineers  perform various  services  and  there are 
several different specialist types  of  engineer.  The  conditions of 
engagement  published  by  the Association of  Consulting Engineers  gives 
separate scales of fees  for  each of  the  following  classes  of work:  -
1)  the design and  supervision of civil, mechanical  and 
electrical works; 
2)  the design  and  supervision of structural engineering work  in 
buildings  and  other  structures; 
3)  the design and  supervision of engineering  systems  in buildings 
232 and  other projects; 
4)  structural engineering services in connection with industrialised 
building. 
The  four  scales are all expressed as  a  percentage of  the value of 
the contract in connection with which  engineering advice is being given. 
In the main  the  scales are  ~apered, that is to say  the percentage declines 
as  the value  of the contract rises.  Scales  1-3 are similar,  being 
identical at low  levels but differing in the extent  to which  the 
percentage declines with higher  contract values.  Table  4  below  shows 
the fees which would  accrue  to a  consulting engineer according to 
scales  1-3 for  a  range of different contract values. 
TABLE  4.  CONSULTING  ENGINEERS  FEES  FOR  SELECTED  CONTRACT  VALUES 
Value  of  Civil, mechanical  Structural engineering  Engineering 
contract  and  electrical  work  (scale  2)  systems  (scale  3) 
work  (scale 1) 
£  £  £  £ 
10,000  1,100  1,100  1,100 
25,000  2,450  2,450  2,450 
50,000  4,325  4,325  4,450 
100,000  7,575  7,575  8,200 
200,000  13,575  13,575  15,200 
500,000  30,075  28,575  35,450 
1,000,000  55,075  53,575  69,200 
2,000,000  100,075  103,575 
4,000,000  185,075  203,575 
8,000,000  345,075  403,575 
Source:  Association of Consulting Engineers;  Conditions of  Engagement. 
233 Table  1  above  showed  that construction costs have  risen over  the 
past decade  by  100%.  Table  5  below  shows  the percentage  increase in 
fees  arising under  scale  1  from  an  increase in the value of  the contract 
of  100%.  The  left-hand column  shows  the  contract value after the 
increase hence  the  increase in fees  shown  against  £  20.000 is the increase 
in fees  earned  from  work  on  a  contract worth  £  20.000 as  opposed  to one 
worth  £  10.000 and  so  on. 
TABLE  5.  PERCENTAGE  INCREASE  IN  ENGINEERS'  FEES  AS  A RESULT  OF  A 
100%  INCREASE  IN  CONTRACT  VALUES 
increase in contract value  to  fee  percentage  increase 
£  £  £ 
20,000  2,000  82 
50,000  4,325  77 
100,000  7,575  75 
200,000  13,575  79 
400,000  24,575  81 
1,000,000  55,075  83 
2,000,000  100,075  82 
4,000,000  185,075  85 
8,000,000  345,075  86 
The  percentage  increases may  be  compared  with the  increase of  73% 
in the retail price  index and  the increase of  136%  in the  index of  average 
earnings which  occured  over  the  same  period.  Such  comparisons  show  as 
in the case of architects and  of quantity surveyors  that engineers 
earnings  have  not been rising relative to other earnings  over  the past 
decade.  Table  5  shows  increases in fees  arising from  the application 
of  scale 1,  the percentage increases generated by  scales  2  and  3  would 
be  higher but would  in all cases be  significantly below  the rise in 
national  average  earnings. 
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earnings  of  other professional groups.  According  to  a  survey conducted 
in summer  1973  by  the council  of Engineering  Institutions, forty per 
cent  of all chartered engineers  earned  less than £  3,000  per  annum 
and  70%  earned  less  than £  4,000. 
5.  Estate Agents'  Earnings 
The  overwhelming majority of estate agents  in the United Kingdom 
adhere  to one of  two  scales of  charges  for  the sale of all immovable 
property.  (Sales  of  immovable  property or real estate constitute the 
main  form  of business;  saies of chattels or of  livestock are relatively 
unimportant;  valuations  and  surveys  are an  important  source of business 
for  only a  small  number  of  agents.  They  are discussed below.)  The 
scale recommended  by  the  three  important professional bodies for  all 
classes of  immovable  property other than private dwelling houses 
situated within England  and  Wales  provides  for  a  fee  of  2~% of  the 
selling price of  the property up  to  a  value of  £  5,000  and  1~% thereafter. 
This  fee is the one usually charged  in the  south of England,  in Wales 
and  in Northern Ireland.  In the north of  England  a  fee  of  2%  of selling 
price for  all values  is  common.  In Scotland estate agency is only 
beginning  to become  widespread;  until now  most  sales  of  dwellings  have 
been arranged by  solicitors at  lower fees  than those mentioned  above. 
Since  1971  it has been illegal for  any  professional  association to 
enforce or to recommend  fees  for  the  sale of  private dwellings  in England 
and  Wales.  This prohibition resulted  from  the  implementation of  a 
d 
.  .  .  •  .  1  recommen  at1on  1n  a  report by  the Monopol1es  Comm1sS10n  The  evidence 
is however  that it has  had  little effect in practice and  that the great 
1  A report  on  the  supply of certain services by estate agents. 
H.M.S.O.  1969. 
235 majority of estate agents  are  continuing to  charge as before.  Apart 
from  a  few  isolated cases of  agents advertising reduced  fees  the only 
notable  change  in practice in recent years  represents  an increase in 
fees:  some  southern agents  have  adopted  the north-of-England fee  scale 
now  that property prices are high enough  for  this to be profitable. 
Table  6  below gives  average  house  prices  over  the  decade  to  1973 
together with the  amounts  of  commission  that would  result from  sales of 
such average priced houses when  calculated according to  the  two  different 
scales referred to above.  To  facilitate comparisons  the retail price 
index  and  the  index of  average  earnings is reproduced  from  table  1  above. 
TABLE  6.  AVERAGE  HOUSE  PRICES  AND  ESTATE  AGENTS'  COMMISSION 
Index of Average 
Average  House  Commission  Retail Price  Index  Earnings 
Years  Prices  2!-1!%  scale  2%  scale  (January  1962=100)  (January  1922=100) 
£  £  £ 
1963  3,195  80  64  103.6  84.0 
1964  3,433  86  69  107.0  90.3 
1965  3,768  94  74  112.1  97.0 
1966  4,030  101  81  116.5  103.3 
1967  4,283  107  86  119.4  106.7 
1968  4,499  112  90  125.0  115.3 
1969  4,819  120  96  131.8  124.3 
1970  5,128  127  103  140.2  139.8 
1971  5,775  137  116  153.4  155.2 
1972  7,398  161  148  164.3  175.2 
1973  10,101  202  202  179.4  198.4 
Source:  Average  house  prices  from  Housing  and  construction statistics, 
Retail Price  Index  and  Index of Average Earnings  see  table 1. 
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Over  the ten-year period house prices rose by  216%.  Those  agents 
charging a  constant  2%  commission would  have  seen their  income  rise by 
the  same  percentage for  a  constant volume  of business;  those charging on 
the  reducing scale would  have  seen their income  rise by  150%  !2!_! 
constant volume  of business.  The  cost of selling a  house  has  thus risen 
appreciably over  the  last decade  and  estate agents'  incomes  appear  to 
have  risen everywhere  faster  than the average  and  in the north of England 
by  nearly  60%  faster  than the average. 
The  rise in house  prices was  not uniform over  the decade.  If we 
study the figures  in table 6  we  find that house prices were  rising steadily 
but unspectacularly until  1970  but  that in the three years  1970-'73 they 
all but doubled.  Table  7  below gives  the percentage  increase of  the 
five series of table 6  for  the  two  sub-period 1963-'70 and  1970-'73. 
TABLE  7.  PERCENTAGE  RATES  of  INCREASE  of  HOUSE  PRICES  AND  ESTATE 
AGENTS'  COMMISSIONS 
Average  house 
Prices 
61 
97 
Commission  Retail Price Index 
2i-li% scale  2%  scale 
59  61  35 
59  97  28 
Index of Average 
Earnings 
67 
42 
In the period prior to  1970  the cost of  selling a  house was  rising 
faster than the general cost of  living as  expressed by  the retail price 
index but  the  incomes  of estate agents were  not rising at a  faster rate 
than the national average.  In the  three years  from  1970  however  house 
prices  shot  up  and  the absolute cost of  selling a  house  not  only rose 
far faster than  the cost of  living but  incomes  of estate agents rose 
much  faster than average earnings. 
237 The  three years  in question were  exceptional.  House  prices  since 
late 1973  up  to  the  time of writing  (October  1974)  have  remained  static 
or fallen slightly in money  terms  and  thus  have  fallen significantly in 
real  terms. 
In general  the trend is for private dwellings  to appreciate in real 
terms  and  accordingly the total  income  accruing to estate agents  for  a 
given volume  of  business rises faster  than the cost of  living,  though in 
the  long-run it may  not  exceed the rate of rise of  incomes  generally. 
Unfortunately the value of  these remarks  is lessened by their being 
no  index of volume  of business  in private dwellings nor  any  indices of 
volume  or value of transactions  in commercial  property.  Statements  by 
representatives of  the profession suggest  that changes  in the volume  of 
business may  be  large relative to  those usually experienced by  other 
professions.  During  times  of rising prices  and  sellers'  markets  less 
property is given  to  agents  and  more  is sold privately.  When  it becomes 
more  difficult to sell a  higher proportion of  the properties  on  offer are 
given to estate agents.  The  volume  of business  thus  has  a  tendancy to 
move  inversely with trends  in prices.  This  adds  weight  to  the view taken 
above  that one  should  give  less attention to  exceptional years  and  more 
to secular  trends. 
Commercial  business also  appears  to vary greatly in volume.  This 
business is not  important  for  the majority of  estate agents  but  is very 
important for  a  small  number  of  large specialised firms.  There  we  however 
no  official indicators of volume  or value  of  commercial  transactions. 
Unofficial  assessments  of rental values  of office  space  tend  to  suggest 
that this has  grown  less fast  than the price of private dwellings  over  the 
238 last ten years  in most  parts of  the country.  Central London  is on 
important exception however  and  is clearly a  special case. 
The  same  firms  who  deal  in commercial  property also earn important 
sums  of money  from valuations  and  surveys.  In the  absence of  any  reliable 
general  indicators of  commercial  property values  we  cannot  calculate any 
changes  in income  from this source.  However,  we  may  note  that  the scale 
of  fees  in operation is sharply  tapered  such that it is unlikely that 
incomes  from valuing and  surveying would  for  a  constant amount  of work  be 
rising in real terms.  Table  8  below gives  the scale of charges  for 
valuation as  laid down  by  the  Royal  Institute of Chartered Surveyors  and 
the  Incorporated Society of Values  and Auctioneers. 
TABLE  8.  FEES  FOR  VALUATION  OF  FREEHOLD  PROPERTY 
Value  of Property 
up  to  £  1.500 
£  1.500 - £  12.500 
over  £  12.500 
Percentage Fee 
1.5 
0.5 
0.25 
Source:  Royal  Institution of chartered surveyors;  Professional 
charges. 
6.  Solicitors'  Earnings 
The  remuneration of  solicitors is heavily influenced by  government 
action in that  charges  for  certain classes of work  are controlled by 
statuteand all charges  are potentially subject  to  taxation,  i.e. being 
reviewed  by  an officially constituted body  to  see whether  they are  'fair 
and  resonable'.  No  recent figures  of  earnings  of  solicitors are available 
but  a  great deal of  information relating to  the middle  and  late 1960's 
was  provided by  the Prices  and  Incomes  Board.  We  shall first of all 
239 summarize  this  information and  then discuss  the methods  of  charging of 
solicitors including  some  recent  changes  in these. 
Table  9  below is reproduced  from  report  no  54  of  the National  Board 
for Prices  and  Incomes;  the  remuneration of solicitors.  It shows  the 
earnings of solicitors and  members  of certain other professions for  1956 
and  for  1966;  it also gives  the percentage change  in these earnings  over 
the roughly  ten-year period and  compares  these with changes  in average 
earnings  of manual  workers  and  salaried employees.  The  rise in retail 
prices over  the period was  37%. 
TABLE  9.  COMPARISONS  OF  CERTAIN  INCOMES  1956  - 1966 
1955/56  1966  Per  cent 
Solicitors  increase 
Principals  in private practice  mean  £2,678  £4,870  82 
medium  £2,212  £4,180  88 
lower  quartile  £1,448  £2,640  82 
upper quartile  £3,348  £6,135  83 
Employed  in commerce 
and  industry  mean  £1,720  £3,545  106 
Employed  in law firms  mean  £  815  £1,630  100 
Architects 
Principals in private practice  mean  £2,393  £4,102  71 
medium  £1,772  £2,996  69 
Employed  in private practice  medium  £  802  £2,075  159 
Employed  elsewhere  medium  £  941  £2,366  151 
Doctors 
Principals in NHS  general 
practice  mean  £1,975  90  (estimate) 
Dentists 
Principals in general practice  mean  £2,182  £3,300  51 
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Average  weekly earnings  of manual 
workers  (Oct.  1955-0ct.  1966) 
Average  earnings of  salaried employees 
(Oct.  1955-0ct.  1966) 
Per  cent 
increase 
84 
86 
Source:  National  Board  for Prices and  Incomes,  report  no  54;  Cmnd  3529. 
In the decade  up  to  1966  the earnings of solicitors in private 
practice rose  by  almost exactly the  same  amount  as did the earnings of 
manual  workers  and  salaried employees.  Compared  to other professionals 
the rise does  not  appear  exorbitant.  The  earnings  of  employed  solicitors 
(not  subject  to official controls)  rose faster than the earnings of 
solicitors working  in their  own  practice. 
A later report  by  the Prices  and  Incomes  Board  showed  that between 
the years  1966  and  1968  the mean  earnings  of  solicitors rose by  10%. 
During  the  same  two  years  the retail price index rose by  7.5%  and  the 
index of average earnings  by  12%.  Again there is nothing to  suggest  any 
excessive  increase in solicitors'  remuneration.  There  are no  later 
figures  available. 
The  work  undertaken by  solicitors can be divided  into contentious 
(i.e.  which may  involve court action)  and  non-contentious.  In principle 
charges for  contentious work  are regulated by  Rule  Committees  of which 
there are  one  for  each different  type of court.  The  initial object of 
this control was  to  limit the costs which could  be  imposed  upon  the 
unsuccessful party in a  litigation.  Such costs determined according  to 
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for  a  long  time  extra charges  have  been  levied by many  solicitors and 
it has  been  common  to refer  to  'solicitor and  own  client costs',  these 
exceeding the party and  party costs. 
According to the  second  report of  the National  Board  for Prices  and 
Income  on  the remuneration of  solicitors  (Cmnd  4217)  this practice of 
charging extra costs  had  become  almost  universal.  And  whilst  such costs 
might  be  formally justified in terms  of extra work  over  and  above  that 
strictly necessary it was  clear that in the main they represented  the 
informal  revising upward  of  a  scale of  charges  held  to be out-of-date  and 
uneconomic.  That  the  charges were  so viewed  was  further  evidenced by 
growing  numbers  of  solicitors who  chose not  to undertake  county court 
work. 
The  National  Board  for Prices  and  Incomes  recommended  a  substantial 
increase in the scale of  charges  for  contentious business  and  expressed 
the  hope  that this would  lead to a  decline in the habit of  charging 
above  the scale.  From our point of view  the most  significant thing here 
is the evidence of the difficulties that arise with imposed  scales of 
charges.  If these do  not  seem fair to practitioners  then they either 
decline work  (a far more  drastic step  than quoting  a  high price)  or find 
ways  in which to make  supplementary charges.  Given  the personal-service 
nature of professional work  and  the  infinite variety in the details of 
individual cases it would  probably not  be  too difficult to provide  a 
justification for  such supplementary charges. 
Of  the non-contentious business of  solicitors little is now  controlled 
directly although there is still a  requirement  that charges be  'fair and 
242 reasonable'.  Prior to January 1st 1973  there was  an official scale 
for  conveyancing work.  Although this was  a  tapered  scale  (charges  rose 
by  a  smaller percentage than property prices)  it did  ensure  that 
earnings  from  conveyancing work  rose  steadily over  the 1960's.  The 
National  Board  for  Prices  and  Incomes  found  these earnings  to be  excessive 
and  advocated  a  new  and  reduced  scale of fees.  The  recommendation was 
adopted  and  a  new  scale was  introduced  in early 1971.  It was  however 
st  abolished as  from  January  1  1973  and  solicitors became  free  to set 
their own  fee  subject  to  this being  'fair and  reasonable'.  If a  client 
objects  to a  solicitors bill for  non-contentions work  he  is entitled to 
ask that a  certificate be  obtained  from  the  Law  Society stating what 
would  be  a  'fair and  reasonable'  fee  for  the work  in question.  Should 
the  fee  advanced  by  the  Law  Society be  less  than that originally asked 
by  the  solicitor the client is only  liable to pay this  smaller fee. 
As  an illustration of  the many  factors  which  have  to  be  taken into 
account  in seeking  to assess what  is a  just fee it is worth quoting  from 
the Solicitors'  Remuneration Order  of  1972.  This,  dealing with charges 
for non-contentious business asserts that solicitors  should  charge  'such 
sum  as  may  be  fair and  reasonable  having  regard  to all the  circumstances 
of  the case  and  in particular to -
(I)  the  complexity of  the matter or  the difficulty or novelty 
of  the questions raised; 
(II)  the skill, labour,  specialised knowledge  and  responsibility 
involved; 
(III)  the time  spent  on  the business; 
(IV)  the number  and  importance of  the documents  prepared or perused, 
without  regard  to  length; 
(V)  the place where  and  the circumstances  in which  the business 
or  any part  thereof is transacted; 
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(VII)  whether  any  land  involved  is registered  land within the 
meaning  of  the Land  Registration Act.  1925;  and 
(VIII)  the  importance  of  the matter to the client.' 
Detailed  though this catalogue of  circumstances may  be it is still 
the  case that what  is fair  and  reasonable is and  can only be  a  subjective 
notion. 
In conclusion we  would  say that control of  solicitors charges  is 
not  an  easy exercise.  Control  already exists in one  form  or another but 
as  the National  Board  for Prices and  Incomes  found  in the late 1960's 
this was  not necessarily effective.  There is no  evidence  to  suggest  that 
solicitors'  earnings  have  in the main  been rising at a  rate which might 
be  considered excessive.  If some  control over higher  earnings were 
desired however  this might best be  limited to the  larger partnership 
(and it is generally here that  the highest  incomes  are earned)  and  be 
based  upon  some  restriction of profit margins.  This possibility is 
developed  further  in the next  section in relation to accountants'  earnings. 
7.  Accountants'  Earnings. 
Very  little can be  said about  accountants  earnings  and  this for  two 
reasons,  accountants,  almost  alone  among  professions working  in private 
practice have  no  official scales of fees.  Charges  are a  matter  for  the 
individual or  firm in question and  the professional bodies neither  impose 
nor  recommend  scales  of  fees.  Secondly  since chartered accountants,  in 
common  with most  other professionals,  cannot  form  limited liability 
companies,  they are not  obliged to publish their own  accounts  and  thus 
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not published  any  information on  levels of  remuneration. 
In general most  accountants  appear  to charge  for  their services on 
a  time basis  and  one  would  expect  the  range  of hourly rates  (for persons 
of different experience  and  qualification)  to move  both with changes  in 
the  cost of living and with the  supply of  and  demand  for  accountants 
services.  In recent  years  the  impression given by various  pronouncements 
by  practitioners is that  the demand  for  accounting  services has  grown 
rapidly and  has  permitted a  steady increase in earnings.  Various press 
reports confirm this  impression though reliable figures  are hard  to 
come  by.  A report  in the magazine Accountancy Age  in August  1974 
suggested  that earnings were  rising in the  second  quarter of  1974  at 
annual  rates of  between 18  and  36%.  The  same  report  found  a  very wide 
dispersion of earnings  amongst  accountants:  average earnings of accountants 
in the 40  - 44  age  group were  reported  to be  f  4.165  but  the difference 
between highest  and  lowest  salaries was  f  6.500. 
The  recent  increase in the demand  for  the  services of  accountants  and 
the resulting rise in accountants  earnings  have  led to a  large increase 
in the numbers  entering the profession.  In time  this may  be  expected  to 
moderate  the rate of  growth of  earnings.  Figures  supplied by  the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants  of England  and  Wales  as  to their current 
membership  and  given below in table 10  indicate a  rapid expansion of  the 
number  of practicing accountants  in the near future. 
Very  little is known  definitely about  accountants'  earnings but it 
should be pointed out  that accountants  are  less protected in their work 
than other professions.  This may  explain the absence of  any official 
245 enquiries into accountancy.  The  only work  reserved  by  statute to 
qualified accountants  is  the audit  of  the  accounts of public  limited 
comparies.  For  the rest  the work  is open  to all and  accountants  are 
in competition for  their business.  Professional earnings may  be  expected 
to  respond  to market  forces more  immediately  than in most  other professions 
TABLE  10.  MEMBERSHIP  OF  THE  INSTITUTE  OF  CHARTERED  ACCOUNTANTS 
OF  ENGLAND  AND  WALES 
Members  practicing as  accountants 
Members  working  in industry,  commerce,  etc. 
Total 
Total  student membership 
14.074 
31.573 
45.647 
26.000 
Source:  Institute of  Chartered Accountants  of England  and  Wales. 
It would  clearly be difficult for  any  government  to control the 
charges  of accountants.  The  heterogeneity of  the work  done,  the 
frequent  uncertainty as  to  how  difficult work will be  before it is 
undertaken and  the element of  skill and  experience attaching to individual 
practitioners would  all make  any detailed control very  hard  to operate. 
A possible  line of  approach would  be  to  limit profit margins  in the 
larger partnership.  This would  not be without its difficulties and  it 
would  involve the  disclosu~by partnerships  of  their earnings.  It would 
also be  inapplicable to sole proprietors and  many  small  firms  where  any 
limitation on  earnings would  be more  likely to reduce effort than 
charges.  The  highest earnings are generally believed to be  in the larger 
firms  and  much  of  these are in the nature of profit  from  running  an 
(unincorporated)  business rather  than from  the practice of  own 
professional skills.  Some  control of profit margins  for  larger firms 
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have  fewer  complications  than any  attempt  to draw  up  and  umpose  a  scale 
of maximum  charges. 
8.  Medical Professional Earnings 
The  medical professions  include doctors  (of  whom  there are  several 
classes)  dentists,  opticians,  a  whole  range  of medical  technicians, 
specialists in certain categories of medicine  and  hospital nursing staff. 
Examples  of professions coming  within these latter categories are 
radiographers,  physiother apists,  chiropodists  and  nurses.  The  reason 
for  treating all of  these disparate professions  together is that nowadays 
in the U.K.  the vast majority of members  of all of  these professions are 
salaried employees  of the State - even if in some  cases  the word  salary 
is not  used  as  unbecoming  to professional dignity. 
In almost all cases  the  earnings· of  the members  of  the medical 
professions  (apart  from  earnings  from private practice)  are determined  by 
national bodies,  for  the most  part Whitley Councils.  These  are bodies 
composed  of  representatives  of the staff concerned  and  of  representatives 
of  the authorities.  The  earnings of doctors  and  dentists is dealt with 
separately by  an  independent body  currently under  the  chairmanship of 
Lord  Halsbury.  This  body  was  set up  in 1971  and  is similar to the 
review bodies  covering the remuneration of members  of  the  armed  forces, 
senior civil servants  and  certain other  special groups.  It replaces a 
previous  review body  for  the  remuneration of doctors  and  dentists under 
Lord  Kindesley which resigned in 1970  following  the rejection by  the 
Government  of its proposed  salary increases for  that year. 
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covering most  categories  and  grades  of workers within the public sector 
other than  the nationalized industries)  and  of  having  a  special review 
body  for  doctors  and  dentists is to  avoid direct political influence in 
the  fixing of  the  remuneration of  the  employees  of  the  government. 
However,  public-sector employees  cannot escape  from  the  influence of 
official economic  policy and  in the past various  awards  recommended  for 
medical  personnel  have  been  reduced  or  postponed  by  governments  of  the day. 
Conversely when  particular groups  of workers  have  protested sufficiently 
about  their earnings  special ad  hoc  committees  have  been  set  up  to  consider 
the alleged  grievances outside  the established machinery  for  fixing pay. 
The  Halsbury Committee  on  the  pay  and  conditions  of  nurses  and  midwives 
of  1974  is an  example  of  such ad  hoc  committees. 
It is clear then that  there is no  reason for members  of medical 
professions  to profit or  to  lose  from  inflation any  more  than other  groups 
in society.  Nor  would  there  seem  to  be  any difficulty in applying an 
incomes  policy to  them given that it is the state which is paying  the 
salaries.  Indeed  in the past  there has  been a  general belief that 
earnings  of  nurses  and  other hospital staff have  been held  down  by 
incomes  policies which have  been applied  to public-sector  employees  but 
not  applied effectively to  employees  in the private sector. 
Over  the  long-run doctors  and  dentists  earnings  have  in most  cases 
risen in line with or  faster  than  average earnings.  The  following  table 
is  taken  from  the  supplement  to  the British Medical  Journal  of  1970. 
248 TABLE  11.  PERCENTAGE  INCREASES  IN  DOCTORS'  REMUNERATION  1960  - 1970 
Average  General Practitioner 
House  Officer  (first year) 
Senior House  Officer minimum 
II  II  II  maximum 
Registrar minimum 
II  maximum 
Senior registrar minimum 
II  II  maximum 
Consultant  (basic  scale} minimum 
II  II  II  maximum 
Retail Price Index 
Change  in Average  Earnings  (Index of 
Average  Earnings  adjusted back  from 
1963  by  reference to indices of 
average wages  and  salaries) 
103% 
141% 
94% 
112% 
86% 
106% 
84% 
71% 
77% 
62% 
46.7% 
87% 
More  recent  surveys  of doctors'  earnings have  been able  to make 
use  of  the recently introduced new  earnings  survey which gives details 
of  earnings  over  a  wider  range  than hitherto available.  The  fourth 
report of  the Review  Body  on Doctors'  and  Dentists'  Remuneration using 
statistics obtained  from  the  Inland Revenue,  from its own  enquiries  and 
making  use of  the new  earnings  survey was  able  to  compare  movements  in 
medical  professional salaries over  the  period  1960  - 1972  with movements 
in salaries of  similar level.  The  technique was  to calculate the 
percentile of  income  distribution in which particular grades of doctor 
or dentist figured  in 1972,  and  then  to  compare  movements  in the earnings 
of  each grade  of doctors  and  dentists with movements  in that percentile 
in the period since  1960  - 1961.  Table  12  below gives  the  findings  of 
the review body. 
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CORRESPONDING  PERCENTILES  (Indices  1960  - 1961  =  100) 
Corresponding Percentile 
Earnings April  1972  April  1972 
Amount  £  Index  Percentile  Index 
House  Officer  (minimum)  1,749  259  50th  222 
(maximum)  2,025  245  50th  222 
Senior House  Officer  (minimum)  2,280  207  25th  223 
Registrar  (minimum)  2,634  211  25th  223 
Senior registrar  (minimum)  3,120  208  lOth  216 
(rtn point)  3,714  206  lOth  216 
Consultant  (minimum)  4,836  190  2.5th  203 
(maximum)  7,350  188  1.5th  200 
(with c  award)  8,742  188  1st  195 
General Medical Practitioner  5,575  249  5th  216 
General  Dental Practitioner  5,050  210  5th  216 
In summary  we  can say that the medical  profession,  or at least the 
senior branches of it, have  seen their incomes  grow  very much  in line 
with comparable  incomes  in recent years.  The  profession appears  to have 
done  better than many  other professions over  the  same  period.  That it 
is a  profession very  largely remunerated  by  the  State and  not  by  private 
practice shows  that official control over earnings  does  not necessarily 
mean  that these will grow  less fast  than would  otherwise have  been the 
case. 
9.  Conclusions 
Data on  professional earnings is incomplete  and  it is impossible  to 
get as full  a  picture as  one  would  like of  the changes  in professional 
250 incomes  over recent years.  The  data is also very variable with at one 
extreme  the  comprehensive  and  regular  information provided  by  the  Royal 
Institute of British Architects  about  the earnings  of  its members  and  at 
tne  other  the virtual absence  of  any  information about  the earnings  of 
accountants.  However,  it has  been possible  to put  together  a  substantial 
amount  of  information from different  sources  and  to get  an  impression, 
albeit imperfect,  of  changes  in professional  incomes  in recent years. 
In the main,  professional earnings  have  tended  to  lag behind movements 
in average  earnings.  The  two  exceptions would  appear  to be  the medical 
profession and  as  far  as  one  can  judge the  accountancy profession.  The 
first of  these depends  upon  the  government  for  the greater part of its 
income  and  the  second earns its income  in a  competitive market  with only 
one  small  area of reserved business.  In neither case  then could  one 
ascribe the rises  in incomes  to professional restrictive practices.  Of 
the  professions  which do  enjoy  some  degree  of protection the  solicitors 
appear  to  have  maintained their relative  income  vis-a-vis other workers 
whilst architects,  surveyors,  and  consulting engineers  have  seen their 
incomes  rise less fast  than the national average.  Estate agents  who 
enjoy no  legal privileges whatsoever  have  seen their earnings as  a  body 
rise but  this was  largely due  to  an exceptional three years  at  the start 
of  the 1970's. 
Control  over  professional  charges  is difficult and  as  the  example 
of  solicitors  shows  is likely to  be  avoided.  Any  policing system to 
prevent  avoidance  would  be very costly.  Further given the  range  of 
services provided  by  most  professionals  any control over  charges which 
was  enforced would  probably  lead  to  some  services being more  profitable 
than others  and  to  some  practitioners declining  to  accept  the  less 
251 profitable types  of work.  This  would,  in many  cases,  be  serious.  Any 
attempt at unit pricing would  in general  be  impossible  given  the infinite 
variability of professional  services. 
There  would  seem  to be  three ways  in which  the  state might  seek to 
influence professional earnings without  becoming  embroiled  in a  mass  of 
detailed and  vitually unenforceable  legislation.  Firstly where  earnings 
are  derived  from  a  scale of  charges  as  in the  case  of  the professions of 
the  land  the state could  impose  maximum  percentage charges.  This  was 
done  until  1973  in the  case of  solicitors'  charges  for  conveyancing. 
A good  case could  have  been made  for  some  imposed  reduction in estate 
agents'  commissions  in the early 1970's.  This measure,  although 
apparently  simple,  is far  from  foolproof.  It is likely to  lead  to  a 
growth of  'extras'  being  charged  additionally to  the  scale fee  rather 
like the wage  drift phenomenon. 
Secondly  in the case  of  large partnerships of  lawyers,  accountants, 
and  others  one  could  apply  some  form  of  limitation of  gross profit 
margins  as  has  been done  successfully with trade  in goods.  This  would 
not  be without its problems  and  would  need  careful definition of what 
was  profit, hitherto undistinguished  from  income  in partnerships. 
However,  the modern  large professional partnerships  increasingly resemble 
large companies  and  much  of  the  surplus available for distribution among 
the partners is more  in the nature of  a  profit earned  from capital 
employed  rather than  income  from  the exercise of  the partners particular 
professional skill.  There  is  some  evidence  of  economies  of  scale in 
services which points to  the  highest  incomes  being earned  in the  larger 
partnerships.  Also  in some  areas  the  larger  firms  have  an influence 
over  the fees  obtainable by  the whole  profession.  There would  thus 
252 be  some  hope  that if one  could  influence their charges  one  would  also 
affect  the charges  of others. 
This  line of attack is a  possibility but it too is not without its 
problems.  In particular it would  be  important not  to apply  such a 
drastic limitation of profits that all benefit of  large partnerships 
was  lost and  in consequence  there was  a  return to  smaller firms. 
Finally less  immediate  but more  hopeful  perhaps  in the  long run 
the authorities could examine  existing professional restrictions and 
where  these were  found  to be  unnecessary make  suitable changes.  And  if 
earnings were  regarded  as  too  high steps could be  taken to increase the 
supply of  resources  into the profession.  A tendancy  toward  such actions 
has  begun  in the U.K.  in the last few  years.  If detailed official 
control over professional earnings is very difficult then at least one 
can try to get  the market  to work. 
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C 0  N C L U S  I  0  N 
In the last few  chapters  we  have dealt with the way  in which 
inflation has manifested itself in particular sectors of the economy, 
and  with the way  in which  incomes  policies - or  lack thereof - have 
impinged  upon  the functioning of those particular sectors.  However, 
we  began  this study with an  account  of the inflationary process from  the 
point of view  of the economy  as  a  whole.  In that  introduction we  stressed 
the macroeconomic  nature of the phenomenon  and  also had  a  good  deal to say 
about  its international character in a  world  of fixed  exchange rates.  The 
latter point is particularly important  in the context  of the  E.E.~ which 
is still aiming,  albeit on  a  longer than originally envisaged time horizon, 
at establishing a  monetary  union. 
It is yital that,  when  looking at the details of inflation as dealt 
with in the bulk of this study,  the reader does  not  lose sight of the 
way  in which  the details fit together  into an  overall picture.  We  have 
seen hints of the way  in which matters hang  together  in individual chapters, 
but it is worthwhile devoting  a  few  pages  of our  concluding  chapter to 
making  the principal  linkages that have  emerged  in our work  more  explicit. 
It will be convenient to deal  with two  sets of questions  separately. 
First we  will  look  at the way  in which  individual  sectors are linked 
together from  the point of view  of the generation of changes  in the overall 
level of incomes  and  prices;  second  we  will discuss certain issues 
concerning the determination of the structure of relative incomes  and  prices, 
about  the effects of inflation upon  the distribution of real  income  that 
emerge  from  our work.  Of  course the two  sets of questions are intertwined 
in practice,  and  we  keep  them  separate here solely for  purposes of 
expositional clarity. 
From  the point of view of the progress over time of the overall  level 
of prices and  incomes,  the important  linkages are those that lie between 
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(Chapter  4),  the effects of taxes  on  the inflation rate are to a  degree 
ambiguous.  Tax  increases do  seem  to produce  incentives towards  wage 
increases  and  hence  put upward  pressure on  prices from  the supply side; 
but  they also tend  to dampen  demand  and  hence  exert downward  pressure from 
the demand  side.  Be  that  as it may,  a  particular structure of taxation 
and  government  expenditure will  imply a  particular surplus  or deficit in 
the budget  of the central  government,  a  deficit whose  financing must  have 
implications for the financial  system.  It is here that specific policies 
towards  certain sectors of the  economy  impinge  with particular force on  the 
overall  inflationary process.  We  have  seen in Chapter 3  that there have 
been  times  when  the banking  system has  been acutely embarrassed by  high 
profits.  This  embarrassment  has  combined  with a  natural  reluctance on  the 
part of central  government  to see the interest rates at which it has to 
borrow rise to put downward  pressure on  interest rates.  Such  pressure 
has  not  of course kept  rates  from  rising but  they have not  in recent years 
risen by  nearly as  much  as  orthodox  economic  theory would  have  led one  to 
expect.  Nominal  interest rates have not,  on  the whole,  been high  enough 
to yield a  positive real return to  lenders  for  several years. 
Now  the  two  factors  just mentioned  are not  the only ones  putting 
pressure on  interest rates.  We  have  discussed  (Chapter  7)  the role of 
building societies in financing  the purchase of owner  occupied housing. 
It has,  and  remains,  government  policy regardless of political party to 
keep  such  lending rates  low  in the  (as  we  have  argued)  mistaken belief that 
this will  reduce the cost of owner  occupied  housing.  But  of course 
building societies must  compete,  at least on  the margin,  with other 
institutions for  funds,  so that it is impossible for their rates to be held 
down  without  downward  pressure being  exerted on  the general  level of interest 
rates.  Policy towards  wages  and  prices in the nationalised industries is 
also  important  here,  for as  we  have  seen in Chapter  5 the last two  or three 
255 years have  seen this sector making  losses,  partly as  a  result of controls, 
both formal  and  informal,  imposed  upon  their pricing policies.  Borrowing 
by  public corporations has  not,  as has been  shown,  been  an  important 
contributor to domestic credit  expansion  in Britain,  but subsidies paid 
to them  by  the central  government  now  make  a  substantial  contribution to 
the central government  borrowing  requirement. 
Now  the conclusions to be drawn  from  all this are straightforward. 
Policies designed to keep  certain costs and  prices down  have had  consequences 
in the monetary  sector because,  as  is well  known,  an  expanding  money  supply 
is needed  to relieve upward  pressure on  interest rates when  government 
borrowing  is increasing.  One  does  not have  to believe that monetary  expansion 
is the sole cause of inflation to recognise the problem here.  If one  merely 
agrees  that monetary  expansion is one  factor that puts upward  pressure on 
the price level,  then it is apparent that the policies which  we  have been 
discussing in the last few  paragraphs have  an  inherent  contradiction built 
into them.  What  might  seem  like a  good  way  of holding prices down  when 
looked  at  from  the point of view  of one  particular sector of the economy 
turns  out  to have monetary  consequences  that will work  in exactly the opposite 
direction when  the linkages between  sectors of the economy  are examined. 
Let  us  now  turn to the question of the effects of inflation and  such 
on  income  distribution.  Here  the links between  the various aspects ofthe 
work  reported above  are much  less obvious,  but they do  nevertheless exist. 
First,  and  most  clearly, it is interesting that of all the professional groups 
whose  incomes  were  examined  (Chapter  8)  that which  most  clearly had  benefited 
from  inflation and  completely avoided restraining  influences of incomes 
policies was  estate agents.  This  stems directly from  the house price boom 
of 1969-73  whose  causes were  analysed  in Chapter 7·  But  of course estate 
agents were  not the only beneficiaries of this phenomenon.  As  has  already 
been  shown  existing owner  occupiers received substantial windfall gains 
256 during this period.  But  this has  not been the only source of income 
redistribution in recent  years.  To  the extent that nationalised industries 
have  been  subsidised to keep  down  their prices, this represents a  redistribution 
of income  towards  their users,  a  redistribution which  in the passenger 
transport sector  (cf.  Chapter  6)  at least seems  to have  been regressive. 
Overall the picture is much  less clear,  but  we  have  noted the view  of Glyn 
and  Sutcliffe that such  subsidies have  largely gone  to increase profits in 
the private sector of industry. 
Now  incomes  policies in Britain up  to the mid-1960s  did not have any 
particular distributional aims,  but their more  recent versions,  in addition 
to attempting to control the overall inflation rate,  have tried to achieve 
the subsidiary goal of attempting to better the lot of the lower paid worker.1 
Clearly,  to the extent that the end  product of certain policies have been 
as  outlined  in the last  paragraph~ this objective has  not been fulfilled. 
Again,  we  see that there has  been  a  certain element  of self-contradictoriness 
about  policy as  far  as  its effects have  been  concerned,  whatever may  have 
been its intentions.  However,  there can be no  doubt  that one  of the most 
serious  social  consequences  of inflation is its effect on  the distribution 
o~ income  and  wealth,  and  there can be  little disagreement that government 
might  reasonably have  policies towards  the effects of inflation on 
distribution~ policies which  have  just as  much  right to the label "incomes 
policies" as do  the wage  and  price control mechanisms,  both formal  and  informal, 
that are more  usually associated with the phrase.  What  form  might  these 
policies take  ? 
The  second  chapter of our study dealt with the question of measuring 
profit income  in an  inflationary environment,  and  concluded that inflation 
could  severely distort the usual  accounting measures  of profit towards  which 
incomes  policies might  be  directed.  But  it is also true that taxationis 
based  upon  accounting measures  of profit so  that inflation must  distort the 
1  For  a  discussion of this see R.Ward  and  G.Zis:  Manchester School,  March  1973. 
257 structure of taxes on  profits as well.  Moreover  it is not  just the meaning 
of profits, but of other categories of income  that are affected by  inflation. 
In  short,  the whole  structure of taxation is distorted by  inflation.  This 
must  affect the distribution of after tax income,  and,  if it is reasonable 
to presume  that taxation codes  have  initially been drawn  up  in order to 
provide a  socially desirable distribution of post-tax income,  then inflation 
must  be having undesired  consequences.  In  an  inflationary environment 
then,  there is a  strong case for  so designing the tax structure that price 
level movements  do  not alter its real  consequences.  In  short,  it seems  to 
us  that an  indexed  tax structure would  make  a  desirable component  of an 
incomes  policy designed not  so  much  to  stop inflation as to mitigate its 
consequences. 
One  could  go  further than this.  We  have  seen how,  as far as the 
overall control of inflation is concerned,  the policy of maintaining interest 
rates at artificially low  levels has  been  self-defeating.  However,  we  have 
also noted that certain groups  in the community  - notably owner  occupiers 
of housing  - have  actually been  able to gain as  a  result of this policy. 
They  have  gained to a  large extent at the expense  of the small  savers 
who  make  up  the bulk of building society depositors who  have  had  to be 
content with significantly negative real rates of return on  their savings. 
Such  small  savers have  thus  lost as  a  result of inflation and  a  regressive 
redistribution has  taken place.  Again it should  be possible to dealWith 
this problem by making  available to  small  savers  an  index  linked security 
as  an  alternative outlet for their savings.  The  existence of such a 
security would  not  only help with a  distributional problem produced  by 
inflation but would  also make  some  contribution to controlling the inflationary 
process.  Private savings  institutions would  have  to raise their borrowing 
rates to compete  with such  a  security and  hence  would  have to raise their 
lending rates.  This would  at least mitigate an  important  source of 
inflationary pressure whose  influence we  have  already analysed. 
258 It would  be tempting  to argue that similar index linking should be 
enforced by  legislation on  wage  contracts and  such,  but  we  can see no 
case for doing  so.  In  Britain,  at least,  wage  bargainers are already 
free to make  index  linked contracts if they so  wish.  We  can  see no 
reason for compelling parties to a  bargain to include in its clauses 
what  they would  not  include voluntarily,  but  equally we  would  object to 
legislation preventing  such  clauses being  included if both parties so 
wished.  Now  this is not  the place to go  into an  extensive discussion 
of index  linking.  There  is not  space to do  so  here,  but  enough,  it is 
hoped,  has been  said to  show  how  this particular policy device is 
interlinked with the subject matter of this study. 
259 CHAP. 
CHAP. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
I 
II 
CHAP.  III 
2. 
CHAP. 
1. 
2. 
6. 
1· 
CHAP. 
1. 
2. 
IV 
v 
DETAILED  CONTENTS 
Introduction 
The  Measurement  of Business Profits 
Introduction 
Some  Alternative Measures  of Profit 
~ 
1 
11 
13 
17 
A Comparison of Accounting Profit and Economic 
Income  35 
A Comparison of Accounting Profit and Economic 
Profit  52 
Conclusion  63 
Financial Sector Controls,  Profitability and 
Inflation  67 
The  Relationship between Profitability and 
Interest Rates  in the Financial Sector  70 
The  Effects of Alternative  Methods  of 
Controlling Finanical Sector Profits upon  the 
Rate  of Inflation and Resource  Allocation  91 
Conclusions  96 
Fiscal Policy and Inflation 
Introduction 
Taxes  as a  Determinant  of Inflation 
Developement  of the  Case  against Taxation 
A Critique 
Taxation and Direct Controls 
Effects of Inflation on  the Tax  System 
Conclusions 
Footnotes 
References 
Prices and Incomes  Policy and the U.K. 
Nationalised Industries in the Post-War 
Period 
Introduction 
Government  Policy 
260 
98 
99 
100 
102 
108 
112 
115 
119 
120 
121 
124 
125 
126 5· 
6. 
1· 
CHAP.  VI 
CHAP.  VII 
CHAP.  VIII 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4· 
5· 
6. 
1· 
8. 
9· 
CHAP.  IX 
Machinery  and  Implementation of Policy 
Wage  and Price Inflation in Manufacturing and 
Nationalised Industry,  195D-73 
The  Incidence of Prices and  Incomes  Policy 
The  Effects of Price Restraint 
Conclusions 
Annex  and Notes 
Notes 
Transport 
Inflation and the Housing Market 
Professional Earnings 
Introduction 
Architects'  Fees 
Quantity Surveyors'  Earnings 
Consulting Engineers'  Earnings 
Estate Agents'  Earnings 
Solicitors' Earnings 
Accountants'  Earnings 
Medical  Professional Earnings 
Conclusions 
Conclusion 
261 
!!Y! 
133 
138 
150 
154 
171 
173 
179 
182 
203 
223 
224 
228 
231 
232 
235 
239 
244 
247 
250 
254 Salgs- og abonnementskontorer · Vertriebsbiiros  ·  Sales Offices 
Bureaux de vente  ·  Uffici di vendita  · Verkoopkantoren 
Belgique - Belgii 
Moniteur beige - Be/gisch Staatsblad 
Rue de Louvain 40-42-
Leuvenseweg 40-42 
1000 Bruxelles - 1000 Brussel 
Tel. 5120026 
CCP 000-2005502-27 
Postrekening 000-2005502-27 
Sous-dep6t - Agentschap: 
Librairie europeenne - Europese 
Boekhandel 
Rue de Ia Loi 244 - Wetstraat 244 
1040 Bruxelles- 1040 Brussel 
Denmark 
J. H. Schultz - Boghandel 
M0ntergade 19 
1116 K0benhavn K 
Tel.141i95 
Girokonto 1195 
Deutschland (BR) 
Verlag Bundesanzeiger 
5 Koln 1 - Breite StraBe - Postfach 
108006 
Tel. (0221) 210348 
(Fernschreiber: Anzeiger Bonn 
08882595) 
Postscheckkonto 83400 Koln 
France 
Service de vente en  France des publica-
tions des Communautes europeennes 
Journal officiel 
26, rue Desaix 
75732 Paris-Cedex 15 
Tel. (1)5786139- CCP Paris 23-96 
Ireland 
Stationery Office 
Beggar's Bush 
Dublin 4 
Tel. 688433 
ltalia 
Librena dello Stato 
Piazza G. Verdl10 
00198 Roma- Tel. (6) 8508 
Telex 62008 
CCP 1/2640 
Agenzie: 
00187 Roma  -Via  XX Settembre 
(Palazzo Ministero 
del tesoro) 
20121  M1lano  - Galleria 
Vittorio Emanuele Ill 
Tel. 806406 
Grand-Duche 
de Luxembourg 
Office des publications officielles 
des Communautes europeennes 
5, rue du Con•merce 
Boite postale 1003 - Luxembourg 
Tel. 490081  - CCP 191-90 
Compte courant banca~re: 
BIL 8-109/6003/300 
Nederland 
Staatsdrukkerij- en uitgeverijbedrijf 
Christoffel Plantijnstraat, 's-Gravenhage 
Tel. (070) 814511 
Postgiro 425300 
United Kingdom 
H. M. Stationery Office 
P.O. Box569 
London SE1  9NH 
Tel. (01) 9286977, ext. 365 
United States of America 
European Community Information 
Service 
2100 M Street, N.W. 
Suite 707 
Washington, D.C. 20037 
Tel. 2965131 
Schwelz - Suisse - Svizzera 
Librairie Payot 
6, rue Grenus 
1211 Geneve 
Tel. 318950 
CCP 12-236 Geneve 
Sverige 
Librairie C.E. Fritze 
2, Fredsgaten 
Stockholm 16 
Post G~ro 193, Bank Giro 73/4015 
Espana 
Libreria Mundi-Prensa 
Castell6 37 
Madrid 1 
Tel. 2754655 
Andre Iande  ·  Andere Linder  Other countries  ·  Autres pays  ·  Altri paesl  ·  Andere Ianden 
Kontoret for De europeeiske Feellesskabers off1cielle Publikationer · Amt fur amtllche Veroffentlichungen der Europaischen Gemeinschaften · Office for Off1cial 
Publications of the  European Communities · Office des publications off1c1elles  des  Communautes europeennes  · Uff1cio  delle pubbllcazioni uff1ciali delle 
Comunita europee ·Bureau voor officiele publikat1es der Europese Gemeenschappen 
Luxembourg  5, rue du Commerce  Bolte postale 1003  Tel. 490081  ·  CCP 191-90  Compte courant banca1re BIL  8-109/6003/300 FB 200,- Dkr  31,30  DM  13,50  F F 24,70  Lit. 3400 
OFFICE  FOR  OFFICIAL  PUBLICATIONS  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES 
Bolte posta le l 003  - Luxembourg 
F I.  13,80  8664 
7020 